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ABSTRACT
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PLAY FROM HOMER TO HEGEL
SEPTEMBER 1996
MECHTHILD E. NAGEL, B.A., ALBERT LUDWIGS UNIVERSITAT
FRE I BURG
,
GERMANY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
Play has undergone a "process of abjection" in western
philosophical thinking: It is considered to be repulsive
and loathsome, yet it is also fascinating and desirable,
that is, the more reason disavows play and unseriousness,
the more it desires to incorporate them. Even though play
has to be denounced, philosophers seem unaware that their
own activity is inherently playful. In my dissertation I
trace a malediction of play in western metaphysics to
Aristotle who eclipses tragic, Dionysian play in his
ethical and political theory. In the archaic ludic
beginnings of Homer and Hesiod, play is not yet put in
binary opposition to seriousness; this conceptual shift
occurs in the pre-Socratic classical Greek period. While
Plato maligns certain mimetic practices in his infamous
critigue of the poets, I aver that he does not turn against
the Dionysian aspects of play. This is clearly shown in
his uses of masks and mimicry, in his mockery of the
sophists and in his endorsement of divine inspiration.
VI
^ th© Aristotelian thread of the malediction
of play in Kant's and Schiller's discussions of the concept
and function of play. Although Kant parts from Aristotle
in important ways in The Critique of Judgment , e.g. with
the modern conception of the artist as not merely being a
follower but also a creator of standards, I argue that Kant
still remains committed to an Apollonian, rationalistic
play of the imagination. In this dissertation, Kant serves
as a transition figure between Aristotle and Hegel. In
Nietzsche's thought, we see an important ludic turn, as
argued by many play theoreticians. However, I argue that
this reversal has been paved by Hegel's Phenomenology of
Spirit . In good Heraclitean terminology, truth becomes a
"Bacchanalian whirl," an interplay of drunken frenzy and
calm repose, i.e. of Dionysian and Apollonian impulses.
This trope serves as a key category for the interpretation
of Hegel's play theory. Hence, I will argue against
critics, who narrowly view Hegel's dialectic as carrying a
notion of 'resentment' and a 'spirit of gravity.'
Vll
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Play is an elusive term which defies all
conceptualization, in part because we are already so
familiar with it. One way of describing it is by employing
Wittgenstein's concept of 'family resemblance'. Play
occupies the role of the "abject"^: play has to be
denounced as unworthy, childish, irrational, superficial
activity, yet, philosophers are fascinated by it. In my
ideology critique of a malediction of play I am interested
in addressing normative questions, such as what gets
excluded and who is not allowed to play.
In this dissertation play is mostly discussed as an
abstract concept, where I consider its ontological status,
e.g. play being opposed to seriousness. I am not talking
about playing games, sport, other cultural activities per
se; but only in so far they elucidate something, as
examples (e.g. works of classic dramaturgists, such as
tragedy, comedy, epos) . In this context, I investigate
playing with masks. I prefer to use play as an attribute
rather than as a noun, i.e., I want to bring attention to
the exhibit of a playful attitude while philosophizing
(about the good life, first principles, etc)
.
I also look
at play and power issues, because I want to differentiate
between agonistic ways of playing and cooperative, non-
competitive ways of engaging playfully with others. Yet, I
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will also show that it is difficult to maintain such a
distinction especially in the case of Socrates, who chooses
a combatative style when engaging with sophist foes and a
more agreeable style when engaging with his equals or
adolescent interlocutors.
Playfulness as a particular aesthetic attitude of the
self also has ethical importance for the Greeks. After all
Aristotle's eudaimonia (happiness) is an end in itself, the
ultimate telos of the human condition. Only a philosopher
is properly predisposed to play, he enjoys proper
seriousness and disdain for decadence. A certain leisurely
attitude is needed to engage in theoria.
I will also look at the play of the divine and the
human in the ancient and modern world. In the Hellenic
epoch the play of the satyr (masking the ludic^ god
Dionysus) dominates; gods play with the human fate. Hegel
calls the play of the gods comic, that of humans tragic
(ethical life). Early (religious) Hegel, influenced by
Boehme, calls absolute spirit tragic.^ The modern
worldview, especially that of Kant and Schiller, invokes
the play of the self, the play of the imagination. The
artist, the genius, creates the aesthetic standard.
Principles such as creativity, freedom and autonomy
preoccupy the Enlightenment player whereas these concepts
are certainly alien to the Aristotelian organic worldview.
In all play discourses (from Homer to Hegel) I will
especially look at the interplay of Apollonian
2
(logocentric) and Dionysian (tragic, Bacchanalian) forces.
I rely on Nietzsche's terminology (from Birth of Tragedy '^ .
because these notions seem to best describe the ethical and
^ssthetic dimensions of play . These play impulses are not
merely in binary opposition (in the play of the pre-
Socratic and again in Hegel)
,
rather, they should be
thought of as being intertwined dialectically in a unity of
opposites. The Apollonian principle, as the princioium
individuat ionis
, makes the Dionysian bearable for us.'*
In addition to using these Nietzschean principles, I
interrogate the 'jargon of authenticity' in play theories,
e.g. with respect to ethical polarization and an
ontological malediction of play. For instance we can look
how an adult's play is "play out" (in the sense of
ausspielen ) adult's against child's play.
What implications does this project have for
philosophy? (1) As a (postmodern) gesture against the
modernity project, play (as free play) has been used to
bring about the death of man (death of the subject). (2)
Play is important for the analysis of the mind/body
problem. One usually distinguishes pre-Socratic thought as
pre-rational and Socratic thought as rational, logocentric.
I hold that the introduction of play/seriousness in pre-
Socratic thought anticipates the problem of dualism.
Maligning play leads to an ontological maligning of the
body.
3
My approach is such that I develop a genealogy of play
within western philosophy and analyze how play has come to
the Other of reason. What is novel about my approach is
how I cast Nietzsche; he is not really a protagonist
because I mostly critique/dismantle Nietzsche's analysis
with his own tools and thus in a way attempt to go beyond
Nietzsche. Yet, I still rely on Nietzsche's oppositional
pair of the Apollonian and Dionysian in characterizing play
in ancient Greek and modern German thought. My main thesis
is that one can trace a malediction of play to Aristotle,
not Plato. This should lead to a re-evaluation of Plato's
philosophy (aesthetic theory) as "logocentric". The
tragic, Dionysian play becomes eclipsed by Aristotle, not
by Plato.
I am interested in studying the effects of the shift
from a play-affirming perspective to a disapproving ethical
attitude towards play. Much has been written about this
shift, but mostly in respect to Plato's introduction of art
as mimesis and Socrates's critique of Hellenic tragedy. In
light of this shift of emphasis it has been argued—by
Nietzsche in particular--that Socratic (Apollonian) irony
and rationality triumph over a Heraclitean (Dionysian,
tragic) notion of play. Many play theoreticians (e.g.
Fink, 1960; Heidemann, 1968; Kutzner, 1975; and Spariosu,
1989) simply follow the lead of Nietzsche's attack on
Socrates, displayed in The Birth of Tragedy . With this
work Nietzsche initiated the Mimes isstreit , the persisting
4
*-®^t]Tov©irsy which has iramif ications for play thoory with
respect to Plato and Socrates
' Apollonian attitudes towards
mimesis and paidia . Following Nietzsche, Eugen Fink avers
that play and (poetic) mimesis are contiguous concepts, and
in his harsh critique of the poets Plato succeeds in
demystifying ( entzaubern ) play, relegating play to a lesser
ontological status of 'mere' play, that is a play which is
not serious. However, as classical philologists have
noted, this ludic (i.e. playful) shift, positing the
oppositional pair of play/seriousness, predates Plato; in
Herodotos ' writings, for example, there are many references
to play as being unreal (a mere jest)
,
harmless (a mere
child's play) and a relaxing activity. Play is thus
contrasted with spoude
, which characterizes the serious
activity of the adult.
^
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: In
the second chapter I will discuss the conception of play in
the ancient Greek world, ranging from Homer to
Aristophanes. I will scrutinize the approaches of those
play theoreticians who have systematized play/power
discourses of the Greeks using the categories of ancient
(proto-logo-rational) and classic/attic (rational)
—
following Derrida/Heidegger. One of those interpretations
differentiates between archaic/agonistic play and
classic/median play where Hesiod serves as a nodal figure
with his fable on the hawk and nightingale. Furthermore it
argues that in Hesiod's writings competitive values are
5
displaced by a rational, cooperative fair play, which no
longer glamorizes the warrior class. in this critique (of
the Homeric world)
,
what is conjured up are images of wild,
out of control, heroes (and gods) who play senselessly like
untamed young innocent children; 'might makes right' is the
rule of the game. This interpretation seems plausible, but
I have tried to give a more ambivalent, less oppositional
reading of the Homeric epic. Also, I have trouble
conceptualizing the Pre-socratic thought as proto- or pre-
rational ; to think of Homer, Hesiod, Heraclitus as
operating outside the confines of the logos is a
problematic romanticization
.
In the third chapter I show that Plato who is thought
of as the philosopher breaking with (tragic) play is
actually served up as a protagonist against Aristotle. Of
course, this is a controversial claim, since Plato ranks
mimesis (=the art of the poets) as three times removed from
the truth. Also mimesis is demoted to the status of 'mere
play' (paidia tinas ) and not to be taken seriously.
However, I argue that for Plato, in the right moment
( kairos ) play and seriousness are contiguous (cf. Agathon's
eros-speech in the Symposium )
.
In the fourth chapter, I will explore Aristotle's
strategy to eclipse the Dionysian impulse: Play (paidia)
becomes the other (of reason) and only leisure ( schol^) is
valuable for philosophical contemplation. Paidia is
condemned in the ethics and 'put to use' in the Politics.
6
Thus Aristotle stresses the instrumental value of paidia
for children's and young men's education.
With the fifth chapter I finally turn to modern play
representatives. I choose Kant and Schiller, in order to
show that both continue to some extent the Aristotelian
validation of the Apollonian and also abandon this path in
their conception of the aesthetic-anthropological
perspectives of play. E.g. I shall criticize Schiller's
Enlightenment view of the play-drives, where he prefers a
transcendental play-drive to a materialistic one. Given
this hierarchy, female subjectivities and other subaltern
subjects seem to drop out of the play discourse.
In my last chapter, I argue that Hegel's Phenomenology
of Spirit pre-empts Nietzsche's "ludic turn", by giving
equal importance to the Dionysian and Apollonian play
impulses. Rationalistic (Apollonian) dichotomies get
deconstructed. Hegel compares Truth with a "Bacchanalian
whirl" which is the interplay of drunken frenzy and calm
repose. I argue that this metaphor of the revel is clearly
Heraclitean in origin and I take the trope to be a central
category for the interpretation of Hegel's play theory.
Hence, I will argue against Deleuze, who narrowly views
Hegel's dialectic as carrying a notion of ' ressentiment
'
and a 'spirit of gravity.'
In my dissertation I will limit my discussion to play
theories up to and including Hegel. So, I will only
briefly note that, after Hegel, play discourses begin to
7
proliferate; we see a discussion of play and developments
of play theory in both left and right Hegelian tendencies.
Nietzsche is the first play theorist to expose play as the
Other of philosophical discourse, and he proceeds to affirm
the Dionysian (frenzied, irrational) aspects of play (cf.
Zarathustra
. Gay Science ^
,
Finally, I wish to address the question why I use
Aristotle as a thread, a guideline. I want to show not
only his influences on' "anti"-play thinkers (Kant) but also
on play theoreticians such as Huizinga who sets up rules
for what counts as good life and good play. For Huizinga,
who follows the logic of authenticity, certain forms of
play have to be rejected (such as professional sports,
playing for money, for material benefits) . Thus in play
theories which are under Aristotle's spell, Apollonian play
wins out over Dionysian play.
My dissertation tries to use the notion of play to
deconstruct the dis-ease of philosophers of discussing what
they pre-judge as objectionable or suspect subjects. At
the same time, I attempt to avoid an idealization of a
certain type of play to be favored over other suspect ones.
This is one of the reasons why I prefer to think of play in
terms of "family resemblance" rather than giving a
coherent, concise definition of what the term might mean in
my project.
8
Notes
1.
This term is borrowed from Kristeva (1982); of. also
Young (1990)
.
2.
'Ludic' is used descriptively as a technical term
for ' playful .
'
3.1 am indebted to Loren Goldner on this point.
4. On this point see Ackermann (1990).
5. On this point, cf. Hermann Gundert (1965), p.l90.
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CHAPTER II
TRAGIC PLAY IN THE PRESOCRATIC WORLD
Es
—
1st ein Spiel, nehmt ' s nicht zu pathetisch
, und vor
Allem nicht moralischl
Friedrich Nietzsche Philosophie im traaischen Zeitalter der
Griechen . KSA 1,832.6-14
Introduction
In this chapter, I will discuss the origins of the
logos of play in Western metaphysics. In the ancient
Hellenic world, play in its general sense refers to an
autotelic activity, i.e. an activity engaged in for its own
sake; at the same time play may be an act which is
"worthless" in a functional sense and characterized as
futile, nonserious, unproductive, ignorant, and childish.
In the archaic and classical Hellenic periods, there
is no single Greek word which covers all aspects of the
English term "play" (as in playing games, theater play,
play as opposed to work, etc.) . Besides the obvious terms
such as paidia and paignion we have to consider other words
as well (e.g. agon . athlos . eris, tuche . ajnanke, charme ,
schgle, diagoge , paideia , mimesis ) . ^ We can however
observe a shift in emphasis. Whereas paidia , i.e. child's
play, is absent in Homer, it gains prominence in the works
of the fifth and fourth centuries.^ In interpreting the
use of the various meanings of 'play', I will draw on
Nietzsche's aesthetic differentiation of Apollonian and
10
Dionysian elements; these elements serve as analytic tools
to explore the playfulness in the archaic life-world.
In examining play in the archaic Greek period, I will
begin with a discussion of Homer and Hesiod. Second,
Heraclitus will be served up as one of their shrewdest
critics, charging that both of them promote superstition
and sentimentality by invoking a mythic, heroic past. In
critically reflecting on the archaic tradition Heraclitus
figures as a forerunner of Socrates. He differs from
Socrates in making tragic play central to his thought. In
the final section of this chapter, I will look at the
antagonists qua Geoenspieler , namely, Euripides and
Aristophanes as representative poets of the Classical
period. Since I share Michel Foucault and Judith Butler's
suspicion of "origins," I wish to concentrate on the above
mentioned dramaturgists and Heraclitus as Beispiele . i.e.
as examples in the Hegelian sense of "playing alongside"
( beiherspielen ) , for my purposes here—not in order to
demonstrate that one can pinpoint a particular idea which
"originates" a school of thought on play. Rather, I am
interested in studying the effects of the shift from a
play-affirming perspective to a decisively disapproving
ethical attitude towards play. Much has been written about
this shift, but mostly with respect to Plato's introduction
of art as mimesis and the eclipse of Hellenic tragedy in
the fifth century. Ludic shifts occur in the works of
Hesiod and Aristophanes. By ridiculing Euripides's tragic
11
"feminized" dialogues in the Frogs . Aristophanes is uneasy
about retaining the Dionysian traces—which are still
present in Euripides's Bacchae—even though Aristophanes
reminisces about the return of an eminent tragic poet, such
as Aeschylus. I contend that there is a lack of moralism
in Euripides's tragic play world and representation of
reality, which I wish to contrast with Aristophanes's harsh
moralist attack of Euripides's naturalist representation in
the Frogs. Hence, Aristophanes's successful critique
amounts to a decisive ludic shift: Apollonian logos
dominates over Dionysian frenzy. Pace Nietzsche,
Aristophanes's comedies--not Euripides's tragedies--induce
the demise of the Dionysian play.
In the following sections, I will focus on the
"beginnings" of ludic, i.e. playful, conceptions of human
existence and will analyze the metaphors of play in Homer's
epics, in Hesiod's poems and in Heraclitus' fragments.
The Archaic Play of Homer
Homer's ludic world is full of uninhibited exuberance
and violence. Agonistic play dominates—the rule of the
game "might makes right." Homer's heroes carry out war-
games ( aristeia ) , battling for life or death; their motto:
"Always be best and excel others", ( II
.
6,208)^ Homer's
play is, above all, a (deadly) play of the archaic noble,
aided and abetted by the quarrelsome gods; thus it is a
play that hangs on fate/chance, depending on the particular
12
divin© int©rvent ion
. There is no self—chosen rational
kairos (a favorable time—to engage an opponent and come
out victorious)
. The gods are the puppetmasters
,
as the
Stranger tells us glumly in Plato's Laws . This divine game
controls the horizon (fate) of the player. It is not up to
a heroic noble (Achilles) or an innocent princess
(Nausicaa) to determine the conditions or rules of their
game. I do not want to suggest, however, that this play
that seems to be prescribed for the heroes (and others) is
always already "innocent" or ignorant, i.e. devoid of
reason
.
Spariosu (1991) contrasts Homer's archaic concept of
having power over someone with the so-called "median"
(cooperative, non-agonistic) notion of power, invoked by
Hesiod, who prides himself on defending the victim's
perspective. Hesiod's play thus radically alters the
nature of play from an agonistic one, whose emphasis simply
lies on dominating others by any means necessary, to a
rational notion of play, i.e. "fair play." (cf. 1991, p.8)
Spariosu suggests that it is necessary to supplement the
Nietzschean aesthetic principles (Apollonian and Dionysian)
with a different set of opposites, namely archaic vs.
median values, which better addresses the issue of power in
play. Borrowing from a famous passage of the Iliad and
drawing on Nietzsche's interpretation of the early work
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873;
hereafter, PhA )
,
he states:
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This Homeric notion of play as arbitrary, free,
and effortless movement analogous to a god's or a
child's activity becomes a philosophical
principle for
_ the first time in Heraclitus. [...]
The Homeric simile also implicitly opposes the
effortlessness and freedom of play with the
painful constraint of work. [...] Apollo's
aristeia highlights the difference between
archaic play and games of an orderly, median
nature: a god, like a child, can invent games to
amuse himself, and as such he can create an
orderly, rule-governed world ("sand-towers") ; as
soon as he gets bored, however, still playing, he
may destroy this world and start building a new
one according to different rules for no other
reason than the sheer pleasure of the game.
(1991, pp.24)
While it is plausible to address the issues of power
in playful activities in the way that Spariosu offers to
do, it is not convincing to limit, on the one hand, the
expression of agonism, of competitiveness and violence to
the archaic age and, on the other, the notion of "fair
play" to the classical age. He argues that "median values"
appear in Plato's discussion of child's play: "paidia
comes to denote not only 'children's play' but also 'play'
in general. It is the moment when philosophy separates
play from agon, that is, from violent contest and power."
(p.6) Furthermore, Spariosu does not explain why this
archaic sense of power is conspicuously absent from the
leisurely or "peaceful games" in honor of the gods in the
Iliad .
What then is the nature of play in the Homeric world?
Even though the term paidia is absent from the Homeric
epos
.
Homer does comment on children's playfulness, as
pointed out by Spariosu. Besides the famous sandtower
14
simile, he has in store more negative comments on the
inadequacy of children and by extension of women? Warriors
should not let themselves get intimidated like a feeble
child f pais aphauros ! or a woman ( II
.
7,235) and a man
should not babble nonsense as a child would do ( Od.
4,32) /
This negative portrayal of children in particular does
not explain, however, the role of Apollo, god of warfare,
who is compared to a child sweeping away the sandtower it
just created. This sandtower simile does not conjure up the
image of innocence (as modern popular child psychology
might do) but more importantly a sense of capriciousness
and reckless joy. These explanations may not have a
negative ring for the Homeric poets as they would for
Hesiod or Plato. Is this child's and god's play always
already agonistic, though? Let us take a closer look at
the passage in question. Fagles translates:
Holding formation now the Trojans rolled across [the
trench],/ Apollo heading them, gripping the awesome
storm-shield/ and he tore that Argive rampart down
with the same ease/ some boy at the seashore knocks
sand castles down--/ he no sooner builds his
playthings f athurmata l up, child's play [ nepieesin i ,
/
than he wrecks them all with hands and kicking feet,/
just for the sport of it. God of the wild cry,
Apollo
—/ so you wrecked the Achaeans ' work and drove
the men/ who had built it up with all that grief and
labor/ into headlong panic rout. ( II
.
15,360-367)
Child's play has different valences, ranging from a
derogatory interpretation of childishness (cf. "mit
kindischem Sinn")^ to a more positive interpretation as a
childlike pleasure ("in kindlicher Freude")*^ and, perhaps.
15
"in boyish sport"^ The child-like "not knowing" sport
spalls disaster though; in a moving voice the poet argues
with the god of warfare for erasing the product of toil of
the Achaeans
. Divine playful capriciousness triumphs over
human hard labor.® In this context play clearly has an
agonistic, destructive connotation. Spariosu does,
however, concede a shift from archaic to median values in
the Odyssey
, for we can observe that upon his arrival at
home Odysseus's identity changes from a warrior to a
country gentleman, (pp. 31-35)
It is certainly tempting to suggest that one era's
literature has a more violent character than another
"civilized" era^, but I contend that this is a superficial
assessment and leads to a romanticization of the epoch that
is cast as the Other. That is why I find it problematic
that in his earlier work (1989) Spariosu delineates pre-
rational and rational ludic values and— in a seemingly
Heideggerian move—suggests that Nietzsche returns to the
pre-rational play-world of Heraclitus.
In addition to describing the Homeric epos as pre-
rational, his world, his representation of reality are also
depicted as "innocent," childlike. In the following I
delineate Auerbach's analysis and offer a critique in order
to undermine this ideal of innocence. In his book Mimesis
^
The Representation of Reality in Western Literature
(1946/1974)
,
Erich Auerbach sums up the characteristic
features of Homer's writings in the following way.
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refraining from labelling the comportment of the Hellenic
and Trojan nobles as simply agonistic. This quote is taken
from the powerfully written chapter "Odysseus' Scar" in
which Auerbach contrasts Homer's representation of reality
(i.e. mimesis) with that of the Elohist of the Old
Testament
:
Delight in physical existence is everything to
[the Homeric poems]
,
and their highest aim is to
make that delight perceptible to us. Between
battles and passions, adventures and perils, they
show us hunts, banquets, palaces and shepherds'
cots, athletic contests and washing days— in
order that we may see the heroes in their
ordinary life, and seeing them so, may take
pleasure in their manner of enjoying their savory
present, a present which sends strong roots down
into social usages, landscape, and daily life.
And thus they bewitch us and ingratiate
themselves to us until we live with them in the
reality of their lives; so long as we are reading
or hearing the poems, it does not matter whether
we know that all this is only legend, "make-
believe." (p.l3)
Homer's heroes are simple. Although Auerbach refrains
from calling them innocent, he notes that they act as if
they start living their lives every morning anew and
without anguish vis-a-vis the gods— in contradistinction to
the anxiety-stricken Abraham in the Elohist 's story. The
Hellenic nobles lead a life of leisure in the archaic
society and as such lead a life 'beyond good and evil.
'
Homer paints a picture of reality that exists for its own
sake and presents no moralizing message, leading Auerbach
to the following comment: "Homer can be analyzed..., but he
cannot be interpreted." (p.l3) He concludes that Homer
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fails in conveying suspension to the reader and in painting
a more complex psychological picture of his heroes.
What does this have to do with Homer's treatment of
play and contests? I aver that while Auerbach's analysis
perhaps adequately depicts the tragic characters in the
Iliad
,
I hold (with Frankel, 1975) that the Odvssev is
imbued with a sense of humanity, of versatile human
behavior that is at the same time an inherently fateful,
tragic play. Auerbach's assessment of Homer's naturalism,
which portrays phenomena as lacking "a glimpse of unplumbed
depths", ultimately leads to a characterization of play as
being shallow, lacking a complex subjective perspective.
Needless to say, Auerbach--in good Aristotelian fashion
—
finds this image reduces humans to simpletons who just live
for no other purpose than play and contests. And all this
playful attitude towards life is non-serious. This
qualification of play is derived from Auerbach's deliberate
juxtaposition of the light and descriptive Homeric verses
with the passage of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, which is
full of seriousness, suspense and grave silence: clearly,
life is not merely about play but being towards death, (cf.
Auerbach, pp.lO) Yet, I argue that to say that Achilles
and Agamemnon cherish "childish" play is to read certain
passages of the Iliad against the current. Whenever play
is mentioned—other than descriptively, such as with
respect to sacred games and dances— it appears in form of
an admonishment, namely, not to play, to act as children do
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(Xlisd, 7,401: being childish or silly) ; the famous
exception might be the sandtower simile in Book 15
(15,361), which portrays the gods intervening in human
matters with a certain lightness—like a child, being at
ease, playing in the sand, randomly building and destroying
sandtowers
,
just for the fun of it. In fact, the contrast
between serious, struggling heroes and buffoon-like gods
could not be painted in starker colors in the Iliad .
Frankel (1975) points out that the play and laughter of the
gods is unrestrained; they exchange vulgar jokes and
rejoice at the sight of the nasty and brutish human
existence: "when men fight for life and death, the gods
join in as a joke and Zeus' heart laughs for joy at their
strife." (Frankel, p.54; cf. II
.
21,389).
In the following I will focus on the portrayal of play
and playing games in the Odyssey and argue with Auerbach's
theory that the Homeric style, elegant as it may be, lacks
a perspective of depth when it comes to describe human
interactions. Prima facie it seems that play has only
bucolic features: it is sweet (Book 23) and radiant, it
excites the gods, notably the nymphs "of field and forest"
(Book 6: Nausicaa's ball game), and imbues warriors with
delight and pleasure (Book 8: the contests at the
Phaeacians and Books 1, 17, 21 which describe the games of
the suitors at Odysseus's homestead).
None of the games described in the Odyssey can be
reduced to superficiality, innocence and self-indulgence.
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Not all of the games are autotelic, i.e. are played for
their own sake. I will argue that they are used for a
Dionysian display of power, for a tactical, cunning
distraction, for diversionary strategies (masking real
purposes, e.g. the plan to murder the suitors). However,
the Homeric poets invoke a prohibition of mimetic play:
imitating the gods leads to hubris. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to discern a unitary picture of the use of play
in this epic work because of different narrative styles
employed by the Homeric poets. I will illustrate this
claim by looking at selected Books of the Odyssey .
As Schadewaldt notes in the epilogue of his
translation of the Odyssey
.
there are clear clues to
suggest that two poets compiled the epic.^° The older "A"
version encompasses about two thirds of the text. It is
"hohe Dichtung" (p.328), i.e. its composition is well-
rounded with only a few figures, limited descriptions and
few speeches. The "B" version is quite different from
that. It gives an account of why Odysseus needed to slay
the suitors: they had to be burdened with guilt. So in B,
the suitors plan to kill Odysseus' son Telemachus. In
addition, the B version paints a more realistic picture of
politics and customs at the aristocratic home of Odysseus.
In Book 1 (poet B's narration), the games of the
suitors are colored by sinister images to mark the men's
immediate doom (which however is not recounted till the
book 23)
.
While enjoying their dice-game the suitors are
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characterized as aqenoras (106)
,
i.e. as arrogant
braggarts, and scolded for the ease with which they sing
and dance and force the bard Phemious to play the lyre for
them. Interestingly, the poet imitates poet A in
anticipation of Odysseus's use of the words anathemata
daitos in book 21 which gives the cue for the slaughter of
the suitors, (cf. 1,152 with 21,430) We can infer that
poet B clearly disapproves of the pastime and sportive
diversions of the suitors. In contrast to their reckless
behavior, poet B gives us a detailed account of Odysseus'
competitive play at the Phaeacians. Although Odysseus is
"forced" to play because he is provoked by Laodamas, he
demonstrates what a good sport he is and shows the
Phaeacians how to play well, i.e. he introduces the notion
of fair play. This kind of play is imbued with agonistic
posturing and Apollonian 'fair play.'
The A poet stresses the functional aspect of play.
Even the incident of Nausicaa and her maids' leisurely ball
game, which is often cited to show that Homer treats games
as having ends in themselves, is not really played "just
for fun." The game is mainly set up to ensure that
Odysseus is discovered by a princess, Nausicaa, and taken
to her parents' castle. Athena intervenes in the ball game
so that Nausicaa 's (play) mate fails to catch the ball,
which falls into the adjacent river, where Odysseus rests
and awakens from the women's shrieks. (6, 100-115)
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When games are played for their own sake they are, for
instance, in the case of the suitors, not condoned, for the
poet refers to the contestants as vain, arrogant, and
indulging parasites. This interpretation becomes even
clearer at the climactic moment at the end of book 21 where
Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, facetiously invites the
suitors to engage in leisure activities, such as dance or
chants and playing the lyre, "since those are the ornaments
of a feast." (21, 429-30) Little do they know that they
are about to be killed and burnt as a sacrifice to the gods
for transgressing basic rules of Hellenic hospitality. So
Odysseus's command to start the play is only a cue for his
son to seize the weapons and begin the massacre.
This is not to say that games in the Odyssey do not
have a serious meaning; to the contrary, they are holy,
fateful and have to be played with the right attitude,
namely, to be unpretentious and humble towards the gods and
the host. The repeated negative descriptions of the
suitors' play are Homer's stern warning to uphold the
sacrosanct order of play. In some sense, to violate this
order is to gamble with one's death, i.e. to play with
one's hubris. So, playing can also be a life-threatening
activity and not simply a savory, delightful event! And
playing and jesting at the wrong time, disobeying one's
kairos , is especially fateful, as we know from Odysseus's
facetious and provocative outburst at the blinded Cyclops
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that Isd. to th© death of his comirades and his own twenty-
year-long wandering. (Book 9, 474-505)
In book 23, we see again the moment of play as a sign
of distraction, as being goal-oriented, in B. Having spilt
lots of the blood of the suitors, Odysseus invites his kin
to play triumphantly in order to trick the outside world
into believing that his wife has finally accepted a
proposition and is celebrating her wedding with a suitor;
also he wants to buy more time before the kin of the slain
sons and brothers pursue the avenger. It is not entirely
clear to me if a revelling dance (cf. 23, 134) after such
bloodshed is not a bad display of arrogance and hubris.
However, Odysseus is aware of hubris and appeals to the
pious sentiments of the aged Euryclea by admonishing her
not to rejoice loudly when she witnesses the slaughter.
To sum up the contrasts between the two versions vis-
a-vis play and games, poet A's account of play lacks the
lightness and purposelessness which poet B emphasizes. For
instance, in book 17, poet A describes the suitors' play
with discus and javelins as being insolent. He issues a
stern warning against transgressing the world order, i.e.
shamelessly occupying Odysseus' oikos ; committing such
transgression entails the certainty of imminent punishment.
Poet B simply parrots this in Book 1 but--without
mentioning hubris--his mimicry fails to attain the
graveness of the situation.
23
In my analysis of the Odyssey and the Ilias
. I hope to
have shown that the conception of play in Homer's epos is
and complex. it cannot be done justice by
characterizing it either as shallow and simple (Auerbach)
or as pre-rational (Spariosu)
. However, what might lead
somebody like Auerbach to the observation that Homer's
nobles have a displaced ioie de vivre could be attributed
to the poets' downplaying of the importance of work.
does not seem to be a part of the aristocratic way
of life as narrated in the Homeric epics and the later
dramaturgists and thinkers
—
perhaps with the exception of
Hesiod's Works and Days—which leads Spariosu to the
following assertion: "Even during the classical period and
later [...]/ Aristotle's discussion of schole (leisure,
play)
,
diagoge (diversion)
,
paidia (play)
,
and ascholia
(occupation, work)
,
it is play rather than work that
produces most Hellenic values." (1991, p.53) Some play
theoreticians have been prone to romanticization of this
(ideological) production of cultural values. Huizinga
(1950) succumbs to this trap by asserting emphatically that
the archaic Geek society was a "playful society. No
doubt, the act of designing the blueprints for the
Parthenon can be construed as being carried out in a
leisurely manner, however, actually carting the stones and
building the structure is hardly a playful amusement.
Before I take up Spariosu 's hypothesis vis-a-vis
Aristotle's appropriation of play, I will turn to another
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sort of play proposed by Hesiod, who was a self-proclaimed
farmer and poet.
Hesiod's Forebearing on the Classical Period
Hesiod wrote around 700 BC but was considered a
contemporary of Homer by later generations (e.g. by
Herodotus) .'2 The most popular and influential works of
his that have survived in complete form are the Theogonv
(hereafter Theog. ) and the Works and Davs (W&D ) .
What is novel in Hesiod is a different logos of play,
namely his introduction of "fair play" (among mortals) and
"median notions of power", best articulated in the famous
fable of the hawk and the nightingale (cf . W&D 202-212)
.
This idea is absent for the most part from the Homeric
epos
,
where heroes win by being favorites of gods and
goddesses who lend a helping hand in extending the length
of their hero's spear throw. No such guarantee of divine
intervention is promised in Hesiod's poems. Yet, Hesiod
does not altogether abandon the archaic ways of playing.
His diction, as one commentator put it, "loves the
unexpected, loves dramatic contrasts and foiled
anticipations."^^ One such noteworthy example is the
Muses ' s song, which functions as an initiation rite of
sorts, oddly in the form of "j 'accuse". It displays
Hesiod's ironic stance towards his own profession,
implicating other shepherds (possibly also the Homeric
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poets )
,
whom he accuses of being susceptible to the
trickery of the Muses' IpgpiJ^.
Shepherds of the fields, poor fools, mere bellies!
We [the Muses] know how to say many lies similar [oridentical] to true things,
t>ut if we want, we know how to sing the truth. (Theoa
26 ff.)^^ ^
Such cunning is unprecedented in archaic times, for
Hesiod challenges the idea that the Muses' song, i.e.
poetry, is about uttering truth. The Muses reveal to
Hesiod that their sweet sayings may be at times laced with
a "crooked account," which imitates perfectly "straight"
logos. The Muses' make-believe cannot be deciphered by
Hesiod's fellow poets, derogatorily called "poor fools,
mere bellies." However, since Hesiod has to be "taught"
( Theog
.
22) this revelation, i.e. he does not independently
acquire this insight, he can barely escape the Muses'
stinging attack himself. "Authentic" truth is hardly
distinct from truth which is imitated; in fact, without
Hesiod's notice, the Muses prompt a displacement of
logos. To argue against the grain I claim that this
passage also shows Hesiod's ironic self-deprecating
attitude and flirtation with Dionysian play
—
perhaps the
ability to laugh at himself (insofar as this kind of
mockery is plausible for such a stern poet) . Even though
emphatically denying that he is much like the Homeric
poets, Hesiod perhaps secretly knows that it is even
impossible for him to receive only the straight logos,
unadulterated from crooked falsehoods . The "divine
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voice" that is "breathed" into him (31) may just turn out
to be a fake ploy by the cunning Muses. Lamberton's
reading seems to go in this direction as well, noting that
the Muses' truth-telling is a "play of poses, a complex and
implicating system of representation that constantly
tantalizes us with the possibility that it represents
something .
" (1988, p.59)
Hesiod also departs from the Homeric tradition with
respect to the story of Prometheus, "the devious planner"
( Theog
.
521) who is trying to outsmart Zeus; here the
notion of "fair play" is irrelevant because Zeus demands
absolute loyalty; he determines the dice throw.
Prometheus' cunning and trickery earn him eternal bondage,
and, since he allies himself with mortal men, Zeus brings
about the "baneful" creation of women, conceived as
bringing evil and being "conspirers in troublesome works."
Hesiod impresses upon his reader/listener the stern warning
that nobody may deceive and toy with Zeus's wit without
encountering a terrible fate. ( Theog
.
535-616)
The Work and Days repeat the Prometheus story but with
a twist: Hesiod conceives a different kind of 'delight'
than Homer. Zeus orders the other deities to create a
duplicitous figure, "an evil to love and embrace" called
Pandora ("the gift of all"— a gift by all the gods to
men) Pandora is made out of clay and water, but she is
not merely a plaything of the gods; simulating a goddess
Pandora carries out her own cunning deeds. (W&D 60 ff.)
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Her double identity (bringer of mischief as well as
fleeting enjoyment) displaces the (straight) logos of
truth, as we have already seen in the case of the Muses.
Tiruth is simulated truth and thus plays with the 'crooked'
logos. Pandora's mission is to carry out Zeus' fateful
game to spoil the paradisical human condition forever;
bios
,
the livelihood of men, i.e. the good life (of
leisure)
,
is kept hidden from humans (W&D 42-46) . Pandora
brings misery in the form of burdensCme labor and painful
diseases and marks the advent of women who devise
"anguishing miseries for men." (91-92). She serves as
Zeus's revenge, as antidote, to Prometheus's cunning
devising. This pair, Prometheus and Pandora, in some sense
bears the signature masks of the god, Dionysus, the god of
many names. In Hesiod's works, though, this god is
simply named as "bringer of joy" and as a god of wine;
nothing is said about the nature of the Dionysian cult.
Yet, I would argue that there are traces of Dionysian
playfulness in his poems.
Hesiod also invokes tragic, Dionysian play in his
discussion of work. Hard labor, the scattered content of
Pandora's jar (W&D 95), coupled with 'strife' encompasses
the human condition. In the Theogonv . which recounts the
creation of the Greek world of gods, the goddess Night
gives birth to bad Eris (strife, discord), "a hard-hearted
demon" from whom descend:
Conflicts of Battle and Fights and Murders and
Killings of Men, Quarrels and Lies and Words
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[Ipqoi ! ] and Disputations, Disorderly Government
and her accomplice, the power of Ruin.
.
.
(Theoa
226-230)
This dramatic enumeration of images without the use of
copulae evokes associations with the loathsome vision of
the state of nature as outlined by Hobbes's Leviathan
.
Such wretchedness, such a colossal break-down of the social
order, dominates Hesiod's own life, which is allegorically
alluded to in the account of the iron race in Work and
Days ;
Might will be justice; and one will destroy the
other's city. Neither will he who swears truly be
favored nor he who is just nor he who is good, but he
will be granted promotion to honor who is a doer of
evil and hubris. Might will be justice and shame will
no longer exist. The bad will injure the good,
speaking crooked untruths and bearing false witness
thereto. (W&D 189-194)
Yet, alternatives to such a crude 'might makes right'
distribution of justice could be envisioned. In the
beginning of Works and Days
.
Hesiod introduces another
Eris, the good spirit of peaceful competition, who is
clearly in opposition to the hubristic Eris. (cf. W&D , 11
ff.) Hekate^^ is praised as bringing luck to athletes who
compete in the games and brings fortune to farmers and
fishers, when they call upon her. Like the Muses, she too
is a capricious figure, capable of denying luck to mortals
if she wills to do so. ( Theoq
.
435-445) Note the
importance of chance-play for Hesiod (it is also important
for Homer and Heraclitus) . Gods in the archaic world are
not predictable, but humans can hope that they are
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favorable to their plight—by fearing the gods. Elpis
(hope or fear)
,
which was not scattered but remains in
Pandora's jar tightly sealed, is the only (positive)
element which Zeus leaves for humans to control. (W&D 96-
99)
The notion of fair play, i.e. Apollonian play, is
perhaps best illustrated in the fable of the Hawk and
Nightingale (MD 202 -212 )^6 . Fair play is postulated as
'straight' play, as is shown in the analogy of both the
nightingale and dike being dragged off by unjust actors
(kings, bribed judges etc.) Another example of good strife
is depicted in the following famous expression:
Neighbor is envious of neighbor
hastening to wealth, and this is the Eris that
benefits mortals.
Potter fiercely challenges potter, carpenter
carpenter,
beggar enviously strives with beggar, singer with
singer. (W&D 23-26)
But is good and bad strife always cast as opposition?
As I noted above, Hesiod incurs a nasty sting against his
competitors in the Muses' song. I concur with Pucci who
notes that competition (=good strife) and discord (=bad
strife) are posed as an empty polarity because it seems
quite arbitrary to judge what counts as good or bad strife.
(1979, pp.l31) So rather than casting Eris as
oppositional, I suggest that we regard this pair as
characterizing different degrees of agonistic Eris.
Play qua paidia does not appear in these poems; on the
other hand, the ode Exhortation of Work (286-319)
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introduces the opposites of work and (foolish) idleness in
moral terms of arete vs. kakotes
. reflecting Hesiod's
^ii-t©rness at being wronged by his (lazy) brother Peseus,
who sued him in court over his inheritance. Hesiod thus
comes across as the spoilsport of the ontological priority
of play and leisure. An ode to work is alien to Homer's
worldview and to other Greek thinkers of the archaic epoch.
Hesiod, an independently successful farmer, condemns the
warrior-class and the aristocrats who administer 'crooked'
justice (like the hawk holding the feeble nightingale "by
the grip of his bent talons") ; thus he prioritizes the
order of the household r oikos ] and agriculture over the
city-dwellers of the warriors this is also expressed in
the pastoral style and content of his poems.
Hesiod differs from Homer in so far as he extolls the
virtues of work as something willed by the gods. He
introduces fair play (Apollonian play) with the notion of
the good eris and is critical of warrior-like agonistic
eris . Yet, even though Hesiod endorses "straight" justice
over a "crooked" one, he does not play by those rules
consistently, as is illustrated by the song of the Muses in
the Theogonv and by the Prometheus-Pandora story in Work
and Days where he toys with Dionysian play. Again, notions
of pre-rational versus rational values do not capture the
kind of play Hesiod advocates; this is illustrated, too, in
the depictions of the apparently different kinds of strife
that cannot be as neatly separated as he imagined.
31
Heraclitus's Human Plav World
Both Homer and Hesiod are in some sense antipodes to
Heraclitus of Ephesus, a contemporary of Parmenides.
Critical of Hesiod's espousal of superstitions (fr.l06),
Heraclitus also indicts Homer, who, he says, "deserves to
be thrown out of the competitions and deserves to take a
beating." (fr.42) Heraclitus's contempt probably stems
from the anthropomorphic treatment of the divine in the
Homeric epics, which is echoed in many fragments,
ridiculing the practice of religious rites, (cf.
fr.5,14,15) In fr.l5, in particular, he critiques his
fellow citizens for their worship of Dionysus, who, after
all, is not only a god of procreation but also the god of
death, Hades.
If it were not in honor of Dionysus that they
conducted the procession, and sang the phallic
hymn, their activity would be completely
shameless. But Hades is Dionysus, in whose honor
they rave and perform the Bacchic revels. (fr.l5)
As Frankel (1975) puts it in jest, Heraclitus wants to
point out that "the fools may continue in wild intoxication
to hail their own deaths." (p.396) However, despite his
ridicule of the prevalent religious beliefs and practices,
Heraclitus, no doubt, takes play, especially Dionysian
play, very seriously.
The famous fragment 52^’ anchors Heraclitus's
conception of play. Perhaps it is the ultimate expression
of a cunning play, since it is enigmatic and still creates
much furor and "agonistic" analysis. The fragment says:
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Lifetime is a child at play, moving pieces in a game.
Kingship belongs to the child. "3° Before I put forth my
own analysis of this fragment, I will summarize the
interpretations of Nietzsche, Fink, Spariosu, Kahn, Frankel
and Wohlfart. Each of their astute analyses has merit, and
I wish to draw on some of those aspects.
Fink's analysis (1960) suggests that the play of
humans has cosmic significance. "Both gods and men are in
an ecstatic relation to pvr and aion
. their poetic force
rests in play of the world." (pp. 28-29) Fink maintains
that in the post-Heraclitean era, there is a distancing
between god and humans, which he determines as the
beginning of western metaphysics. However, he notes that
Plato asserts that the relationship between the gods and
humans is play in so far as the mortal becomes a plaything
of the god ( paionon theou )
.
(p.30) Fink echoes Nietzsche's
concatenation of fire and cosmic force; however, Nietzsche
also insists on the play's character of "innocent caprice"
and invokes the sandcastle image of the Iliad , thus
combining play metaphors from Homer and Heraclitus:
In this world only play, play as artists and
children engage in it, exhibits coming-to-be and
passing away, structuring and destroying, without
any moral additive, in forever equal innocence.
And as children and artists play, so plays the
ever-lasting fire. It constructs and destroys,
all in innocence. Such is the game that the aeon
plays with itself. Transforming itself into
water and earth, it builds towers of sand like a
child at the seashore, piles them up and tramples
them down. From time to time it starts the game
anew. . . . Not hubris but the ever self-renewing
impulse to play calls new worlds into being. The
child throws its toys away from time to time and
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starts again, in innocent caprice
. But when itdoes build, it combines and joins and forms its
structures regularly, conforming to inner laws.(PhA, p.62; emphasis added)
While Nietzsche captures the image of becoming and
perishing as laws of life (the aion )
,
he also affirms that
the child's play has a certain naivety, an innocence,
perhaps in order to suggest implicitly the
interconnectedness of Apollonian regularity and Dionysian
capricious impulses.
Frankel (1960) speculates that the chess-playing child
makes up rules arbitrarily; it is a random, human rule-
governed game, comparable to the one in Plato ( Laws . 803c-
804b) where humans are playthings of gods. Frankel notes
that fr.52 with its focus on fallible, unpredictable human
law finds its pendant in the higher, divine law, mentioned
in fr.ll4: "For all human laws get nourishment from the
one divine law." This can only mean, Frankel argues, that
Reason is not an accomplishment of an individual but relies
on a super-human universal power. (1960, p.264) In a later
work Frankel (1975) refines his position and avers that the
cryptic fragment gives hints about the ethical choices of
humans. The outcome of human actions is determined by the
gods, since "[i]t would not be good for men if all that
they desire took place." (cf. fr.llO) Thus, he states that
it is not surprising if "our life plays games with us
according to equally arbitrary rules." (1975, p.393)
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Instead of reflecting on children's "innocence,"
Frankel points out that in Heraclitus' times, children were
considered weak or feeble-minded creatures, (p.259)^^
Childhood is nothing but a preliminary stage to maturity.
(p.382) Only much later a child's positive values were
discovered. Frankel equates 'positive' values with
Christian values of childhood, which is anachronistic.
Sure enough, children in the Hellenic age were not highly
valued, but it is misleading to suggest that they were not
sppi^sciated at all (cf. Wohlfart, p.87) . l agree with
Wohlfart's position, since Heraclitus, for instance, also
points to children's ability to outwit the wisest of all
men, Homer, with a simple riddle, (fr.56) And Wohlfart
points to fr.l21, Heraclitus's ironic advice to the
citizens of Ephesus, who should let their children rule
them, because they seem much less "despicable" than the
corrupt adults.
Spariosu asserts that Heraclitus's play is a "restless
play of warring forces," since elsewhere in the fragments
play is compared to strife ( polemos , eris) and thus has
nothing of the "innocence of a child's play." Furthermore,
Spariosu rejects Kahn's (1979) "rationalistic" explanation
that the child's moves follow definite, calculated rules.
Kahn agues that it makes little sense talking about random
play since the fragment mentions pesseuon [=moving pieces]
;
in order to play pessoi , a board game, such as backgammon
which involves dice, a player has to move the counters
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following definite rules, such as alternating in turns.
"The rules of the pessoi
-game thus imitate the alternating
measures of cosmic fire." (1979, p.227; cf. fr.30)
(Although I would argue that the possibility of playing
against an imaginary other is not so difficult to fathom in
our postmodern cyber-age.)
Wohlfart (1991)^^ devotes an entire book to the
notorious fragment (fr.52) and has given the most
interesting interpretation. He notes that Heraclitus
adapts Homeric similes, notably the Iliad 's child's play
simile (Book 15, 360 ff.) although he alters the Apollonian
game ( athurmata ) of building and confounding "sand heaps"
(i.e. the Argives's sand rampart) to the imagery of playing
at draughts. However, Wohlfart claims that sugcheo (to
confound), which does not literally appear in fr.52, plays
an analogous role in the fragment, because the Heraclitean
boy also "confounds" his opponent in the pessoi-game by
building obstacles (as suggested by modern games, such as
Tavli (Greek)
,
Tric-Trac (French)
,
and— I would add
—
Malefitz (German)). (Wohlfart, pp.l05) In Homer, pais qua
Apollo confounds the toil of humans; analogously, in
Heraclitus, pais qua aion (life) toys with the mortals.
Plato seems to have combined both images, hinting at the
playful lightness (characterizing both god and boy) of
Homer's simile and the board player ( petteute ) of
Heraclitus's simile, (cf. Nomoi , 903d-e) (Wohlfart, pp.l04-
107)^^ Most interpretations of fr.52 seem to be at loss
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ovGr ths comparison of ths child with basileus (king)
Wohlfart puts forth several compelling interpretations,
first, equating pais with Apollo, then Dionysus and
thirdly, with the fate of Kyros, the Persian king
(according to Herodotus, Kyros, supposedly a shepard's son,
was elected king as a child during a game (of basilinda ^
and actually ends up ruling over his arch enemy King
Astyages, thus reversing the power dynamic: the Persians
become masters, the Medes slaves) (cf. Wohlfart, pp.l89-
196) . Those who are children today (worthless) are kings
tomorrow. The lot to each of us which fortuna ( aion )
distributes will change and turn around the outcome of the
game.^^ (Wohlfart, p.l97)
In my view, this game is mastered equally by the
(adult) king and child. Heraclitus does not differentiate
between the skills of the child and those of the adult;
furthermore, the child's play is not romanticized; it has
nothing to do with innocence. As Fink rightly avers it is
the aion
.
the cosmic force qua play, that matters here. It
does not matter who the players are. I also agree with
Kahn's focus on the imagery of "playing with draughts,"
instead of speculating on the psyche of children. But he
does not look at the chance/hazard part—Kahn puts too much
emphasis into the role of ananke . Frankel (1975) is
correct to stress the role of chance but does so at the
expense of ananke ; furthermore he does not properly assess
the role of children: a board game played by a child may
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seem irrational and nonsensical to an adult, who observes
the moves of the player, but perhaps, Heraclitus is eager
here to "confound," to toy with, his adult audience, who do
not grasp the orderly, rule-directed moves of the child
which in fact are not randomly executed at all.
Furthermore, as Heraclitus puts it, mistakes are deeds of
humans, (fr.70) suggesting that humans are not mere
playthings of gods but responsible for their actions.
In my view, perhaps a better perspective is to take
Heraclitus' mantra, the unity of opposites, to task: This
play of aion is a struggle of chance and necessity, the
play of the Dionysian and Apollonian forces. A divine
decision is necessarily fateful but humans choose their
fate by "taking their mistaken views as seriously as
children their toys." (fr.70) Another way of interpreting
this interplay dialectically is using Nietzsche's
formulation of "law in becoming" and "play in necessity"
( PhA
.
p. 68) .
What are some socio-political implications of
Heraclitus's play? Spariosu accuses Heraclitus's play of
being thoroughly elitist and blames it on his aristocratic
origins. Although I do not want to dismiss his point, he
perhaps overstates his case by charging that only the
aristocratic play is the 'best'. After all boys, even of
ignoble origins, are considered being at least of equal
worth (e.g. in the case of outsmarting Homer). Spariosu's
point is well taken, though, with respect to Heraclitus's
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grudges against hoi polloi. 'The many' objectively simply
do not have the leisure, the freedom to forgo hard work, in
order to play. still, l maintain that Heraclitus's thought
is motivated by the doctrine of the unity of opposites and
does not necessarily imply that only nobles know how to
play well unlike Aristotle's normative move, who will
charge that only the play of the philosophers, the true
nobles, is valuable in itself. Pace Aristotle, it is
Heraclitus's play which is the specter haunting modern and
postmodern plays of the self— it is Hegel who exhumes the
dark thinker's dialectical play, followed by Nietzsche,
Heidegger and Fink.
Euripides and Aristophanes; The Role of Dionysus in Greek
Mvthos
In this section I want to compare the discussion of
play by the classical dramaturgists and antipodes,
Euripides and Aristophanes. I will show that while
Euripides is sympathetic to Dionysian frenzy in his tragic
plays, Aristophanes leans toward an Apollonian, orderly,
and rationalistic perspective. The examples used to
underscore these claims are The Bacchae and The Frogs .
In the second part of Aristophanes's play The Frogs ,
Dionysus is called in to preside as judge over the contest
between Euripides and Aeschylus over which one deserves
Sophocles' chair in Hades. Whoever beats all his rivals in
each of the great sciences and liberal arts will eat at the
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Prytaneum and take a seat at Pluto's side. Aeagus tells
Dionysus that he needs to preside over the dispute, since
he is the master of tragic poetry. Dionysus's rhetorical
mastery is nicely displayed by Aristophanes when the god of
masks mocks Euripides's poetry: Euripides boasts that he
"introduces our private life upon the stage, our common
habits."
'Tis thus that I taught my audience how to judge,
namely, by introducing the art of reasoning and
considering into tragedy. Thanks to me, they
understand everything, discern all things,
conduct their households better and ask
themselves, 'What is to be thought of this?
Where is that? Who has taken the other thing?
'
Dionysus retorts in mockery:
Yes certainly, and now every Athenian who returns
home, bawls to his slaves, 'Where is the stew-
pot? Who has eaten off the sprat's head? Where
is the clove of garlic that was left over from
yesterday? Who has been nibbling at my olives?'
Whereas formerly they kept their seats with
mouths agape like fools and idiots. (971-991)
Aristophanes derides Euripides for having denigrated
Greek tragedy by introducing the banalities of daily life
onto the stage. He argues that Euripides vainly attempts
to "lighten up its heavy baggage and treating it with
little verses, with subtle arguments, with the sap of white
beet and decoction of philosophical folly" (cf. The
Frogs??) However, I contend that one should not
readily dismiss Euripides's depiction of the "tragic mask"
of Dionysus. Spariosu (1991) says it aptly in the
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following quote by alluding to the Nietzschean "iron dice
game of necessity":
Human tragedy in the Bacchae reminds us of its
counterpart in the Iliad : it is the outcome of an
agonistic game of wagering against infinite
power, which takes either the form of the gods
or, ultimately, the form of chance (tuche)
.
Hubris is the limit or the end of the game, where
chance reveals itself as necessity (ananke^.
(p.109)
Spariosu avers that Dionysus's play is an archaic game
of power, comparing it to Apollo's plotting in the
l-liad^^» (1991, p.ll3) I wish to question this critique
of power, which is analogous to Socrates's strike against
Thrasymachus
' s theory in the Republic . I simply doubt that
a "might makes right" ideology is germane only to the
Homeric world. Spariosu 's analysis is to a certain extent
presentist, in so far as he applies Enlightenment ideals to
the Classical Greek period. On the other hand, it is
certainly correct to assert that Euripides's Bacchae paints
an image of the god of mask that shows him in horrific
brutality.^®
The French anthropologist Rene Girard gives a similar
account of Dionysus in his book La violence et le sacre
(1972). In the fifth chapter, which is simply entitled
"Dionysos," he presents the god of masks and many names as
an initiator of gory and cruel events. With much scrutiny
Girard analyzes the climactic event, "la crise
sacrif icielle"
,
in the Bacchae where the prince Pentheus
serves as the god's main antagonist, for he tries to resist
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the Dionysian frenzy. For this reason he is slaughtered,
literally ripped into pieces, by his own mother, who is
temporarily blinded by Dionysus. Girard notes a play of a
masked double, a monstrous double, which involves both of
Dionysus and Pentheus, both of whom are intermittently cast
by the poet to represent the 'guardian of order and
tradition' and to be the enactor of transgression.^^
Girard concludes the chapter with the cynical remark:
"Dionysos est le dieu du lynchage reussi."^° (p.l90)
Girard seems to follow Nietzsche's argument for the unity
of opposites in The Birth of Tragedy , namely that the
Dionysian is only affirmative in its interconnection with
the Apollonian and totally destructive if unleashed by
itself. Nietzsche hails the Presocratic poets for
striking a balance between the two forces—one might
suggest that this is perhaps why Euripides fails, has to
fail as a poet, in Nietzsche's judgment, because he simply
could not grasp that kind of fine tuning, either by
churning out too rationalistic plays, which are dominated
by a silly question-and-answer game, nicely ridiculed in
Aristophanes' The Froqs^^, or by writing too chaotic,
violent plays like The Bacchae or The Folly of Heracles .
While it is true that the tragic play The Bacchae
conveys a world marred by violence and extreme disorder, I
claim that it has a progressive political message:
Dionysus figures as a trickster who not only ridicules the
state power, namely Pentheus ' s absolutist authority, but
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also encourages women to act in defiance of the king's
repressive orders. Clearly, Girard does not appreciate the
notion of a "life enhancing" Dionysian frenzy and misses
the subversive role this god plays in the drama. Albeit
being the supreme "maitre du jeu," Dionysus does not bring
rules of cpnduct to the humans but provokes panic in those
who are docile bodies complicitous with the authoritarian
(®*9* Tiresias)
. In that sense I disagree with
Girard's stance, according to which Dionysus merely
ii^itistes an irrational sacrificial feast for no other
purpose than to demonstrate the god's own monstrosity.^^
Euripides and Aristophanes have contrasting
conceptions of life, drama, and play; Euripides stresses
the Dionysian and Aristophanes the Apollonian play
principle. Aristophanes merely reminisces of the past, of
the great Sophoclean tragic age, of not-too-human heroes.
Euripides on the other hand, uses the tragic material and
gives it a new spin, e.g. in his tragedy Medea . In this
play, he transforms the Medea of the tradition into a
cunning but all-too-human mother who incites the
spectator's empathy despite the transgressions she has
committed. No small feat!'*'^ For the most part,
Euripides's plays lack the moralistic tone, which is so
prevalent in Aristophanes who at all cost wants to restore
and preserve the Apollonian values of (social) order and
beauty in a hierarchical political framework. Euripides's
socio-political outlook seems to me to be more progressive
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as shown by the provocative play The BacchaP. in which the
guarantor of order, Pentheus, is mocked and a rebellion
against a repressive state apparatus is encouraged. Also,
it seems to me to write about the "banalities," the "petty
amusements of the masses instead of the "noble" pursuits
of the aristocracy is perhaps more than the trivial pursuit
of a populist gesture.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to compare
perspectives on play from several ancient Greek poets and
thinkers. While both Homer and Euripides portray their
respective worlds in naturalistic colors, they do not
succumb to a naive, innocent perspective. Dionysian play,
after all, is multifaceted; the masks-personae of the god
unleash life-affirming and life-threatening power-play.
That is why both poets stand accused of using strife [eris]
in a 'bad' sense, which Hesiod, followed perhaps by
Aristophanes, is trying to stamp out. Heraclitus is not so
easily classified. The 'dark thinker' stands out in
deriding the Dionysian cult and playing with Dionysus (in
the image of the child) at the same time—thus play
exemplifies his dialectical strategy of conceiving the
unity of opposites.
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Notes
I. Spariosu (1991), p.xiii.
2.Spariosu (1991), p.20.
3
.
"Aien aristeuein kai hypeirochon emmenai allon."
4.
Cf. Wohlfart (1991), p.93.
S.Schadewaldt 's translation.
6.
Rape's trans., cited in Wohlfart (1991), p. 95 .
7.
Cordery's translation, noting that "pais" almost
always means "boy" not generic "child."
8 . It is noteworthy that play qua athurmata becomes
early on contrasted with work.
9.1 do not think that such a 'median' poet as
Euripides meant to portray archaic values in Medea and The
Bacchae just to highlight the violence of previous eras
—
and to condemn it. It certainly has relevance for the
bloodthirsty Pericleian age, Athens's expansionism; his
plays could be taken to be a social history on his
contemporary age—not of past epochs. The Bacchae has
nothing of a critical tone vis-a-vis Dionysus' behavior
that a 'median' poet should express, according to Spariosu.
Also, despite the crimes Medea commits, Euripides is
sympathetic to her plight, (cf. my "Mothers and Monsters"
paper, ms.)
10. 1 will rely on Schadewaldt ' s philological analysis
of the origins of the verses:
Book 1: all verses are in B
Book 6: in A
Book 8: the whole contest belongs to B
Book 17 : both in A
Book 21: in A
Book 23: both in B
(cf. Schadewaldt, pp.330).
II. Cf. my paper "Play in Culture and the Jargon of
Primordiality : A Critique of Huizinga's Homo Ludens "
(1996) .
12. What is more likely, as recent philological
scholarship on Hesiod and Homer has shown, is that they
draw on the same oral tradition, using a common source of
formulas. Hesiod or the Hesiodic poets depend as much on
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the Odyssey as Homer/Homeric poets depend on the Theoaonv.(cf. Lamberton, 1988, pp.20)13.
Unless otherwise indicated, I use Frazer's
translation (1983)
.
14.
cf. Lamberton (1988), p.58.
15. On this point, cf. Pucci (1977), p.io.
16. Pucci's translation (1977), p. 9 .
.
17. Cf. Pucci's (1977) excellent analysis of this topic
in Chapter 1 "The True and False Discourse in Hesiod."
18. On "straight" and "crooked" decision see Theoa. 85
ff.; also cf. Pucci (1977), pp. 16-21.
19. On this point, cf. Pucci (1977) who suggests that
the Muses' logic "adds itself to things without vicariously
intruding a sound or body of its own" (p.28).
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Pucci (1977) notes that Hesiod is unable to
"control the difference that marks his discourse." Truth
and falsehood may not be that far apart (i.e. as
opposites)
.
(p. 27)
21.
Cf. Auerbach's quote above.
22.
Hesiod 'translates' by reversing the directionality
of the usual meaning: "she who has [brings] all gifts")
.
Cf. Pucci (1977), p.97.
23.
However, an incommensurable difference is that
women are celebrants in the Dionysian cult and not
vilified.. Nietzsche (1968) makes a similar point about
the presence of Dionysus in Greek tragedy: "[...] Dionysus
never ceased to be the tragic hero ;[...] all the celebrated
figures of the Greek stage—Prometheus, Oedipus, etc.—are
mere masks of this original hero, Dionysus." (p.73)
24.
Perhaps it is not farfetched to compare Hobbes and
Hesiod's conservative politics, each of them longing to
preserve the old orderly monarchical ways and resenting the
mayhem of wars in their respective life time.
25.
This "glorious" goddess is one of the few (female)
deities who are deeply revered by Hesiod; it is noteworthy
that Hesiod does not comment on her mischievous behavior--
yet it is followed by a section that spews with anger over
the mischief (mortal) women bring upon their husbands.
Every misogynist theology/theogony makes allowances for one
sacrosanct Woman put on a pedestal... But then again,
hostility of gods towards human beings is Hesiod's main
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staple.
_
On relation of gods and men and Plato's aesthetic
assessment, see Lamberton (1988, pp.90-104) Particularly insightful is his discussion of thetwo explanatory narratives (aitia) dominating in Theog.
.why do we sacrifice as we do?" and "why is our life as
miserable as it is?" Hesiod does not care where women comefrom (not a relevant action) but is only concerned withtheir creation in so far as they explain Zeus's hostilitytowards men and thus man's wretched condition on earth(pp.lOO)
26. Cf. Spariosu's
fable, pp.1-49.
(1991) lengthy discussion of this
27.1 owe this point to John Brentlinger.
28.
Perhaps this fragment motivated Freud to talk about
a death-drive and a pleasure-drive.
29. "aion pais esti paizon, pesseuon: paidos e
basilen." (B52)
_ Diels/Kranz translate: "Das ewige Leben
ist ein Kind, spielend wie ein Kind, die Brettsteine
setzend; die Herrschaft gehort einem Kind."
30.
Kahn (1979)
,
trans.
31. See Wohlfart's criticism of anachronism in
Frankel's analysis: he notes that it is too value-laden to
declare a child as "contemptible," a better description
would be "weak" or "simple minded", cf. Wohlfart, p.86.
32.Wohlfart aptly summarizes the significance of the
child imagery in the following: "I think that Heraclitus
begins with contemporary [i.e. timely, M.N.] conceptions of
the inadequacy of the child in comparison to the adult
person, as is indicated in the context of his other
children-fragments
,
but then he transcends untimely--even
though not falling outside the realm of early Greek
thought—this conception, because he attests that the child
has more insight than the ignorant many (the adults) —who,
however, are not mentioned in B 52." (1991, p.93; his
emphasis)
33.1 am grateful to Rainer Marten for pointing out
this book to me.
34. One of Wohlfart's most devastating and brilliant
critiques of interpretations of fr.52 is directed against
Heidegger (cf. pp. 219-226), who is portrayed as one of the
worst offenders of irresponsible scholarship by tailoring
his account to Nazi ideology (cf. Heidegger's 1934/35
lecture, GA 39, p.l05; and more ominous, his 1943 lecture
on Heraclitus, GA 55, pp.l80).
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35. Also cf. Plato Laws 903de (on the analogy of
snd king-play) : a virtuous boardplayer
distributes better lots to those characters who promise
moral improvement and those who do less well to a lesserlot/place.
36.
This is exactly the point Nietzsche makes in Birth
where he charges that Euripides brings about the death of
Dionysus as tragic hero (1968, p.73), in Kaufmann's words,
Euripides produces a "tragedy made lite" (1968, p.77).
Nietzsche thunders that "[cjivic mediocrity ... was now
given a voice, while heretofore the demigod in tragedy and
the drunken satyr, or demiman, in comedy, had determined
the character of the language." (pp. 77-78)
37.
Cf. 15,361-66.
38. It seems to me that this fascination with monstrous
others finds its pendant in the modern horror-film ( Friday
the 13th
, Texas Chainsaw Massacre . Silence of the Lambs ,
etc
.
)
.
39. The double of Dionysus and Pentheus:
-Dionysosia) "le gardien jaloux de I'egalite, le defenseur
des lois divines et humaines;" b) "subversif et dissolvant
de 1' action tragique."
-Pentheus: a) "conservateur pieux, un protecteur de 1 ' ordre
traditionel ; " b) "transgresseur . . . contribue au desordre
qu'il pretend empecher." (p.l82)
40. "Dionysus is the god of successful lynching."
41. On this point, cf. Ackermann (1990).
42
.
Particularly dull in that way is Euripides' The
Cyclops .
43.
Feminists have noted the subversive political
meanings of Euripides' work. Froma Zeitlin (1985) notes:
"[...] Euripides may be said to have 'feminized' tragedy
and, like his Dionysos in the Bakkhai . to have laid himself
open to the scorn that accrues to those men who consort
with women. Aristophanic comedy, which loves to lampoon
Euripides and all his newfangled ideas, continually presses
the scandal of his erotic dramas, especially those that let
women speak more boldly (and hence more shamefully) on the
stage [...]." (p . 88
)
Thanks to Angela Curran for pointing out this article to
me
.
44. Cf. my "Mothers and Monsters" paper (unpublished
ms
. )
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CHAPTER III
PLATO'S PLAY: THE DEMISE OF THE DIONYSIAN?
Introduction
In this chapter, I want to revisit the question
'''Whether Plato eradicates the promises of Dionysian
playfulness in philosophical discourse, more poignantly,
whether he has initiated a "repression of play.
Plato asks what is good play, what is the value of
child's play and whether philosophers are allowed to be
playful. In the notorious critique of the poets in the
Repub 1 ic
,
Plato's play ( paidia ) is associated with mimesis,
which is the art, or rather pseudo-art, of the poets.
Furthermore, play qua child's play seems to be contrasted
with seriousness, supposedly the activity of an adult.
Both connotations suggest a devaluation of playful
activities--unworthy of a philosopher's submitting to them.
However, I find such an argument reductivistic . I contend
that the uses of play ( paidia ) in the dialogues are varied:
undeniably, jest and mockery spice Socrates's elenctic
method. Playful irony is an important stylistic tool of the
Socratic discourse, as revealed by his student Alcibiades
in the Symposium . I claim that more often than not play is
conjoined with seriousness, and I will illustrate this
claim with passages from the Euthvdemus . Phaedrus and even
the Laws . Playful seriousness and serious play are
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important ingredients of dialectics
— to be neither
sacrificed nor maligned in the Platonic dialogue.
2
I want to caution against a hastily pronounced
malediction of Plato's play; I contend that he appropriates
play in various ways, ranging from advocating the
usefulness of play in moral education (by provoking
perplexity)
,
of pretense-play, toying with the sophists
(elenchus)
,
e.g. by challenging simplistic assumptions, of
play in myth-telling, to denouncing irresponsible mimesis.
Plato's writings indicate an ambivalent attitude towards
play: on the one hand, playfulness seems to 'lose' to
reason and seriousness and on the other, it gains
ontological status by catching a glimpse of the divine in
human beings. I want to interrogate paidia vis-a-vis three
aspects: a) an ontological malediction of (mere) play and
benediction of seriousness; b) an ethical polarization of
"good" and "bad" play; and c) an ontological benediction of
play ("as being the best in humans"). In addition, I wish
to focus on the style, e.g. the rhetorical devices Socrates
employs, in order to elucidate the content of play. The
Platonic dialogues I will be focussing on are the Republic
(esp. Book III and X)
,
Euthvdemus
.
Symposium
.
Phaedrus and
Laws
.
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The Masking o f Truth : Plato's Play with in
Republic
In the Republic
,
Plato gives an indirect account of
paidia ' s ontological ranking by maligning the uses of
mimesis in his famous critique of the poets. l will
concentrate on his accounts of mimesis in Book III and Book
X respectively.^
In Book III Plato imposes a series of guidelines of
what counts as a permissible mimetic representations of
human heroism in his best state. First, he calls for a
of poetic narratives. Homer is rebuked for relying
extensively on mimetic—and hence dramatic—representation
in his epos ; his narrator impersonates'^ the hero by using
direct speech. (III.393ab) Homer fails to excercise good
judgment because he does not employ the proper mix of
narration (indirect speech) and mimesis (direct speech).
Impersonation may only be "a small part of a long tale"^
and should avoid mimicking ludicrous or banal things, such
as "thunder and the noise of wind and of hail, of axles and
of wheels, of trumpets and flutes and pipes, ... the cries
of dogs and sheep and birds." ( III . 396e-397a) A properly
playful representation is such that emotions do not
manipulate the cognitive faculties of the listener. Hence,
deceptive play, which merely appeals to the feelings of
pleasure (and pain)
,
is ruled out. By minimizing the use
of direct speech, the emotional spell which the minstrel
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casts over his captive audience is undermined so that
narration creates a critical distance (of the
viewer/listener) to the enacted plot. The spectator may be
less tempted to identify vicariously with the emotions of
the hero. (cf. Brecht's Verfremdunasef fekt ^
Second, Plato introduces a normative polarization of
playfulness and seriousness. Mimesis is permissible if the
actions of a good person ( agathos ) are impersonated. ( Rep.
III.396d) Plato also advises against a serious imitation
of bad actions or persons, since they might lead one astray
to "taste"--and enj oy ! --being a bad character, thus the
actor might be tempted to become that persona (mask) which
he impersonates. (III. 395c 7) Interestingly, it is
possible to imitate bad actions; yet it may only be done
in jest, i.e. a comic mockery, in order to maintain the
critical (serious?) distance between playing the morally
reprehensible person and being seduced into adopting his
character flaws. (396e) It thus becomes clear why Plato
singles out the tragedians in his attack, since tragic art
does not allow for such buffoonery—even the wicked have to
be portrayed in earnest. Plato seems worried that artists
are thus more susceptible to assuming the misguided ideals
that they embody on stage.
While Plato focusses mostly at the impersonating
aspects of mimesis in Book III, he looks at mimesis as
imitation in Book X. It is in this last Book of the
Republ ic , which is often regarded as a supplement, rather
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than an integral part of the core argumentation of his
vision of the best state, where Plato launches his famous
attack on mimetic representation. ( Rep. X.595a-608b) In
comparing the ontological status of the Form (eidps) of a
bed with the empirical object of a bed and the imitation of
a bed (e.g. in a painting), the imitation is considered
being at three removes from nature (or truth)
. The maker
(ppetes) of an artwork unknowingly produces phantasmatic
pictures of reality (e.g. in scene paintings) by falling
prey to optical illusions. (X.602d) The painter is faulted
riot listening to the rational part of his soul and his
imitation becomes psychologically suspect for being "an
inferior thing and consorting with an inferior part [of the
soul]," and thus being far from the intelligent part of the
soul. While Plato's Socrates begins his ontological
malediction with the work of the painter, his criticism is
actually foremost directed against a poetes of a different
sort, namely the tragic poet—already maligned in Book III.
The tragedian engages in imitation as a kind of amusement
( einai paidian tina ) which is not to be taken seriously.
( Rep
.
X.602b). Plato links mimesis with (mere) play and
contrasts play with seriousness. He discredits the poet's
truth claim by alleging that as a mere imitator he does not
have any valuable knowledge of the subject that he writes
about—and worse, that he merely caters opportunistically
to the taste and pleasures of the masses. (X.602ab; cf.
Gordias
.
501d ff.) In this context, Plato's indictment of
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mimesis signals an ontologic-epistemological malediction of
play. It follows from Plato's argumentation that the
imitator is not a spoudaios (a serious, virtuous person)
,
since "he does not know whether a particular subject is
good or bad" (X.602bl-2)
. Unable to make such epistemic
distinctions with his pseudo techne
. the artist's ability
to make ethical judgments (e.g. what virtues to teach
s youth) is also cast into doubt. So in a guite
manner, Plato issues an ethical polarization
of play versus seriousness.
Plato's disparaging remarks of mimesis and poets in
Book X is only mitigated by his apologetic gesture at the
end of the mimesis discussion: Plato ascertains the
possibility that a certain kind of poetry, which proves
itself to be a positive artform, does not need to be
banished from the city. Above all, Plato's Socrates
informs his interlocutor—certainly in jest—that he "does
not want to be accused of a certain harshness and
boorishness," since he knows very well that poetry is able
to spice up the lives of the many. (X.607b) Thus Plato
almost seems ready to take back his earlier indictment, yet
he remains firm in his (pre) judgment that poetry is neither
serious nor truthful.
In this section, I want to comment on the
phenomenological critiques of Plato's interpretation of
mimesis and play in Book X. Fink (1960) provides an
extensive critique of the Platonic interpretation of
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mimesis and the mirror-model (pp. 89-117), accusing Plato of
being the key culprit who has contributed to the
ontological devaluation and demise of play in philosophy.
In Platonic thought, play is demystified when it is
determined as mimesis. It loses its mythical-tragical
understanding of kosmos. (p.lOl) Also, Fink charges that
Plato simply gets the analogy wrong with his mirror-
imagery :
The play of humans is not imitated passively; it
does not merely repeat mimetically an original.
Strictly speaking, there is no mirroring
r Spiegelunq l in play. (p.llO)
Fink recognizes that there is an element of playfulness in
Socratic irony, but he argues that Plato is overcome by the
preoccupation with putting the poets in their place and
denying them any Ansoruch (claim) to truth, (p.89)
Fink's scathing critique of Plato's denunciation of
poetry, of play's being a mere shadow, an imago of the
original (form), is not without merit. But I maintain that
Fink dismisses the Platonic jester too quickly. Plato's
labelling of mimesis as "a kind of play" does not
necessarily mean that the criticism is intended for the
genus; playing games for amusement's sake has its right
time ( kairos )
In his valuable book Polls und Poesis , Dalfen (1975)
re-evaluates Plato's conception of the poet's use of
mimesis, contrasting the argumentation of the middle
dialogues (e.g. Republic ) with that of the Laws. Dalfen's
analysis is a marked departure from a Finkean dismissal of
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Platonic mimesis, in part because Dalfen sheds light on the
socio-political context in which Plato was writing. He
notes that Plato clashes with the sophists over the issue
as to whether poetry ought to give pleasure or utility
(hedone vs. ^rpsis)
.
(cf. Gorgias
. 501d ff.; Reo. . Ill)
Common or traditional poetry wants to please the audience
even if it has to offer that which is morally
reprehensible. (Go^^g
» , 501d) ; thus poets pander to the
passions and pathological wishes of an audience that
resents hearing that which is useful (because it's not
pleasurable)
. This issue is revisited in the Laws . Here
Plato allows for pleasure as long as it is enjoyable to the
virtuous person, the philosophical critic, who alone judges
the work of art and gives guidelines to the poets, so that
they create works of art that are educational and pleasing.
However, the audience's tastes have been corrupted by
traditional poetry, and they have to be re-educated.
Dalfen speculates that Plato criticizes his fellow citizens
for their subjective decisions with respect to political
trials where the jury refuses to make rationally binding
judgments and favors those that it finds pleasurable.
(pp.266) For Plato, true mimesis has to be linked with
charis
.
not hedone. (cf. Dalfen, p.315) Thus transformed,
mimesis is philosophical, i.e. knowledge-producing, unlike
the deceiving, pseudo-techne mimetic works of art. In this
educational game, the young citizen is supposed to be in
awe of philosophical poetry and at the same time be able to
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learn to overcome lowly feelings of pleasure. Plato
clearly wants to force a separation of the manic,
persuasive power of rhetoric and crude hedonistic
enjoyment.
Perhaps we can regard the example of the mirror and
the painter as a paignion (plaything) —and even as
paradigmatic model which Plato uses in order to test the
limits of knowledge about the world of appearances. Note
the comic description of the painter's use of a mirror to
go around and copy things quickly—and not surprisingly,
the artist's work turns out to be a mirage. (cf. Phaedrus
276b) Similarly, the tragic dramaturgist is guilty of such
phantasmatic, illusory production. The comedian, however,
"knows" better and is exempted from Plato's critique
Also, I wish to take seriously the oddity of introducing a
god in creating the Real, the Form. Perhaps, God is
invoked as a jester, who toys with seriousness. After all,
nowhere else in Plato's writing are Forms described as
being divine creations.® In a similarly speculative
vein, one might want to reject taking the indictment of
mimesis at face value and instead interpret it as an
provocative gesture. How can poetry be possibly three
times removed from the truth? This seems bizarre given
Plato's point about the possibility of divine inspirations
experienced by poets, (cf. Ion ) Socrates' mockery plays
games with our imagination and leaves us perplexed.'^
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Clearly, Plato's (and Socrates') playful masquerade is
also that of laughter. As the Hegelian philosopher William
Desmond (1992) suggests, Plato highlights the mockery of
philosophers in the tale of the Tracian maid in Theaetetus
(174a) . The maid's laughter, her mockery of the great
philosopher (Thales)
,
has to be taken seriously and haunts
philosophical thinking to this day.^° Riddles and jokes,
as some Platonic scholars have observed, play a key role in
conveying Socrates' thought, and they should not be
dismissed as mere "by-play" (or Beisoiel ^ . I argue that
Plato stays here in the tradition of the "dark" philosopher
due to his casting of Socrates as playful, mocking—and
elusive, because—much to our irritation—he stays beyond
our cognitive grasp.
The Play of Loqos/Mvthos in the Phaedrus and Symposium
In the following I wish to look at Plato's conjoining
of myth and reason in the dialogues Symposium and Phaedrus ,
in particular with respect to the possibilities of
Dionysian frenzy. Wendy Brown (1994) —who is sympathetic
to a re-evaluation of Plato's play with myths and similes
—
argues that we should take seriously the female
personification of truth and philosophy in Plato. One
ought to go beyond the charge of logocentrism (Nietzsche,
Derrida) and interrogate the relation of philosophy to
power in Platonic writings. Socrates often finds himself
mocked by the sophists, in particular by Thrasymachus who
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calls him a wimp for opposing the sophist's agonistic
theory of power. (1994, p.l59) However, Brown makes no
mention of the fact that Thrasymachus gets a thrashing
too
.
Some Lacanian feminists have also interpreted Plato's
game as subversive in two important ways: a) for recasting
the philosophical enterprise as female—because Plato
attacks the male aspects of sophistic dialectics, its
agonistic mode;^^ b) for reversing gendered roles, e.g.
in Socrates' myth of love in the Symposium
. Truth is a
woman (Diotima) who plays sensuously with her lover (of
wisdom), (cf. Irigaray, 1994; also Nye, 1994)
While Socrates mythologizes Diotima^^ in his speech
on the nature of love and absorbs her teachings, Alcibiades
puts forth his own mythic account of the historic Socrates.
He employs similes to expose Socrates's method of playing
in his laudatio ( Svm. 215a-222c)
,
which at the same time
serves as an indictment of his teacher's cunning and
' outrageous ' mockery
:
To praise Socrates, gentlemen, I shall proceed as
follows: through similes. He will assume that I'm
ridiculing him. But the simile will be for the sake
of the truth, not for ridicule. I assert he is most
like the Sileni which sit in statuaries' shops—the
ones which the craftsmen carve to hold shepherd's
pipes or flutes, which when they are opened into two,
turn out to have images of the gods inside. And I
shall compare him, too, with the satyr Marsyas.
( Svm. 215a-b)
He goes on to explain the effects of the satyr's piping on
him, feeling mesmerized and at the same time intimidated by
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the force of the Socrates' speech which uncovers one's own
moral and intellectual defects. Another posture of Silenus
is to claim to know nothing but when his inner self is
exposed, when 'silenus' is 'in earnest', his other images
are revealed; they seem—to the initiated— "divine, all-
golden, exquisite and miraculous." And as if he were
in the Bacchanalian mysteries, the enraptured
Alcibiades just complies with whatever Silenus demands of
him (cf . Svm. 217a)
.
In the end of his bombastic speech, Alcibiades
unravels the meaning of the similes of Sileni and Satyrs.
Upon opening up the Sileni, one discovers that what at
sounded ridiculous, is serious stuff, which is only
revealed through a hermeneutic engagement with the matter:
His arguments are all clothed by words and phrases
which are like the hide of an impudent Satyr, for he
speaks of millstones and pack-asses, of smithies,
shoemaker's shops and tanners, and through all these
things seems to be repeating himself over and over, so
that any ignorant fool would laugh at the things he
says. But if one sees them opened up and penetrates
into them, one finds to begin with that they are the
only discourses r logoi 1 that make any sense; and later
that they have a great divinity, that they are filled
with the images of virtue, in themselves, and when
they are extended to their fullest meaning they
encompass everything that it becomes a man to
contemplate who is seeking to achieve the beautiful
and the good." ( Svm. 221e-222a)
Alcibiades 's play with satyr/silenus similes alludes
to a god who is often mistakenly represented as a
laughingstock by the uninitiated--Dionysus
,
the god of many
names. It has been argued that the entire dramatic action
of the Symposium mirrors the series of events of the
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Dionysian cult in a four-day spanJ'^ According to
Brentlinger (1970), it begins with Agathon
' s victory at a
festival celebrating Dionysus's birth followed by a day of
sacrifice in honor of the god, which involves heavy
drinking. On the third day, Agathon 's friends congregate
in his house, where they have a contest as to who can give
a superior speech on love, and finally succumb to a deep
sleep or Bacchanalian revel, except for Socrates, who, as
Brentlinger puts it suggestively,
rising to begin the fourth day with a bath at the
Lyceum, is like a risen god among the debris of
spent mortality. He, it appears, and not
Agathon, is the victor and the true symbol of
Dionysus, (p.4)
Given the abundance of Dionysian imagery and the
'serious' play with masks in the Symposium
. it is odd that
Nietzsche prefers to chide Plato for his Apollonian
preponderance. In the following, Ellie Ragland-Sullivan
takes Nietzsche to task:
How Nietzsche could have seen Socrates as a master of
reason? Perhaps if Nietzsche had read Lacan, Socrates
would have appeared to him as master of another kind
of passion, one that obviates the need for an
opposition between the Apollonian and the Dionysiac.
Are we to believe (if we believe there was a Socrates)
that he really chose to drink the hemlock only because
he wanted to continue a discourse with immortal souls?
Mind without body? Or was he finally (unconsciously)
weary of the desire/love/knowledge game? Did he
commit a kind of suicide (as hysterics sometimes do)
because, beyond politics and philosophical mastery,
the only game in town was no longer so titillating,
was, for him, without exit? (1989, pp. 748-749)
This peculiar game of the mask-bearer (Silenus) , which
combines elements of self-conscious cleverness and
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uncontrollable, divine inspiration, is played out in
Socrates's conflation of myth and logos. After all, the
true philosopher is according to the description of the
Phaedrus "out of his wits" and "overcome by divine
madness." (cf. also I^) Dionysian frenzy is immanent in
^l^^oriic dialectic but has been overlooked for the most
part by 20th Century Plato-scholarship which has been
to Nietzsche ' s indictment of Socrates as being
responsible for entombing the archaic logos.
^yths in particular need to be re—evaluated with
respect to Plato's use of play. In this regard I want to
draw on Elias's book Plato's Defence of the Poets (1985),
in which the author argues that one should re-evaluate
Plato's scathing attacks on the poets by considering the
function and role of the myths in Plato's own methodology.
Elias gives a 'strong defense' of poetry, since myths play
an essential, rather than merely accidental, role in
Platonic thought and are invoked where dialectic fails to
prove first premises, (p.37) While one can argue with
Elias, that he should perhaps be listening more sceptically
to the ironic tone of Socrates's assertion that rhetoric
has 'greater power' over uncertain things, such as myths,
than the dialectic ( Phaedrus 263b)
,
I agree with Elias that
we should take the myths more seriously. I also agree with
his challenge of the 'weak defense' of poetry (e.g. Bacon's
view)
,
which says that most people do not grasp absolute
truth and, since Plato recognized their Unvermogen . he
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wrote myths which are compatible with truth. in any case,
both defenses suggest that myths are seriously reckoned
with and employed by Socrates and hence are not merely
pleasurable. As such, they could also be employed to meet
Plato's famous challenge to defend poetry, namely, that if
mimetic poetry is to show a reason for her existence, she
needs to provide a benefit other than pleasure, (cf.
Republic X.607cd)
The Phaedrus displays Plato's strategic use of
1
5
myths. In the opening scene, Socrates ridicules a
sophistic interpretation of a myth and claims that he is
generally not interested in bothering with mythologemes ; he
is just as happy to leave these logoi to the sophists.
( Phaedr . 229c-230a) However, this emphatic disavowal of
myths has an ambiguous meaning, as Derrida notes in his
article "Plato's Pharmacy": 'bidding myths a farewell' also
suggests a salute. (1981, p.68) Throughout the dialogue
Socrates plays with the opposites of giving a rational
account (logos) and merely telling a story (mythos)
,
suggesting that he is not seriously advocating a dismissal
of mythologemes and that it seems implausible to try to
force a rationalistic division between the two concepts.
In fact, later in the discussion of what constitutes good
writing, Plato introduces two original myths^*^ as logoi :
the fable of the cicadas (259b3-259d9) and the story of
Theuth (274b9-275c4) . I will focus on the latter, since
it is part of an argument which introduces paidia . In this
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myth, Theuth presents the letters as a pharmakon (a remedy,
drug, or poison) to king Thamus (of Egypt)
. The king,
however, immediately rejects the gift^^^ pointing to its
toxic rather than beneficial effects; writing after all
makes people forgetful, since they don't have to rely on
the power of remembrance. Plato here uses Theuth as a
divine trickster note that Socrates is often cast as
magician^’—who, according to Derrida, distributes his
pharmakai carelessly and callously:
[Theuth] cannot be assigned a fixed spot in the
play of differences. Sly, slippery, and masked,
an intriguer and a card, like Hermes, he is
neither king nor jack, but rather a sort of
joker , a floating signifier, a wild card, one who
puts play into play. (1981, p.93)
'Putting play into play' is Derrida's shrewd observation
that in his myth, Socrates attributes the invention of
games (draughts and dice) to Theuth (274d)
,
which seem to
obtain the stamp of approval from the king. The invocation
of games seems to be an anticipation of the play writings
of the dialectician in 276b ff.
Analogous to the playful conflation of the
mythos/logos dichotomy discussed above, Plato conjoins play
with seriousness when it comes to philosophical
writings/musings . The unity of this oppositional couple is
featured in the following passage, where Socrates poses
these questions to Phaedrus:
And tell me this. Would a sensible farmer, who
cared about his seeds and wanted them to yield
fruit, plant them in all seriousness in the
gardens of Adonis in the middle of the summer and
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en^oy watching them bear fruit within seven days?Or would he do this as an amusement and in honor
of the holiday, if he did it at all? Wouldn't he
use his knowledge of farming to plant the seeds
he cared for when it was appropriate and be
content if they bore fruit seven months later?(276b-c, trans. Nehemas & Woodruff)
Phaedrus agrees that a serious farmer would not force a
harvest as is done with the pot plants that bear fruit
during the festival of Adonis. The practices of the
insincere farmer are criticized—Socrates ' s swipe against
the sophists who pride themselves in teaching their methods
guickly.^^ The dialectician (not unlike a demiurge)
earnestly and in a leisurely manner selects a proper soul
in order to implant it with the seeds of logos and to
recognize that it takes time for this to take fruition in
the form of self-knowledge (276e-277a) . While the
amusement in the gardens of Adonis may not be the sort of
game the true philosopher indulges in and condones, we have
to make note of the irony of the comparison of writing with
painting which precedes the agricultural trope. Socrates
warns that "writing shares a strange [ schlimme ; trans.
Schleiermacher ] feature with painting. The offsprings of
painting stand there as if they are alive, but if anyone
asks them anything they remain most solemnly silent. The
same is true of written words." (275d; trans. Nehemas &
Woodruff) If Mimes isverbot extends to writing, it has
grave consequences for Plato's work, which cannot just
pretend to engage in and sustain itself in living dialogue.
Plato stands accused of reinscribing doxosophia and not
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genuine knowledge. Plato is aware of such pitfalls and,
therefore, he is not really interested in advocating an
absolute prohibition of mimesis nor, for that matter, of
myths
.
Furthermore, the allegory of writing as a play of the
dialectician illustrates the mixing of play and
ssriousness
; yet, it maintains and reinforces a division
of lesser and nobler kind of games, that is a polarization
of play in the good and bad sense, weeding out false fruit,
i.e. drinking parties and other base amusements (276d)
,
from good fruit, such as philosophical conversations
(276e)
In my analyses of the Symposium and the Phaedrus
.
I
have attempted to rehabilitate the notion of play and
myths, while acknowledging that in his pursuit of the true
art of philosophizing, that is dialectically, Plato imposes
a .standard of what constitutes superior play.
Nevertheless, I agree with Brown, pace Nietzsche and
Derrida, that we ought to realize that Dionysian paidia is
also immanent in Platonic philosophy and that Plato is as a
poet "the celebrant of eros, the dreamer, the maker of
myths and allegories . "2^ Recognizing Plato's flirtation
with the Dionysian, Brown claims that Plato's Socrates does
not provide a theory of knowledge that is void of
sensuousness, madness and playfulness. Singling out one
passage in the Republic (481d-482d) , she comments:
"Socrates develops the image of the passionately sexual.
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monogamous, possessive, and creative lover of wisdom in a
passage that moves from the sexual act to procreation and
birth in a split second.
Agoni stic Play in the Dialogues
In this section I will single out the Euthvdemus as
being paradigmatic for Socrates's display of the
combatative power, of taking on the sophists by engaging in
their eristic game. In this dialogue, Plato exposes the
the fallacy of the sophist's claim that false speaking and
teaching (virtue) are compatible with each other. In
Socrates' vigorous pursuit of this argument, it becomes
apparent that agonistic play is just as much a feature of
Platonic philosophy as it is of the sophists'.
Many Plato scholars have commented on the use of irony
in Socrates's philosophical dialogues. I hold that irony,
in Plato's idiosyncratic casting of it, namely in the
interplay of jest and seriousness, plays an important part
in his agonistic style; it does not simply serve an
instrumental function, illustrating the sophist's game
satirically. I thus argue against Spariosu (1991) or Brown
(1994) who contend that play as agon merely portrays
Socrates's verbal contest with cantankerous sophists to
beat them at their own game.
Similarly, in his magnum opus, Friedlander (1928/1964)
argues that play is a feature of Socrates's posture, but it
is a peculiar play, namely of irony (of hiding something, a
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same time statinggame of skillful deception while at the
the truth, without polite reservations). (1964, pp.l52)
Friedlander states that one of the richest examples of
"ironic polyphony" can be found in the Euthydemus. In this
dialogue, the sophists perform a great "firework of the
most bombastic eristic artistry" only to be beaten by
Socrates's simple ironic stance. But his ironic tone takes
tunes; it oscillates between a grimacing one
and a relaxed, sotto voce
. (1964, p.l54) I would however
that Socrates is not too comfortable in the role of a
soothsayer—although Plato tries hard not to let Socrates's
i^ronic attitude overpower the dialogue and occasionly lets
him come to Cleinias's or Ctesippus's rescue, where they
falter in answering the sophists' trick questions.
Socrates mocks?/faults the sophists by using the dichotomy
of play and seriousness ironically: Encouraging Cleinias
not to be intimidated by their sheer overpowering
argumentation and trick questions, and insisting that they
have in fact failed to teach him anything useful with their
superficial play, Socrates bursts out into this tirade:
So you must think of their performance as having
been mere play. But after this they will
doubtless show you serious things, if anyone
will, and I shall give them a lead to make sure
they hand over what they promised me.... So,
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus
,
put an end to this
joking. (278c-d; trans. Sprague)
With this stern speech Socrates promises to fight it
out with the sophists. This competitive game turns out to
be harder than he first thought: Socrates confesses to his
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friend Crito that he has lost round one by being thrown
into a state of perplexity^^ and being duped by
Dionysodorus
,
who claims that to wish that somebody becomes
wise, who is not, means to wish for nothing else but his
^®^th
.
( Euth . 283d) Socrates, however, recovers from this
defeat and gains the upper hand by focussing on the misuses
of reason; he does this— in typically ironic manner—by
misleading the sophist with phrases, such as "I am rather
thickwitted and don't understand these fine clever things."
(286e) Moreover, Socrates spoils the game by provoking the
sophist with counter-questions, e.g. in Euthydemus's proof
that Socrates always already knows everything (295bd) . In
the end, Socrates seems to succumb to the eristic game;
however, the sophists' triumph is ridiculed by Plato, who
attributes the following question to a jubilant
Dionysodorus: "Is Heracles a bravo, or is a bravo
Heracles?" (303a) Socrates, however, has the last
laugh, telling the sophists that the rules for their game
are easily learnt (303e) and, in an ironic voice, advises
them to keep their game to themselves lest they want to
forgo remuneration for teaching their art to the crowd.
(303e-304b)
While Socrates excels in eristic art, he advocates a
superior techne , namely dialectics, hardly a "worthless
affair and chattering" (cf. 305e)
;
nevertheless Plato is
ambivalent about discarding the sophistic eris. That is
why I argue against Spariosu who holds that agonism (and by
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extension, Dionysian tragic art) is eclipsed in Platonic
^ median, non-violent, cooperative
(Apollonian) spirit of rationality ushered in. Socrates
may appear to dispute less aggressively with inexperienced
interlocutors (e.g. Charmides)
,
but he argues no less
vigorously than the sophists. A spirit of defiance, i.e.
an unwillingness to end disputes in a draw, often marks the
end of a dialogue; at the same time Socrates wears his
comic mask, embodying Dionysian buffoonery, which seems
especially untimely when serious ethical matters are to be
discussed. For example, in the final passages of the
Socrates practically gives a soliloquy, because
Callicles is too annoyed to answer the impertinent
questioner on the nature of temperance. Callicles brushes
off Socrates suggesting that he carry on the dialogue with
somebody else (505c) while Socrates pretends to be insulted
("Well, but people say that 'a tale cannot rightly be left
half-finished; a head must be put on it, that it may not
run about headless."^®) and forces Callicles to continue
his role as an interlocutor. The sophist begins to agree
with every point made by Socrates in order to hasten the
end of the speech ("Granted, Socrates, in order that you
may bring your argument to an end"). (510a)
Another case in point is the final scene of the
Symposium : as Agathon and Alcibiades are falling asleep, a
sober Socrates carries on the conversation and coerces them
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to accept his viewpoint. According to Aristodemus
'
s
account, he tells them
that it was possible for the same man to know howto write comedy and tragedy, and that the skilledtragedian can write comedy as well. Well they
were being forced to agree to all this, but they
weren't following it very actively, and weredozing off. ( Svm. 223d^
Another example which displays Socrates's eristic
bravura occurs in the Ion where he mocks the rhapsode for
claiming that his art enables him to be a good general as
well and that such art must rely on divine inspiration.
Socrates's irony is also manifest in his pretend-play,
hereby mocking the interlocutor, or the audience, taking on
different roles, befitting a satyr. For instance, in the
aporetic dialogue, Charmides
. Socrates asks the adolescent
man what he makes of temperance f ti esti sophrosyne
;
)
.
Charmides stumbles to give a reasonable definition, which
eventually leads nowhere, guided by the probing questions
of his thoughtful mentor and teacher. At the same time,
Socrates pretends to be virtually overcome by his own
"intemperance," i.e. his sexual attraction towards
Charmides, thus mocking the by-standers who are literally
in awe of the adolescent's strikingly good looks.
Clearly the deceptive mask of a satyr is important for
this game, that is hiding a fierceful 'soul' behind a
smiling facade. Socrates's game is about winning an
argument—to prevail in the name of truth. It has defined
the way we conduct the 'business' of philosophizing, and
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only recently this agonistic game has come under criticism
by feminists who seek to introduce playfulness as 'loving
perception' (cf. Lugones, 1987).
Irony secedes perhaps—as suggested by Dalfen ( 1974 ) —
in the later dialogues. in his esoteric works, which are
not intended for the public 'eye', Plato does not see the
need for ironic attacks of the sophists, e.g. he
reinscribes positively the manic-mantic connection in the
philosopher (cf. Phaedrus)
,
and it is in dialogues, such as
the Laws and Timaeus
,
where he discusses play in a good
sense and revisits the meaning of mimesis. The
philosopher's business is the highest among the arts
(musike ) as indicated already in Phaidon (61a) ; he is the
true poet whose tragic plays imitate the true and best life
( Laws 817b) . Poetic mimesis plays a new role as
philosophical mimesis.
Much material in Plato is inherently playful (in the
sense of donning cunning, mocking roles and of being a
cooperative, good sport)
,
nevertheless, he clearly sets up
a game of a polarization between good and bad play as
Spariosu (1991) and Derrida (1981) suggest. However, I
believe Spariosu (following Nietzsche) goes too far in
stating that Plato banishes the "archaic" or "prerational"
forms of play (e.g. agonist, eristic) and introduces
"median" or "rational" (cooperative) aspects (e.g. in the
'contest' between the poet and philosopher in Book X of the
Republic ) It is a misrepresentation of Plato's
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thought to state there are prohibitions against "archaic,"
agonistic and mimetic expressions of play.
Plato's early dialogues are highly competitive in
their nature, perhaps because they were performed at the
Olympic games. Here, Socrates, as interlocutor, comes
across as a spoilsport, a cunning manipulator, a trickster,
and a fighter, by harping on the elenctic method. As Ryle
(1966) explains, the purpose of this method is to drive
"interlocutors by sequences of questions into admitting
falsity of theses that they have been defending." (p.io)
Rather than admitting to a self-serving double-standard
—
Plato later on denounces the cunning poets (in the third
book of the Republic) and advocates that they be thrown out
of the city he insists that the elenctic dialogue has a
pedagogic function, but dialectics should not be used for
the education of young men. If they had a taste of the art
of dialectics, Plato cautions:
they take it as a game and always use it to
contradict. They imitate those who cross-
examined them and themselves cross-examine
others, rejoicing like puppies to drag along and
tear to bits in argument whoever is near them. --
Yes, to excess. And when they have themselves
cross-examined many people and been cross-
examined by many, they fall vehemently and
quickly into disbelieving what they believed
before. As a result, they themselves, and the
whole of philosophy are discredited in the eyes
of other men. — Very true. (VII.539bc)
Such "playing and contradicting for play" mocks the
serious business of philosophizing and drags it down to the
level of a farce. Philosophical discourse cannot tolerate
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such delegitimizing act. The playful expose of the failure
of the logos has to be cast as an act of sacrilege. Play
is thus cast as the other of Reason. However, for Plato,
other forms of play have legitimacy, as long as they are
enacted seriously. As pointed out by Brown (1994), what is
unusual about the dialogical form is that Socrates changes
his forms of attack, whether it is to match the style of
the agonistic opponent he sees in Thrasymachus or Gorgias
or whether to accomodate timid, less sophisticated
companions such as Charmides or Glaukon. Brown claims that
competitiveness is not an end in itself for Socrates, who
attacks the Sophists for their eristic dialectical
practice, but it is something he performs con gusto .
Clearly, agonistic, mocking play displays Socrates's
Dionysian masquerade, which is juxtaposed to an Apollonian
imposition of a hierarchical ranking of play; both are
features of Plato's play and as such contribute to the
ambivalence which is symbolized as a pharmakon . a gift of
Dionysos—one is never quite sure, whether taking the
potion is life-affirming or whether it is deadly and its
toxic effects strike the player gradually numbing her
limbs .
.
Playfulness as an Existentiale in the Nomoi
The Nomoi are relevant to our discussion of Plato's
play theory in so far as they address the issue of what is
the "best" play. Also, this dialogue provides a clue as to
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how Plato ranks play with respect to other human
activities, and as to what his views turn out to be when he
revisits the dichotomy between play and seriousness. While
the Laws have been described as a "non-agonistic
dialogue''^!, which is certainly true in terms of the style
of the conversation, I want to maintain that, with respect
to the content, Plato weighs both sides of Hesiod's eris,
that is peaceful, non-lethal strife vs. warrior strife, and
ends up privileging the former. in other words, Dionysian
excess is tamed by Apollonian harmony and order, especially
in the case of regulating wine consumption at symposia and
Bacchanalian revelry, (cf. 653d; 654a; 666b; 671a-d)
. Yet
this does not mean that agon (contest) simply gets
discarded.
In the so called theologia ludens passage^^ of Book
VII, where the demiurge figures as puppeteer, thus
reiterating the paignon theme hypothesized in Book I
(654d)
,
Plato makes a stronger claim by arguing that in
fact the human being "is made to be the plaything of God,
and that this, truly considered, is the best of him;
wherefore every man and every woman should follow in this
way, and pass life in the noblest of pastimes, be of
another mind from what they now are." (803c-d; trans.
Jowett) This other--deviant
—
perspective is the pursuit of
a life of peace which includes participating in sacrificial
games, singing and dancing, rather than a life of a
warrior. (804d-e) This novel approach resonates with the
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one put forth by Hesiod in his famous hawk/nightingale
simile, (of. Chapter II) m this context, I would argue-
contra Spariosu-that Plato does not address the question
how the games are supposed to be played out; yet, it is
difficult to imagine that his Stranger would voice a
Prohibition against agon.
What is interesting about Plato's proposal is that he
sheds new light on the as-if approach of play^^.
prefaces his theophilia play account with the statement
that seriousness in this context is being toyed with for
Its own sake (or perhaps for assuring our sanity as
mortals). After all, "human affairs are hardly worth
considering in earnest, and yet we must be in earnest."
(803b) This point is emphasized again at the end of the
simile that the pupils should just carry on with their
delightful games to please the gods, but we should realize
that they are "for the most part puppets, but having some
little share of reality." (804b) Tasting a part of Being,
of Truth is a divine affair., (cf. Rep. III. 395c) However,
Plsto s extreme view is rebuked by Megillus; "you have a
low opinion of mankind. Stranger." (804b) To which Plato's
Stranger responds kindly, "...And let us grant, if you
wish, that the human race is not to be despised, but is
worthy of some consideration." (804bc) In this ironic
manner, he again dangles the oppositional pair, play and
seriousness, in front of the interlocutor.
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Finally, l want to mention a different account of
play, which Plato puts forth as a strawman argument for
elevating another aspect of his play theory. This concerns
Plato's critique of atheists (X.888e), who, he says,
believe that phusis and tuche produce the best values of
the world, not god. Techne (art) which comes later into
existence produces mere games (paidias tinas ’t that only
mimic truth; however arts in connection with natural
sciences produce serious things (X.889cd). Thus, play,
being removed from phusis, functions as a cultural product,
and it becomes ontologically maligned because play is
merely derivative not a necessary activity.
Clearly this is not Plato's own account which assumes
that play is an existentiale and not merely a derivative
feature of the human condition. However, this materialist
view (e.g. of Democritus) has interesting political
implications, because it sidesteps the Platonic question of
what constitutes good play and raises instead the problem
of who can afford to engage in a leisurely playful life
style. In this context, play becomes ideologically
suspect, as an activity that is only
consummated/appropriated by the economic-political elites.
In the Laws, while play is at the forefront of the
conversation, the play perspective shifts slightly in favor
of an Apollonian order. Similarly, the style of the
conversation is markedly non-confrontational ; thus the
Platonic dialogue 'succeeds' in setting itself apart from
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an eristic interrogation. Play, again, is contrasted with
seriousness, but I do not see an ethical polarization. m
jest and seriousness, the Stranger remarks that play is
what makes a human life bearable and in fact it is the most
divine aspect of humans. (803b) i will conclude with a
citation of the paignon-simile from Book I which
illustrates this point:
May we not regard every living being as a puppetof the gods, which may be their plaything onlyor may be created with a purpose; for that is amatter which we cannot certainly know? but this
we know, that these affections in us are like
cords and strings, which pull us different and
opposite ways, and to opposite actions; andherein lies the difference between virtue and
vice. (644de)
Plato then ponders what happens if this puppet is put into
a state of drunkenness, a question incidentally picked up
by Hegel's trope of the Bacchanalian revel in The
PhenomenoloQv of Spirit
,
(see Chapter VI)
Conclusion
In light of my discussion of the Nomoi
. I would like
to consider Plato's harsh discrediting of playful mimesis
as a (comic) aberration. After all, the "theologia ludens"
passage solemnly holds that "man is made God's plaything,
that is the best part in him." And "life must be lived
as play, playing certain games, making sacrifices, etc."
(803cd) This passage hardly suggests that mimetic play has
to be ruled out. No such ontological prescriptions are
invoked here (although it is not specified which are the
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-certain,-
-most beautiful- games to be played). Note also
that Plato does not use new terms—to make room for
authentic play unlike Aristotle, who discards paidia but
praises schple, to elevate the true, pure play of
philosophers and priests, (cf. Chapter III) Spariosu aptly
calls Plato's dialogues
-paignia-
—the
-trying out and
"testing- of his thought, in particular of his conception
of play, which is reflected on further in the Republic and
the Laws. (Spariosu, 1991, p.l68)
In this chapter I attempted to contribute to a ludic
re-evaluation of Plato's work—pace Nietzsche, Fink and
Derrida. Paidia
,
for the most part, does not get maligned
as mere play in order to be contrasted with serious
activities; rather, several dialogues seem to attest to the
conflation of these opposites; on the other hand, I want to
note that Plato favors an ethical polarization of "good"
and "bad" play, and an ontological benediction of play as
an existentiale, "as being the best in man". Furthermore,
Plato does not eclipse the Dionysian ludic element from his
philosophy, and we see evidence for that claim in Socrates
play with masks, i.e. his toying with the sophists and his
defense of philosophical madness in the Phaedrus
. I argue
that mimetic play is indeed important in so far as it shows
Socrates's superb cunning when he imitates the sophists and
beats his opponents at their own game. Play of
representation (Vorstel lungsspiel ) becomes pretense-play
(Verstellungsspiel ) . Both notions are captured in mimesis .
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In his (serious) pursuit of truth Plato gives a taste of
his comic side by toying with masquerading and by seducing
us with regulatory fictions. An account of truth may be
represented in myth-telling but those myths might also mask
the truth (e.g. the Myth of Theuth)-this is Plato's
esoteric appeal which infuriated Aristotle. The Socratic
satyric mask does hide 'something' which can be uncovered
and claimed, through various means, e.g. irony, baffoonery.
However, only Hegel's 'tarrying with the negative' will
reveal that there is no essence behind the mask-
philosophers have to come to terms with playing 'merely'
with masquerades, simulacra. And Nietzsche, the artist-
metaphysician, fully grasps this affirmative, yet
subversive, dimension of the thinking muse.
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Notes
=
Derrida's view in his article "Plato'sPharmacy" (m Dissemination
. 1981
,
p.l56).
claims ^ disagree with Derrida (1981) who
(e q in ?L Play serves as (serious) pharma Icon
innLi ^^^.^^^g^Hiaedrus ) , it has already lost its playfulappeal- in the name of logos or truth (p.l56).
rh=,-irq
Rgpublic Plato also discusses play gua(education, pedagogy), thus highlighting play's
important feature of paidia is beyond thrscop^o? iLT
(Chapte; IV) Aristotle chapter
is used in the
n. 21)
.
5. Unless otherwise indicated,
translation (1974)
.
I will follow Grube's
6 . On this point see, Hermann Gundert (1965): "polemic was directed primarily against that what* is[Gespieltes ] , which pretends to be serious, rather
against playing per se." (p.210, translation, MN)
Plato '
s
played
than
_
holds comedy in higher esteem than tragedy or
epos, prompting Nietzsche to blame Socrates/Plato forinitiating the decline of tragic, Dionysian art form and
elevating the Appolonian, rationalistic art form of comedv(cf . Birth l . ^
8.Cf. Grube (1974) who suggests, au contraire
. not to
take Plato's illustration about the gods too seriously
(pp. 241, n. 4)
.
9 . On the positive uses of perplexity in philosophical
thinking, cf . Matthews (1996)
.
10. Cf. Desmond (1992), p.256. However, Desmond also
claims that Plato's Socrates is the first philosopher to
laugh at himself (p.260). Desmond seems to misunderstand
the purpose of Socrates's masks (e.g. of self-deprecation)
.
I think that one of its functions is to obfuscate his
elenctic method by disarming, duping the opponent, who
realizes too late that his arguments are refuted (by the
sophist himself!).
11. I owe this point to John Brentlinger.
12. This is also Brown's position.
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this
V, 1959, pp.415-430) tha? l^atrcasgrAgathon and Socrates as opponents. Their speeches on 1 nvta
th?c=”'?^®
honor of Dionysus who presides as judge overis agon (contest) (1970, p.4). uyt^
IS.While I will not discuss the question why Socratesuses myths in the Phaedrus, the following passage presentsa compelling interpretation:
-A myth, unliL a Syllogism,as the capacity to act as a complex mirror in which peoplecan recongize not just who they are but who they might
notion! niyth is a mirror thit can
Whn^ reflect one s hopes but also seek to realize them.ile it preserves contact with our ordinary self-
understanding, it also deepens it." (Griswold, 1986, p.l47)
M, -hK
point of originality, cf. P. Frutinger (LesPlaton
,
Pans: Alcan, 1930), cited in Derrida(1981)
,
p. 67.
17. On this point, cf. Griswold (1986), pp. 139-140.
18
.
Note here the parallel to Hesiod's story of
Pandora, the gift/poison from the gods to the humans.
19.
Derrida (1981) suggests that Socrates plays the
role of a gharmakeus (magician)
,
cf
. Symposium (being
confronted with a "J' accuse" by Agathon and Alcibiades ofbewitching them)
,
Meno (allegory of Socrates being a sting
ray numbing body and soul of Meno)
,
Charmides (handing out
the charm that relieves Charmides of his headaches)
(pp. 117-119)
.
20. On the meaning of the gardens of Adonis see Plato,
Phaedrus (1995), p.81, n.l84.
21.
Compare this allegory with the deed of the painter,
mentioned in Book X of the Republic who hurries around and
quickly copies down images with his mirror.
22.
Cf. Derrida (1981), pp. 154-155.
23.
Brown (1994), p.l63.
2
4.
Brown, p.l70.
25.
However, in the aporetic dialogues, Socrates avers,
with sincerity, that he is also perplexed, e.g. about what
virtue is (cf
.
Meno ) . On this point, see Gareth Matthews,
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Philosophy"^ Teaching Thinking Through
p.61,^n!l04?*'^^
point, cf. Sprague's explanation (1993),
of thrPla?on?^*'®^"\''° Matthews for a discussionr ne Platonic examples mentioned below.
28.
Jowett's translation.
29.
Cf. Dalfen, pp. 300-307.
reflect on the gendered
to^laL?^+-^o
dichotomies he invokes, although I hesitatebel the pre-Socratic period as dominating with "male"values and the Socratic epoch being imbued with thefeminine play spirit. Such talk of polarization is
essentialist and disguises its intent to set up abetter, more authentic ontological mode of play.
31. Cf. Spariosu, p.l78.
32.
Cf. Spariosu, p.l89.
33. In the Republic, pretend play has a different
va ence
. Dialectics out to be taught to adolescents as ifIt were a game (536e-537a)
.
34. Cf. Gundert (1965), p.73.
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CHAPTER IV
ARISTOTLE'S MALEDICTION OF PLAY
Introduct 1 nn
In this chapter I will look at the ontological ranking
of play and mimesis in Aristotle's ethical, political and
aesthetic writings. l aver that his writing style bears
little resemblance to Plato's eristic toying with the
dichotomy of play and seriousness and, in fact, Aristotle
cements the dichotomy, relegating these opposites to
different spheres. This does not mean that he endorses an
abstract critique of paidia; moreover, he develops a
function argument. Play is good only for relaxation in
order to improve one's subsequent work habits. He echoes
Plato by suggesting in the Politics that play qua child's
play has an educational value. The question I want to pose
in this context is if Aristotle also values paidia qua
autotelic play, i.e. a play which is pursued for its own
sake
.
Although Plato, as many have argued, instigates an
ontological devaluation, if not malediction, of play, I
maintain that there are many shifts in positions and
emphasis in Plato's dialogues in which we observe an
occasional surfacing of his seductive play and wit, due to
his training as poet and playwriter, so that it is
misguided to suggest that Plato ultimately maligns play.
That is why I shall argue with Plato's critics, such as
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Nietzsche and Fink, and aver that Plato does not bring
about the demise of play in philosophical thought. Their
approach refuses to acknowledge the display of irony, the
use of myths and masks, the importance of inspiration and
divine madness for Plato and hence it disregards the
presence of Dionysian impulses in the Platonic dialogue. i
wish to put forth the hypothesis that Aristotle relegates
the Dionysian aspect in Plato's play to 'abstract negation'
and strengthens the Apollonian motif in play—what Spariosu
calls the logo-rational principle.
I will look at several of Aristotle's writings: the
Nicomachean Ethics (NE)
,
the Politics and the Poetics .
With respect to the NE I will discuss the use of play for
the many and for the virtuous person, and I will argue that
a significant ontological-epistemological semantic shift
occurs which leads to a malediction of paidia so that play
becomes the Other of reason. In the Politics paidia is
represented above all as having instrumental value,
especially in the context of the discussion of music
education, yet, despite its seemingly higher ranking, play
is an activity which ought not to be pursued for its own
sake. Finally, in the Poetics
. I will look at the uses of
play and mimesis. I will ask in what sense 'mimesis' is
used here and how Aristotle's concept of mimesis differs
from the Platonic conception. Is mimesis "a kind of play"
for Aristotle as well?
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In this chapter, l will argue that three different
kinds of hierarchical ranking of play can be identified in
the following works of Aristotle: first, in the Mcpmach^
Ethics, play is ranked lowest and is squarely denounced as
an activity unworthy of a virtuous person; secondly, in
the Politics
,
play is considered "harmless" which can be
taken up for educational and recreational purposes by the
youth and lower classes (the demos) ; and finally, in the
Poetics
,
play gains a higher ontological status. Aristotle
sets up Apollonian, normative standards for play: the play
for amusement, enjoyed by the masses, is valuable if it is
not tainted by 'bad' elements, i.e. Dionysian impulses.
Thus in tragedy we find a play that is valued for its own
sake, but it is appropriately purified.’’
Play and—Leisure in the Nicomachean Ethics
In my analysis of play in the Nicomachean Ethics
(NE) I shall attempt to show that pa idia is ontologically
maligned in a way that sets Aristotle markedly apart from
t®^c:her ' s theory of play. The NE discusses the various
ways a virtuous person can attain happiness ( eudaimonia ^
The structural design of the presentation is such that
Aristotle guides us from a discussion of different kinds of
virtue (pertaining to the practical-ethical life) to the
best kind (realized in the theoretical life of the
philosopher)
. I will focus on Book X (6-9) of the NE in
which Aristotle outlines his conception of the highest
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happiness. it is only within this context of napping out
the best life, bios theoretiKos
,
that Aristotle introduces
the concepts of play and leisure. Very few Aristotle
scholars have devoted any attention to these notions or to
their role in his play theory. i claim that in order to
understand play in ancient Greek thought it is paramount to
focus on these passages—especially
, chapters 6 and 7— in
the last book of the NE.'*
In chapter 6 of Book X, Aristotle revisits the
question of the nature of happiness. (1176a30; cf. Book
1.6) Happiness is thought to be self-sufficient, Aristotle
observes, and desirable for its own sake; yet, virtuous
actions also belong to happiness. The activity^ of
happiness has to be contrasted, Aristotle goes on, with
playful ones, contrary to the dominant opinion. To put it
crudely, for Aristotle, striving for happiness does not
consist in indulging in amusement. (1176b9) This
instruction is arguably a stark contrast to the Homeric and
Heraclitean predilection for the aristocratic life, clearly
synonomous with indulging in play—not toil. But here in
the NE
,
Aristotle admonishes his audience (the corrupt
archons, phauloi, supporting the tyrant ruler) that a life
in accordance with virtue is serious and not a play. The
following quote explains this dichotomy between play and
seriousness: "And we say that serious things r spoudaia ] are
better than laughable things and those connected with
amusement [ paidia l . . .
"
(1177a) Aristotle affirms here
87
unambiguously that play and seriousness are opposites.
Following Ross's translation, I hold that paldia signifies
(playful) 'amusement' in this passage. Aristotle
emphatically denies playfulness anv r-iaiir.2 ^ ijxa j.u±iies y claim to seriousness,
in fact "to exert oneself and work for the sake of
amusement [pa idia ] seems silly and utterly childish."
(1176b) Moreover, playing games for amusement's sake is
"played out" against "serious" activities of the virtuous
person (in chapter 6), the philosopher (in chapter 7), and
the legislator (in chapter 9); play is also cast in
opposition to work (ergon ) . Altogether, Aristotle maligns
play seven times in chapter 6, and only twice, in
connection with the notion of proper relaxation, does he
note its beneficial consequences.
It seems difficult to conceptualize play as an
intrinsic value; the exceptions that are made to allow for
its application merely point to an instrumental validation
of play. Thus, child's play may be valued because it is
pedagogical ly useful^, and adults may also engage in play
for the sake of relaxation "because we cannot work
continously.
" (1176b) ^ Play thus is valued for other
purposes— it is an activity not worth seeking for itself.
I will now turn to the discussion of leisure ( schole )
in chapter 7. Desmond (1992) states that leisure is highly
valued and sets the philosopher's activities apart from
others. Thus it reaffirms the hierarchical nature of the
different ways of life that Aristotle delineates in his
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discussion of happiness. Leisure is cast as an opposite of
work and characterized by the absence of external, material
constraints. In comparing Hegel to Aristotle, Desmond
suggests
:
work's necessity, the speculative
looks to the end of toilhighest activity, an activity not itselfinstrumental work but leisure. Philosophy looks
o_ leisure, is itself leisure, skole
. an activityenjoyed as an end in itself, a goal whole withinItself, yet open, making the human being at homewith being's otherness. As Aristotle piouslyputs It: A man living in philosophical leisurelives not as a mere man but as having the divinedwelling with him. (p.l31)
^ special ontological status as an activity by
the philosopher, who after all engages in theoretical,
scientific matters and whose life characterizes the best
life. Amelie O. Rorty concedes that if it is the case that
theoretical and practical reasoning clash theoretical
deliberation takes precedence, "because the independence of
the intellectual from the moral virtues allows
contemplation to continue in the midst of political
disaster and practical blindness." (1980, p.392) As a
second best life, Aristotle proposes the political life of
the lawmaker. The legislator after all uses phronesis
(practical reason)®, so that his intellectual requirements
are similar to that of the philosopher; therefore, the
nomothetes also requires leisure.
It is only in the life of the many, who engage in
'many games', when ascholia (playful amusements) takes
precedence over schole . My delineation of the three lives
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in the Book X of the NE differs from the one proposed by
Sparshott (1994), insofar as he seems to suggest that
playful diversions of the Bhauloi oan be characterized as
leisure activities;
pleasure is leisurely but not serious, the
I
virtue IS serious but not leisurely, the
Doint
intellect has both values (and from this
perhaps the most complete
^^eleips] virtue as well as the most exalted, (p. 332 -
I think that Sparshott is correct in pointing out that
spoude does not need to be an opposite of schole in
Aristotle. The mechanism of ontological malediction of
play (£aidia ) and the concurrent benediction of
seriousness (spoude)
—that I believe to be at work in the
NE IS displayed in the coupling of the following concepts:
play and frivolity, relaxation and seriousness, and
finally, leisure and seriousness.
First, paidia qua childishness, amusement, and pastime
cannot be taken seriously. The play of children and the
hedonistic doings of the inferior adults ( phauloi ^ are
"frivolous matters." To engage in play for its own sake
becomes an ontologically suspicious act and obtains the
lowest rank in the hierarchy of ethical activities.
Second, the virtuous, hard-working serious person combines
spoude and diagoge (relaxation) ; still, his virtuous
activities are classified merely as secondary in the
ontological order, because this 'practical life' is
reactive and too caught up with urgent political and
economic matters. Thus the life of such a person is not
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self sufficient enough to be considered the best life.
Third, the philosopher's contemplative activities are
considered to be of the highest ontological rank because
they combine spoude and schple vis-a-vis the demands of a
theoretical life (bios theoretikos) which is sufficiently
independent from external constraints. in this context
connotations of Dionysian frenzy or
playfulness. it is noteworthy that the hierarchy of
playfulness corresponds to the three lives outlined in Book
I and X: the pleasurable life of the phauloi
. the life of
the virtuous person who deals with serious matters
(spoudaia ) , and finally the life of the philosopher, which
eclipses the need for play qua amusement altogether.
However, some scholars have argued that Aristotle
conflates playfulness with leisure activity, which
interpretation would contribute to a more ambivalent
reading of his harsh stance on play. Sparshott's book
Taking
—
Li f
e
—Seriously; A Study of the Argument of the
Nicomachean Ethics (1994) is a case in point. He compares
the following sayings, "We are busy that we may have
leisure" ( ascholoumetha hina scholazomen
. Il77b5) with
Anarcharsis ' s advice "to play in order to be serious"
( p.aizein hopos spoudazei
. 1176b33)
. (p.430) Aristotle, no
doubt, is comfortable with juxtaposing these proverbs,
which to Sparshott seem contradictory. Sparshott claims
that the tension is only resolved in the discussion of
pleasure in the Rhetoric . He points to I. 11, a discussion
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of the nature of pleasure. Aristotle states there that
strain and serious effort are eliminated from the
consideration (of pleasant matters), since, unless one is
accustomed to them, they are painful and have to do with
compulsion and force. Moreover, the opposites of work and
seriousness are those activities associated with play:
"ease, freedom from toil, relaxation, amusement, rest, and
leep. (1370a) Sparshott, however, does not comment on
the fact that leisure is not included in this list. in
Illustrating the pleasure associated with playing agonistic
games, Aristotle remarks that the learning of "serious
games" (as opposed to ball, dice, and draught games) might
not be always pleasant from the start, but once they are a
habit they become pleasant. As an example of such a
serious game he mentions hunting with hounds. (1371a3-5)
By differentiating between serious and non-serious games,
Aristotle seems to indicate that the involvement in some
games may throw the contestant into grave danger.
Contrasting, as he does, these 'play' passages in the
NE and the Rhetoric
,
Sparshott does not notice that, in the
list of playful diversions in the Rhetoric
. leisure is
notably absent because Aristotle does not consider it being
part of paidia . In fact, Aristotle quite clearly
differentiates the notion of play ( paidia . diagoge ) from
leisure (schole) . Hence, what presented itself as an
irresolvable tension is actually nothing of the sort. On
the other hand, leisure and seriousness are contiguous, not
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oppositional concepts, as Aristotle's descriptions of the
life of contemplation attest to. The qualities describing
a life of theoria, that is, a life of highest happiness,
which are contiguous with leisure as well, are stability,
pleasure, seriousness, independence, and final telos (of.
NE 1177al8-b26) ; his play (or is it work?) is a scientific
activity, a serious pursuit of the conditions of knowledge.
The theoretical life is thus marked by leisurely activity
sought for its own sake.
In order to set up this worthy game of attaining
happiness, Aristotle has to start out with a malediction of
play, insofar as it is merely pleasurable and childish,
[£aidion hai hedeiai ] , and clearly not an activity of
theoretical reflection. Schole has more to do with
®^^®riuous academic work than with 'mere' play and is
carefully delineated as being accessible only to the few,
i.e. to those who bother to inquire about metaphysical and
ethical questions... Schole is a necessary condition for
the person who wants to engage with a book such as the NE!
Sparshott points out correctly that Aristotle basically
describes the material conditions of philosophers, or of
priests, who are—due to the division of labor--the
designated leisure class. (1994, p.332) And rather than
denouncing the parasitical nature of their existence,
Aristotle affirms it tout force . To return to the quote by
Desmond on his comparison of Hegel and Aristotle (see
above)
,
I want to point out that the meaning of schole does
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not encompass the Hegelian notion of the Bacchanalian
revel,’ since Aristotle's schole illustrates Apollonian
order and harmony (kosmos ) and clearly banishes Dionysian
aspects. The NE initiates a malediction of play, of
Dionysian play—a theme continued in the Politics and
Poetics .
—
—Kinds
—
of Play in the Politics
£.olitics ^° Aristotle explores the moral and
political conduct of an individual virtuous person vis-a-
vis a virtuous self-fulfillment in the community (pikps)
.
What then is the relevance of play to his project? In the
context of prescribing norms for a political community, the
valence of paidia ought to shift as well. After all, the
ethical horizon of (quasi-solitary) philosophical musings
is quite distinct from the civic responsibilities of a
nomothetes (legislator) who might perceive certain
(pedagogical) needs being fulfilled in child's play.
In Book VII and VIII, Aristotle continues his
discussion of children's play and of philosophical
leisurely activities. Again, as postulated in the NE,
leisure is contrasted with paidia (play, pastime)
.
However, what is different is that 'diversion', as Spariosu
points out correctly, in Aristotle's play theory differs
from Plato insofar as the Stagirite no longer views
intellectual diversion ( diaooqe ) as a form of paidia . In
its highest expression diagoge amounts to philosophizing.
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(1991, p.224) This shift of meaning parallels the
conceptual shift in the NE, that is, in Aristotle's re-
evaluation of leisure as a specific attribute of the
philosophical life.
The hierarchies of playful activities are especially
pronounced in Book VIII, in which scholia (leisure) is
ranked highest, followed by
_ascholia (work— for sake of
leisure), ^apausis (recreation) and lastly paidia (play,
amusement).''^ Again this hierarchy corresponds to the
mechanism of ontological malediction of play I have
outlined in the previous section. in the Politics as in
the NE, a leisurely activity is associated most of all with
the 'work' of the philosopher, which is distinct from the
demands of practical life:
For many necessaries of life have to be suppliedbefore we can have leisure..., as the proverb
says, 'There is no leisure for slaves,
' and those
who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of
invader. Courage and endurance are reguired
for business and philosophy for leisure.
.
.
(VII
1334al8-24)
Philosophical life is not preoccupied with material
conditions but is compared to a life of blissfulness.
However, Aristotle emphasizes a different point here: in
the absence of war and external impediments, it is
essential to get exposed to philosophy (and temperance and
justice)
,
so as not to live superfluously. In this case,
philosophy seems to fill a void (which of course for the
ancient poets was filled with playing games...). (1334a30-
34)
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Similarly, Aristotle seems to fall back on postulating
a dichotomy of Mos_thepreti^ vs. Mos praktikn. (cf. ne)
by advocating a division between the upper and lower agora
in the city: the life of the upper agora is devoted to
leisure and free from the tumultous thriving of hoi oolini .
whereas the lower market place, the traders' area, is
devoted to the necessities of life. (VII, 1331b) Life thus
is divided into business and leisure, where only schole is
an end in itself. in the same vain, Aristotle determines
that there are two kinds of spectators and, thus, various
performances are needed to satisfy both of them: There are
the free and educated spectators (supposedly priests and
philosophers) and the vulgar crowd (of artisans)
. The
latter should be entertained by professional musicians, who
practice art merely in order to give pleasure, not to give
educational enjoyment. (1342a) Who performs for the former
crowd of nobles? Aristotle does not tell us—but most
likely they 'play' for their own kind: fellow philosophers
who are free from the constraints of taking care of
material necessities so that they do not need to perform in
order to earn an income.
In the end of Book VII and in Book VIII, the pedagogy
of playfulness is reconsidered. Yet, this reconsideration
occurs within the parameters of Aristotle's prescriptions
with respect to proper children's education ( paideia ) . He
notes that their play "should not be vulgar, tiring or
effeminate." (VII, 1336a27-28) In a lengthy discussion of
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the merits of music for children's education, Aristotle
decides in its favor, because of its "power of forming the
character." (1340bll-i2) However, Aristotle worries about
the varied uses of music; it can lend itself to either
Dionysian (=bad) pleasure or to Apollonian (=good,
intellectual) pleasure. Music may produce education,
amusement (paidia) or intellectual enjoyment (diagppe)
:
Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and
relaxation is of necessity sweet, for it is theremedy of pain caused by toil; and intellectual
enjoyment is universally acknowledged to contain
an element not only of the noble but of thepleasant, for happiness is made up of both(1339bl5-19)
Clearly, all three concepts are theorized as pertaining to
Apollonian values only. Spariosu maintains that Aristotle
gives a circular argument, because work and play do not
exist only for the sake of leisure, but also for the sake
of each other, (p.228) Unlike in the NE, Aristotle links
amusement, pastimes, play with 'proper' recreation
( anapausis ) in this passage. Diaaoae . synonymous with
happiness, consists of play and relaxation and in this
coritext becomes "intellectualized"
. However, I am puzzled
by Spariosu 's claim of circularity. Work, Aristotle avers,
does not exist for the sake of amusement, and playing is
merely an "alleviation of past toils and pains" ( Pol
.
1339b39) —an admonishment which echoes the paidiophobic
passages of the NE. However, people like to deviate from
the path prescribed by the philosopher. Aristotle notes:
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happens that men make amusement the
o? ^leaLre tho =°"tains some elementordinary or lower
mistake the lowe^ for thfigher, and in seeking for the one find the
end of
every pleasure has a likeness to theaction. ( Pol. 1339b32-35)
Even though such playful amusement is not an end in itself,
engaging in it is a harmless, excusable activity. After
all, the act of listening to music is relaxing and
intellectually stimulating.
In the NE, Aristotle attributes the belief of the
ranking of play as an end to the faulty deliberations and
actions of the self-indulgent person, "the lover of
amusement," who fails to realize that "amusement is a
relaxation, since it is rest from work; and the lover of
amusement is one of the people who go to excess in this."
(NE, VII, 1150bl6-18) Their excessive vice, Aristotle
laments, is incurable. (NE, 1150b32)
When properly sanctioned, music education ought to pay
attention to building moral character and the music to be
played ought to avoid stimulating base effects ("Bacchic
frenzy"!) which are produced by flute playing. ( Pol
.
. VIII,
1341a) The main impetus for the lengthy discussion of
the purposefulness of music education/play seems to be to
drive out the Dionysian element, which is best achieved by
means of catharsis or purgation (cf. Pol
.
I341b37; also
Poetics
,
1449b27). Those feeble minds who succumb to
religious frenzy experience cathartic relief through
listening to sacred songs. Members of the lower class
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need to
whose "minds are perverted from the natural state"
receive melodies in "perverted modes and highly strung and
unnaturally coloured" (PoU 1342a23-2S) While Aristotle
stresses the importance of play in music education, play is
subservient to other activities, e.g. education does not
occur for the sake of play, so that play has merely an
instrumental value. It seems to me that if Aristotle could
have conceived a way in which he could get children to
learn without pretense-play’‘, he would have preferred
that!
Aristotle seems eager to set up a dichotomy between
the play of children and "ordinary" people on the one hand
and the edifying leisurely 'play' of the philosopher and
statesman on the other. He presents a multitude of
examples for rationalizing and reifying this dichotomy,
e.g. by claiming that the many simply enjoy perverted
pleasures and are unable to become productive citizens. In
outlining the best form of government, Aristotle maintains
that the citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or
tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble, and inimical to
virtue. Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is
necessary both for the development of virtue and the
performance of political duties." ( Pol
.
VII, I328b39-
1329a2) For Aristotle, the content of each play (of the
two classes) is radically different from each other, and
the play of the leisure class is clearly to be favored^^;
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however, unlike in the NE, the other kind of play is also
condoned in the Politic.
The play set up by Aristotle in his ethical and
political writings has significant socio-political
implications, in so far as it determines whose play is
worthy of philosophical approval. l claim that a critical
re-evaluation of the Aristotelian validation of certain
kinds of play occurs only in Marxist, phenomenological,
deconstructivist play theory and in the novel field of the
philosophy of childhood.
Play and Mimesis in the Poetioc;
In this discussion of representation of play and
mimesis in theatrical production I want to address the
question whether Aristotle's Poetics ^^ furthers a
malediction of play. in order to answer this point we
need to analyze the function of mimesis in poetic
works
.
Mimesis, Aristotle notes, is an intrinsic value, a
of human nature: "Imitation is natural to
man from childhood," and humans are the "most imitative
creature[s] in the world, and learn[...] first by
imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in
works of imitation." (1448b) Imitation is inherently
playful. (Note that Aristotle adopts Plato's definition of
mimesis as "a kind of play.") The poets portray human
actions in three different ways, i.e. they either idealize
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them, make caricatures of them, or portray them
realistically. The most common imitative poetic works are
epic poetry and tragedy, both representing noble actions,
and comedy, representing ridiculous actions. (1447a-1448a)
After discussing the differences between these imitative
arts, Aristotle goes on to focus on tragic art (chapters 6-
22) and ends with a brief discussion of epic art claiming
that tragedy is a superior kind of imitation than epic
poetry (chapters 23-26), because it is better able to
attain "the poetic effect than the Epic." (cf. I462b) In
assessing the value of poetry Aristotle makes use of
ontological categories, such as plausibility, possibility
and reality, to elevate the status of poetry, which
portrays the plausible and general, as being a more
philosophic and serious techne than history. Possibility
is ontologically approved, whereas actuality, pertaining to
mere singular events, is maligned. (9.1451b) (However, it
remains unclear if Aristotle includes comedy here, as a
serious," i.e. grave, techne
. ) Given the importance of
poetry in comparison to historic accounts of events, it
would seem that Aristotle also elevates mimesis (and play)
.
But we have to ask what kind of mimesis is restored in
tragic art?
Spariosu correctly holds that it is misleading to
suggest—as Anglo-American scholarship has done—that
Aristotle restores the prestige of mimesis in the context
of poetry.^® He states that in fact Aristotle continues
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to emphasize median values over archaic ones and that both
Aristotle and Plato see poetry as a playful simulation
(mimesis) of serious discourse and that poetry produces
pleasure, not knowledge. i disagree with Spariosu on this
point because I think that we need to differentiate between
Aristotle's and Plato's uses of mimesis insofar as for
Aristotle a poem's criterion is not knowledge but only
plausibility whereas for Plato true mimesis is indeed
"philosophical" and produces intellectual enjoyment. i
also argue against Spariosu (1991) who holds that
Aristotle continues the Platonic taming of the ecstatic
nature of poetic play.” m fact, unlike Aristotle, Plato
does not condemn poetic frenzy or divine rapture, but he
sees Its truest expression in the philosophical enthusiast,
who is also engaged in poetic mimesis. Furthermore, Plato
does not chastise divine madness in poets but demands that
philosophers examine the poems critically
.
In contrast to Plato, Aristotle favors the
intelligent, talented ( euphues ) poet who puts himself into
the roles he creates over the mad, frenzied poet, since the
to stay within the boundaries of human
experience, and just creates whatever he imagines, i.e.
without any purposefulness. Aristotle writes:
At the time when he is constructing his
Plots [...], the poet should remember [...] to put
the actual scenes as far as possible before his
eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the
vividness of an eye-witness as it were, he will
devise what is appropriate, and be least likely
to overlook incongruities. ( 17 . 1455 a)
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Aristotle envisions a poet, who shrewdly maps out the
details of his plot in his imagination and makes them as
plausible as possible. Aristotle also acknowledges that a
good poet, who is passionately attached to his plot and
characters may portray their emotions more convincingly:
may be, too, the poet should even acthis story with the very gestures of hispersonages. Given the same natural
qualifications, he who feels the emotions to bedescribed will be the most convincing; distress
instance, are portrayed mosttruthfully by one who is feeling them at the
moment. Hence it is that poetry demands a man
with a special gift for it, or else one with atouch of madness in him; the former can easily
assume the required mood, and the latter may be
actually beside himself with emotion
r=ekstatikoi ]
.
(17.1455a)
To create a poetio work with sentiments of madness is
acceptible to Aristotle if it is effective in purging the
spectator's emotions. However, given the restrictions
Aristotle places on the poet's mimetic production, it is
clear that Bacchic frenzy is to be tamed, as Spariosu
suggests. For instance, a poet's portrayal of the very bad
attaining a bad state is not condoned, because it
does not produce the proper emotions, namely fear or pity,
in the spectator. (1453a)
The theatre critic Augusto Boal goes a step further in
his critique of Aristotle's instrumental-rational treatment
of poetry. In the chapter "Aristotle's Coercive System of
Tragedy" (in Theatre of the Oppressed ) . he argues that
Aristotle justifies the use of tragedy as an instrument of
repression to avoid instability among the populace which
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might be discontent about existing socio-economic
injustice. The stabilizing function of tragedy consists in
the sympathetic portrayal of the tragic hero as being
smitten with a tragic flaw (hamartia) and after his
recognition of his error suffering the consequences
(catastrophe)
. Most importantly, the spectator, who is
terrified by the catastrophe, needs to experience
catharsis, i.e. she has to be purified from her own
hamartia
. Spectators live vicariously the hero's
experiences. (Boal, p.34) They empathize with him and at
the same time fear that they too suffer from an impure
character, from bad traits. m instilling this fear of
excessive, unlawful acts tragedy effectively normalizes
behavior and produces docile bodies.
Instead of providing us with a conception of poetic
play, in which creativity, spontaneity, and a giddy play
with seriousness surface^^, Aristotle prescribes a (best)
play which prescribes proper feelings of terror and pity.
Nevertheless he disavows that tragic, mimetic production
has political significance. Aristotle, as Boal correctly
notes, gives an ideological manifesto in defense of the
status quo (of an undemocratic social system)
. Rather than
romanticising the "playful spirit" of Greek society (cf.
Nietzsche, Huizinga)
,
Boal has pointed out the socializing,
repressive character of poetic performance, whose sole
purpose is to enforce a rationalistic (Apollonian)
aesthetic code, a standard which is employed for the "moral
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education of aesthetic :nan..^3. representation of
tragic or comic aspects of human nature, human reality, is
thus condemned to the "service of Reason"^^.
While Aristotle condones the idea that a poetic work
should take seriously the realm of possibilities of human
experience by exaggerating or accentuating certain tragic
flaws, the main impetus of a superior mimetic performance
IS to present us with a rather limited trajectory of human
emotions: a good tragic work has to incite pity or terror,
and it may not deviate from this mandate. In addition it
has to 'induce' purgation ( catharsis ^ of those feelings in
the spectator in order to avoid promoting agonism and
social unrest in the audience. It thus becomes clear that
play is maligned when it deviates from the rationalist
Apollonian path.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to show that
Aristotle eschews Dionysian and agonistic elements of play.
While similar (moral) misgivings about the ludic god are
voiced in the works of Hesiod, Aristophanes and Plato, I
maintain that it is Aristotle who consistently disavows the
relevance of frenzy, cunning, and humor for leading a
virtuous life. I point to Aristotle's function argument
for paidia
.
particularly to his distinction drawn between
schole and paidia . While both terms are elusive in their
meaning, I hold that the dichotomy which Aristotle erects
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effectively erases tragic play which is both destructive
and life-affirming. l have argued that we can see an
interpretative shift in his three writings, from an
outright condemnation of play and amusement in the
Nicomachean Ethics to a cautious endorsement of two kinds
of play in the Politics and a positive re-evaluation in the
Poetics. However, Aristotle ushers in "median,"
rationalistic values, and sets up a game that is about
making rational choices and following given rules. Even in
the Poetics, mimetic play is neither about playing with the
masks of Silenus, nor about cunning and frivolity. Given
this evaluation of playful attitudes and activities, I
suggest that Aristotle eclipses the Dionysian element--
(free) play becomes the Other of reason. Only in Hegel
do we see a re-evaluation of the Dionysian (in the
Bacchanalian revel)
,
where play recognizes itself in
Reason—as truth.
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Notes
grateful to Angela Curran for a helpfuldiscussion of the ontological shift of play in Aristotle.
2.
Unless otherwise noted, I will make use of W.D.
Ross' translation of the NE (in McKeon, 1941).
3 . In the Appendix I present two different schools of
thought in Anglo-American scholarship, namely the inclusive
end and the dominant end theory, on the valence of
individual virtues in the pursuit of the final good
( eudaimonia ) . I will provide a defense of the dominant,
intellectualist account.
4.1 find it surprising that Spariosu, who has written
extensively on play theory in the ancient Greek world, does
not deal with Aristotle's ethics at all in his book God of
Many Names (1991). His Aristotle chapter is entitled:
"Aristotle: Poetics, Politics, and Play."
5.
Note that for Aristotle happiness is not a state of
being, a particular disposition ( hexis ) but is an activity
( energeia ) . It is not just about being free from external
constraints that determines happiness.
6.
Curiously, the benefits of child's play are not
explicitly mentioned in his ethics. But we can infer this
from the passages on education in the Politics (Book VII)
.
7 . Incidentally
,
this sentiment is echoed in Kant, (see
Chapter V)
8
.
Phronesis is a virtue that has intrinsic status. On
an elaboration of this point see Appendix.
9. On the notion of the revel, cf. Chapter VI.
10. 1 will follow Benjamin Jowett's translation for the
most part.
11.
Cf. Spariosu, pp. 225-230.
12.
Thus playing for money taints the value of this
activity, a sentiment which reappears--emphatically ! — in
Huizinga's Homo Ludens .
13.
Most of this pedagogical discussion and the
prescriptions of proper education Aristotle borrows from
Plato's Republic and Laws .
14. I. e. a child's moral educator devises a "noble
lie"—a play that isn't--in order to motivate the child to
learn his chores.
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15. Gareth Matthews' studies have shed a new light onthis matter. He calls on adults to take children's
philosophizing 'seriously', cf. The Philosophy of Childhood
Philosophy of the Young Child (1980); and Dialoaues
with Children (1984) . ^
16.1 am thinking in particular of Buytendijk's work.
17.1 will make use of Ingram Bywater's translation (inMcKeon 1941) .
18. Cf. (1991)
,
p. 195.
IS.Spariosu, p.l97.
20.
Cf. also Elias (1984).
21.
For an excellent feminist discussion of Aristotle's
best tragedy, see Curran (1996)
.
22.1
want to draw attention to Marten's definition of
poetics here, which expresses this non-Aristotelian
aesthetic sentiment: "Poesie ist und bleibt ein Spiel, eine
Inszenierung des Menschen, freilich ein Spiel voller Ernst
und Realitat. Das spielend-ernste Verhaltnis zu
Unendlichkeit und Unsterblichkeit ist ein Zeugnis
poetischer Realitat unter vielen, und damit eben ein
Zeugnis von Realitat." (1988, p.82)
23.
cf. Schiller (see also Chapter V).
24.
For an explanation of this term, cf. Marten ( 1988) .
25.Djuric (1985) notes Nietzsche's criticism of
Aristotle for conceiving play as a lesser good,
subordinated to higher life goals, (see p.l76)
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CHAPTER V
KANT'S AND SCHILLER'S PLAY
Human lif© is not a game of joy but a concatenation of
necessities and strenuousness r Bemuhunaen
-| . Only by being
subjected to this constraint we can have enjoyment. Those
who shun work, have to become savages or are overcome byboredom. They are afraid to die, because they have not
felt life.
Kant, Reflexionen zur Anthropoloaie
. WW XV, 1104.
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall pursue the malediction of
play in Kant and Schiller's discussions of the concept and
function of play. Although, Kant, unlike Schiller, does
not develop a play theory per se, nevertheless, he utilizes
the concept enough so that one can rule out the possibility
that Kant uses the "free play" of imagination as a mere
'by-play' of its productive activity. Recent work by
Heidemann ( Per Beoriff des Spiels
. 1968)
,
the first of its
kind which analyses play systematically in philosophical
discourse, and by Trebels ( Einbildunqskraft und Spiel .
1967) has focussed on the Kantian analysis of play and
imagination. These studies have been amplified by
Makkreel ' s hermeneutic work Imagination and Interpretation
in Kant (1990). However, they do not give a historically
situated analysis of Kant's play of the imagination nor a
comparative approach, e.g. contrasting his conception with
Hume's, Aquinas's or Aristotle's play.^ I will explore
the Aristotelian thread of play in Kant, and I will focus
on the treatment of play in the first and third Critiques;
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in addition I will examine anthropological applications in
the pre-critical work of "Observations on the Feeling of
the Beautiful and Sublime" and in the post-critical work of
The Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View .^
In the second part of this chapter, I will briefly
discuss a Kantian student of sorts, the poet Friedrich
Schiller, whose work On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in
a_ Series of Letters may not have great philosophical value
but has nevertheless reshaped the way we think about
aesthetics. Schiller, as Heidegger claims, has been the
only one who "has grasped essential things vis-a-vis Kant's
doctrine of the beautiful and of art." (cf. Heidegger,
Nietzsche Vol.I, p.l37) I claim that in his writings, the
purpose and the differentiation of play into ontological
dichotomies is more pronounced than it is in Kant, since
Schiller distinguishes explicitly between a transcendental
play-drive and a material play-drive, giving primacy to the
former--in good Kantian tradition. Notice that he is also
indebted to Aristotle's differentiation
—
perhaps
unwittingly—because he sets up his own dichotomy between
the supreme play of the philosopher (qua schole
.
leisurely
activity) and the mere pastimes of the many, who pursue
material play things.
Among play theoreticians it is commonly accepted that
Schiller is influenced by Kant's radical subjectivism.
Evidence of this influence finds its way into Schiller's
own talk about players (and their games) . With his
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emphatic benediction of play in the Letters
. Schiller has
inspired a generation of like-minded play theoreticians,
such as Groos, Buytendijk, Huizinga, Bally and Hartmann.
Others, who have criticized Schiller's subjectivist
approach, have developed a phenomenology of play (Scheuerl,
Fink and Gadamer) in this chapter, I will limit myself
to the 'beginnings' of subjectivist play, rather than focus
on the divergent play tendencies which emerged after
2*-h.iller. I will claim that both Kant and Schiller follow
Aristotle's lead vis—a—vis play and its purposefulness and
continue to disregard the Dionysian element of play.
Kant's Ruminations on Plav
In order to understand Kant's conception of play, it
seems appropriate to evaluate the importance of play in
several of his writings, beginning with his rather
impressionistic treatment of the subject matter in the
brief essay on the feelings of the sublime and beautiful
and going on to the unfolding of the play theme in his
third Critique, The Critique of Judgment . The structure of
this Kant-section of the chapter is as follows: First, I
will discuss the pre-critical anthropological reflections
in the essay concerning the sublime and beautiful and how
they bear on the analysis of the third Critique. Secondly,
I will briefly discuss the first and second Critiques and
argue for a shift of emphasis in the third Critique, which
gives much more prominence to play than is to be found in
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Kant's earlier writings. Finally, l conclude with a
discussion of moral and anthropological implications of
play in his Anthropology
.
The Pre-critical Period; On the Beautiful and Sublime
In the essay "Beobachtungen iiber das Gefiihl des
Schonen und Erhabenen," (published in 1764, hereafter BSE)
there are only five occurrences of the term "Spiel" and its
composita (Trauerspiel
. Spielwerk ) . Given the sparsity of
occurrences of the term, it does not seem important to give
any attention to this essay, and in fact, this seems to be
one of the reasons why many play theoreticians have chosen
to ignore it. Play, however, surfaces here with clear
ideological valorization. It is the means used to converse
with women in public gatherings.^ Male playfulness, i.e.
demonstrating one's wit and cleverness, ("[seinen] munteren
Witz spielen . . . lassen" ) at dinner table conversations is
encouraged, according to Kant, in order to please women
F Frauenzimmer l . who embody the beautiful.^ While women
may also play in ways that demonstrate their wittiness,
they are warned about transgressing (gendered) standards: a
woman who is too witty, too precocious, is called a fool
(Narrin )
.
(BSE A57) She is allowed to express only enough
to show that she graciously welcomes any complements from
the (sublime) male counterpart. Clearly, she may not
venture far in her play, given the restrictions that are
immediately placed on her. Kant's advice follows an
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infamous observation that he is doubtful that women ("the
fair gender") are in fact capable of grasping first
principles. (A56) Kant goes as far as to declare that
women are cast as the sexualized object of play, of the
male gaze and wit, so that "Woman is always as woman a
pleasant object of a well-behaved conversation" (A63)
. As
subjugated players they all too willingly play along with
male insinuations r Anspieluncren ] , lest they be accused of
being pedantic^ or prudish. Kant claims that he may
invoke such observations as essayist, not as moral
philosopher, because he "only" observes appearances, viz.
feelings of the beautiful, and does not make moral
judgments. (A63)
In French high society, such good taste is not adhered
to, according to Kant. First of all, necessary boundaries
between jest and seriousness are shamelessly transgressed:
"Important affairs are treated as jokes, and petty things
get the most serious attention." (A90) One of those "petty
things" is the Frauenzimmer . But most disturbingly, in
such conversations the other person becomes merely a toy
r Spielwerk i for one's own pleasure, regardless of gender!
While Kant has no objections to raise in his "empirical"
discussions of how the "fair gender" is the play-object of
dinner conversations in Prussian society, he is appalled by
the social and political prominence of women in French
(high) society. In a footnote he says that woman has the
say at all parties: "Madame sets the tone." What is lost.
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Kant laments, is that woman is not truly honored in such a
culture. (A88-90)
There is a duplicitous tendency towards playfulness in
this essay. Playing, jesting, galantery are expressly
condoned, but "excesses" of play—especially in female
jokers, or when play itself becomes a national pastime—are
a bad habit, an unfunny folly. The rules of the game are
given by good taste. (A57) Clearly, play has a specific
function, if only to overcome the oppositional relation
between the sexes ( "Gegenverhaltnis der Geschlechter" ) as
required by bourgeois etiquette. In good Aristotelian
tradition, Kant cautions against hubris; too much play is
clearly unacceptable, especially among women players.
In pursuing the Aristotelian thread of 'good' schole
vs. 'bad' paidia
, I contend that this oppositional couple
has left its marks in this essay. The "fair sex" is
differentiated when it comes to practices of play,
seemingly incapable of enjoying clever games of the mind.
Furthermore, playfulness has its kairos ; if put to use in
serious activities, these will inevitably become
superficial, lightweight f lapoisch . leichtsinniq l affairs.
I will now turn to such serious matters by discussing play
in Kant's critical writings.
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Play in The Critique of Pure Reason and in The Cri-higue of
Practical Reason
The Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter CPR)
,
play
is not valorized as a different kind of activity but as a
negative activity. Kant repeatedly refers to the "mere"
play of imagination f Einbildunoskraft ] . which, according to
him, has no import for the objective validity of empirical
concepts. As Heidemann (1968) points out, "play is neither
knowledge nor good in itself." (p.213) But since synthesis
is a rule-directed activity— "the act of putting different
representations together, and of grasping what is manifold
in them in one [act of] knowledge" (B103) — it seems that
synthesis must have something to do with play.
Knowledge is defined by Kant in terms of the
determinate relation it bears to given representations of
an object; however, such a determinate relation does not
exist in "mere" play, which is a random, spontaneous,
subjective movement of the lower cognitive faculties (e.g.
imagination) . The study of speculative reason is a serious
affair [ ein Geschaft ] , a scientific endeavor, not a game of
mere opining, which does not have the least bit in common,
according to Kant, with the earnest search for truth (cf.
the play of imagination in B850/A822)
.
Kant often
juxtaposes the opposites, Geschaft and Spiel . to indicate
that work (seriousness) and play exclude each other—to the
chagrin of phenomenologists
,
such as Fink and Gadamer.
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However, Kant makes room for play in transcendental
dialectics (e.g. the dialectical play of cosmological
Ideas)
,
(A462/B490) This kind of play (perhaps qua
Spielerei
,
i.e. a play of fancy^) is contrasted with "the
rules of experience" and simply does not correspond to an
object of experience; it is mere illusion or a false
impression (Schein and Blejndwerk)
. in this Scheinwelt .
reason is unable to bring these cosmological ideas "into
harmony" with truth, the laws of nature. (A462/B490)
Trebels suggests a positive use of play here, since
illusion is the realm of truth within a game. Play has its
own truth, its own reality. (Trebels, 1967, pp.151) I
think he takes on a Gadamerian interpretation and— in a
presentist move— imposes it on Kant's CPR. After all, Kant
maintains that the speculative thinking of cosmological
ideas yields meaninglessness, F Sinnleeres . Nonsens 1
.
(A485/B513)® Play does not satisfy the conditions
required for knowledge, because it has nothing to do with
rule-directed synthetic activities, which characterize pure
concepts. I disagree with Menzer (1952), Trebels and
Heidemann, who loosely interpret the term "to put into
play" r ins Spiel setzen i as Kant's way of introducing rules
into the game of pure reason, which could suggest,
misleadingly, that play has some epistemological
significance in his critical methodology.
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I will now briefly turn to The Critique of Practical
Rea^ (hereafter CPrR)
,
in which there are only a few
references to play. However, negative value judgments
abound. For Kant it is absurd to substitute for the
concept of duty, which follows the principles of pure
practical reason (the moral law, autonomy of the good
mere mechanical play" of contradictory pleasures.
(CPrR, p.68) However, it is noteworthy that Kant
uses the expression, Widerspiel (conflictual
play, the back-and-forth movement, the subjective inter-
play of opposing affects), (cf. CPrR, pp.53, 61, 130)
Heidemann points out correctly that the term Widerspiel is
not synonymous with a logical contradiction. (1968, p.l27)
It merely depicts the ephemeral, unreliable moral character
of play (of passions) Kant stresses that base pleasures
are in Widerspiel to the feeling of respect for the moral
law and hence have to be defeated (cf. CPrR, p.l30). In
its moral application, free will is not playful; freedom
here has nothing to do with "free play," which on the other
hand is a key (positive) term in the aesthetic context of
the third Critique.
Finally, Urteilskraft (the mental faculty of judgment)
is condemned as a mere children's game, something practised
only for competition's sake (CPrR, p.275). Kant revises
this "prejudgment" two years later with the publication of
The Critique of Judgment , where he considers the aesthetic
dimension of play. But this may be only prima facie a
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approach: Kant maligns play in the
epistemological and ethical realm and approves play only in
the aesthetic realm; thus the second Critique manifests his
commitment to establishing semi-autonomous spheres of
metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics (and perhaps
philosophical anthropology)
.
In both the first and second Critiques, play is held
in contempt epistemologically, figuring as the Other of
reason and understanding. "Mechanical" or haphazard play
does not have a part in the second order rule-directed
activies of pure concepts, which produce the synthetic
unity of consciousness, (cf. CPR A106)
I will now turn to the third Critique, in which Kant
attempts to recognize play's aesthetic function as
interplay—not Widerspiel—of imagination and
understanding. Yet, I will attempt to show that, in this
formalistic harmony, play is not knowledge-producing
either. However, the first part of the third Critique
(which deals solely with a critique of taste) features new
aspects of play which have influenced later play
theoreticians (notably Schiller)
.
Play of the Imagination in The Critique of Judgment
Where The Critique of Practical Reason ridicules the
play of judgment as mere child's play and The Critique of
Pure Reason discounts any serious critical study of
aesthetics, Kant commits a ludic turn in his third Critique
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where he probes judgments of taste and holds that they are
indeed synthetic judgments a priori.
In recent years it has been fashionable to break with
those aestheticians who criticize Kant's Critique of
Judgment (KdU)^° as shallow and subjectivist. Trebels
(1967) and Makkreel (1990) argue for a complete re-
evaluation of the third Critique and assail Gadamer's
standpoint for his dismissal of Kant's aesthetics as
subjectivist.^^ Kemal (1992) criticizes those who chide
Kant for introducing a formalist aesthetic theory (notably
Crawford, 1974) . On the other hand, defenders of Gadamer's
view maintain that Kant pre-judges, if not, maligns, play
when he talks about das bloje Spiel of the imagination
(e.g. Heidemann, 1968)^^. In my discussion of Kant's
analysis of play I maintain that his penchant for formalism
reveals his Aristotelian tendencies, while his subjectivism
and his elevation of genius make possible a different kind
of play—one that breaks free from traditional aesthetic
standards. Kant maintains that aesthetic judgments which
have universal validity are communicable.^^ Yet Kant
cannot bring himself to part completely with Aristotle. I
claim that in The Critique of Judgment and in the
Anthropology Kant again displays Aristotelian tendencies
insofar as he describes a playful activity as "the Other"
of seriousness; play, for instance, a conversation, may not
have a purpose, except that it is enjoyable in itself. It
may also serve as relaxation . In Kant play is simply a
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pleasurable activity, in an aesthetic
—not pathological
—
sense! Kant says that play is something that is an sich
^qenehm . Yet, Kant's use of the term Spiel is quite
ambiguous in the third Critique; in some instances it is
(positively) identified with the aesthetic judgment, which
mediates between Reason and understanding. In the section
on the "Analytic of the Sublime" (KdU, §§23), however, Kant
turns against play—so to speak—by stating that this
feeling is "no play but seriousness..." (KdU, p.75) —which
is consistent with his pre-critical reflection on the
sublime and beautiful.
In exploring the meanings (and tensions) of Kant's
play in the KdU, I want to put forth the following leading
questions: (1) what is the function of imagination in KdU?
How is it used in the first as compared with the third
Critique? (2) What is free play, rule-directed play, and
what is the significance of examples? (3) What is the role
of play vis-a-vis aesthetic pleasure?
(1) There is much disagreement about the
interpretation of the function of play, which is so
intricately tied to the faculty of imagination. In order
to make sense of their interconnection (qua "harmonious
interplay"), we will first have to understand the role of
imagination in the first and third Critiques.
Makkreel's study suggests that a re-evaluation of
imagination f Einbildunqskraf
t
) takes place in Kant's first
120
Critique. Kant follows Leibniz, Baumgarten and Wolff in
arguing against the Cartesian dismissal of imagination as
an arbitrary sensory power and prone to give false
judgment. (1990, p.9) What is novel in Kant's first
is that he assigns a double function to
imagination, i.e. imagination is both a productive and a
merely reproductive mental activity. in so far as this
cognitive faculty is able to conjure up images creatively
and spontaneously, it is a transcendental a priori faculty,
synthesizing inner sense prior to all experience; in its
reproductive capacity, imagination merely replicates
objects empirically (a posteriori), i.e. according to
empirical laws that it does not conceptualize.^^ We have
to ask at this point: does this double function of
imagination 'carry over' to the third Critique?
Henrich (1992) claims that the third Critique is more
precise than the first Critique in describing the
employment of the harmonious play of mental faculties and
in presenting a new aesthetic theory about the relationship
between understanding and imagination, feeling and play,
(pp. 35-38) However, Kant remains vague in his description
of the structure of "harmonious play." Trebels, on the
other hand, maintains that the role of imagination and its
play (with understanding) is not remarkably different in
the two Critiques. Trebels 's analysis is provocative and
original yet rather "imaginatively" interprets Kant's
aesthetic theory, as a coherent one, even though Trebels
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notes that The Critique of Pure Reason rejects the
possibility of a philosophical theory of aesthetics (cf.
CPR, B35n.). Trebels claims that the first Critique has to
be considered foundational for the critique of aesthetic
judgment. (Trebels, p.8) I am in agreement with his claim;
however, I find it doubtful that there is no interpretive
shift with respect to the function of imagination, once
Kant was determined to write a book about an aesthetic
theory that makes universal validity claims about judgments
of taste which do not rely on rational proof or experience.
Makkreel (1990) also counters Trebels 's position by
stating that he does not account for the different function
of imagination in the third Critique, a function quite
dissimilar from its synthesizing activity in the first
Critique. Makkreel notes how odd it is that it is so
frequently overlooked that Kant says nothing of the faculty
of intuition and its crucial function in the synthesis of
apprehension in the KdU. (pp.47) Makkreel argues with
Trebels that it is imprecise to reduce "felt harmony" to
"synthesis," since the former is a reciprocal relation that
brings about attunement between two elements (imagination
and understanding) and the latter is a one-sided influence
"for the sake of strict unity." (Makkreel, p.47) I find
Makkreel ' s position that there is no conformity of the role
of imagination in both Critiques more plausible (than
Trebels 's analysis), and thus I also take issue with
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Henrich's optimistic view that Kant actually clarifies the
role of imagination in the KdU.
(2) How does the controversy about the uses Kant makes
of imagination reflect on Kant's conception of the
epistemological function of play, which is intricately
intertwined with imagination in the first and third
Critiques? Prima facie, there is an important shift from
"mere" play (indicating its derivative role) to the "free"
play of imagination (and understanding)
.
How does Kant determine this free play in the KdU? It
is spontaneous, lively, voluntary, not bound by law or
concepts. Imagination is free— in so far it rejects all
rigid regularity—and at the same time is productive in
accordance with the law without the law: "[ajnything that
gives the imagination scope for unstudied and final
r zweckma;0iq
]
play is always fresh to us. We do not grow to
hate the very sight of it." (§22, p.73) Without being
subservient to the synthesizing, unifying activity of
understanding, imagination plays within the Spielraum
mandated by this higher cognitive faculty. Barriers are
imposed on the play of imagination through the unifying
drive of understanding, as Gadamer puts it.^*^ However
these barriers do not present an obstacle, merely a
demarcation of sorts in order to make play possible. Kant
allows for a self-determining role of imagination—
a
freedom from external, imposed rules. Kant's genius
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creates artistic forms which become the standard. He
produces the art work in isolation. This represents a
decisive shift from the Aristotelian organic development of
paradigmatic art--epitomized by Sophoclean tragedies—to
provide guidelines for what constitutes good play. The
creative play of imagination is a key concept of the modern
individualist worldview which is opposed to the ancient
organic worldview.''®
Nevertheless, Kant's discussion of play (of the
imagination) is still indebted to Aristotle. I do not
agree with Trebels or Makkreel's thesis that play has any
significant epistemological role in Kant. Good play is an
activity which is engaged with disinterested interest, with
affects that are free from pathological desires (e.g.
obsessions with chance-games)
. But Kant insists that the
free play of imagination is merely concerned with objects
of beauty (such play is goal-free) to be differentiated
from lively, goal-oriented games of music, chance-play and
jest; the purpose of wit, for instance, consists in
contributing to good health of the body.'^
In the following I will examine more closely the
problem of 'free' play and of a game played according to
rules. What kind of play is mise en scene ? In the
introduction to the KdU, Kant rejects a mere psychological
solution to the problem of the generalizability of
judgments of taste, since that methodology is unable to
determine "according to which rule our cognitive faculties
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really carry out their game r=ihr Spiel wirklich treiben] ."
(KdU, p.XXXI) What is needed is a transcendental deduction
of judgments of taste, and that is exactly what Kant is
determined to show. The lengthy deduction of pure
aesthetic judgments (§§30-54) introduces the notion of the
genius. Kant then reveals that the genius is capabable of
prescribing rules for fine art. In judging a beautiful
object, the genius grasps spontaneously the fast, free
flowing, ephemeral play of imagination.
In the act of aesthetic cognition, imagination and
understanding play in accord, or in tune. Makkreel notes
that "[i]t is the accord necessary for all cognition that
is appealed to in the deduction of taste to assure that
aesthetic judgments are universal." (p.62) But he also
criticizes the hasty conflation of attunement or harmony
with synthesis, the latter being a necessary unifying act
initiated by one faculty only, namely understanding.
Harmony, on the other hand, is a "reciprocal relation
between two distinct elements," (p.47) and Kant's
insistence that this harmony must be the result of a non-
coerced play between the two cognitive faculties seems to
substantiate Makkreel 's claim.
If this distinction is to be upheld, what is one to
make of synthetic judgments of taste? Makkreel ascertains
that "synthetic" here is to be qualified as merely
"synthetic in form" pertaining to the subjective state of
mind, (p.48) Suppose Kant has such a distinct use of the
125
term 'synthesis' in mind, —does that mean that aesthetic
synthesizing is an activity performed according to a rule?
But that would involve a concept, i.e. a universal which
serves as a rule (cf. CPR)
. Kant however explicitly denies
that concepts are "put into play" in the KdU. After all,
the cognitive faculties are engaged in a free play,
"because no definite concept restricts them to a particular
rule of cognition. "20 (§9, p.28) Therefore, Makkreel's
distinction between the notions of harmony and synthesis
ought to be heeded in reading the third Critique.
This observation still leaves the question unanswered
as to what, if any, rules Kant has in mind when he mentions
play in such cursory fashion. Trebels has suggested,
following Menzer that the phrase ins Spiel setzen suggests
a conscious rule-governed activity. However, 'free play'
is a much more frequent term in the KdU and mostly linked
with imagination, a cognitive faculty which conjures up
phantasies, perceptions or thoughts without being subdued
by—or subservient to—understanding's synthesis.
It is perplexing—as Henrich has noted—that Kant
neglects (or perhaps he purposefully toys with us?) to
specify the structure of the play, in particular with
respect to the interplay of imagination and understanding.
Henrich (1992) speculates that Kant can only have in mind a
harmonious play "between imagination in its freedom and
understanding in its lawfulness." (p.50) This interplay is
characterized positively as lively f erleichtert 1
,
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literally, relieved; here erleichtert carries the meaning
of being non-reflective
,
care-free, perhaps displaying
Kant's interest in Rococco aesthetics; "in the more facile
play [im. erleichterten Spiele ] of both mental powers
(imagination and understanding) as quickened r belebt ] by
their mutual accord." (§9, p.31) It is a unanimous
sentiment [ einhellig ] , a subjective, self-sustaining and
enlivened movement of Geist—actualized or set in motion by
the genius
,
which "sets the mental powers into a swing
that is final, i.e. into a play which is self-maintaining
and which strengthens those powers for such activity."
(§49) These attributes seem to suggest a more or less
chaotic, uncontrollable back and forth movement of playful
interaction that dominates the aesthetic field of taste.
However, it is not the case that Kant conjures up
Bacchic frenzy. Rather, one should be thinking of an
orderly baroque minuett dancing formation. Kant says that
the play of aesthetic impressions (perceptions of sound and
color) is "orderly" r regelmassig ! (§14, p.40); but he
qualifies that statement by suggesting that "orderliness"
r Regelmassiqkeit 1 should be avoided if it is accompanied by
coercion. (§23, p.71) Yet, restrictions apply, since
freedom (of associations) in play is to be represented as
"being subjected to a lawful business ( qesetzliches
Geschaft 1 .
"
(p.ll6)
On the one hand, Kant is adamant that the play of
affects has nothing to do with intellectual ism ; on the
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other hand, he does not rule out certain constraints in
Spielraum « After all, how can the faculties of
understanding and imagination interact harmonously if
imagination does not act in conformity to the law? Henrich
(1992) maintains that the upshot of Kant's formalistic
theory on imagination and understanding is to draw a clear
distinction between an ontological/mathematical form and an
aesthetic form, (p.56) This would suggest differentiating
the meanings of play with respect to an intellectual and a
sensory realm. Thus play is ontologically maligned in the
first and second Critiques (as "mere play") and
ontologically affirmed (as "free play") in the third
Critique, which is concerned with pure aesthetic judgments.
Hence it is wrong to argue that play has the same meaning
throughout Kant's work (cf. Trebel, 1967, p.l33). Even
though abstract play seems to lack cognition in both
Critiques, one has to look at the shifts of meaning. There
is a decidedly affirmative perspective on play in the third
Critique, yet it has an increasingly intellectual (and
instrumental) tendency, even though this is disavowed in
the discussion of pleasure. (See below.)
I will now turn to the problem of play as a rule-
directed activity by discussing the role of examples in the
KdU.^^ In Kant, an example is the place holder for a
certain objective rule. In §18, there is a noteworthy
emphasis on "exemplary" judgments. Kant indicates that the
modality of judgments of taste is not of logical necessity
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but of a necessity of a special kind: "it is a necessity of
everyone's endorsement of a singular judgment, which is to
be regarded as an example of a general rule, which cannot
be named." (pp. 62-63) Hence, examples only hint at general
rules, since reflective judgment (of taste) is not equipped
concepts, i.e. universal principles which serve as
rules (cf . CPR, A95—97) . In §59, examples are defined as
empirical concepts, being opposed to schemata, i.e. pure
concepts of understanding. (KdU, p.254) Poetry, for
instance, often uses examples of experience (i.e. death,
jealousy, vices). (§49, p.l94) Poets also play with
illusions r Schein ] which are beyond any experience (§53) .
Kant approves of their deceptive game, since they promise
little with their "mere play of ideas" and infuse life into
concepts through productive imagination. There is a
familiar Aristotelian ring to this assertion, for the
suggestion that possibility (within the play world of
phantasies) pleases aesthetically more than mere reality
(play with concepts of experience)
.
In §14, entitled "Exemplifications", Kant lays out a
formalistic definition of play on the varieties of
judgments of taste, which has puzzled many Kant scholars.
He states
:
All form of objects of sense (both of external
and also, mediately, of internal sense) is either
figure or play ; in the latter case, it is either
play of figures (in space: mimic and dance) or
mere play of sensations (in time), (p.42)
129
Inner sense, as we know from the first Critique, is
the subjective time order, whereas outer sense refers to
the category of space. Inner sense is mediated through the
free play of imagination (cf . schematism in CPR)
. Outer
sense is not involved in the interplay of imagination and
understanding, which is the condition for 'common sense.
'
(KdU, §20) Trebels maintains that, because play appears
here as shape r Gestalt . Gebilde ] , this formalistic
definition of play is Kant's attempt to consider the
problem of an objective conception of play. (Trebels,
p.210) In fact, this definition sticks out in the KdU
insofar Kant does not mention play as Gestalt again, except
in two instances: first, it appears negatively in the
description of the sublime as "shape-less," and secondly,
it appears in connection with "many games," that is, fine
arts (poetry, painting and music) . Painting, Kant says,
depends on external sensory impressions. (§51, p.205) In
fine art, however, the subjectivist interpretation prevails
due to the dominant role of the genius, who displaces the
generic critic (of good taste) . Interestingly, Kant
invokes a peculiar Verbot of mimesis. The genius's work of
art is supposed to be a sample, "i.e. exemplary and should
not originate from imitation." (§46, p.l82) This is a
truly modern conception of the artist, who is allowed to
defy all traditional norms and asked to set new standards
and to determine aesthetic rules.
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But is the genius's play with the tradition a play
that addresses critically judgments concerning the sublime?
Kant is uneasy about anwering this question. He suggests
that, since the sublime is characterized by a feeling of
displeasure, it has nothing to do with play, but "seems to
be" (note Kant's cautiousness!) a serious, as opposed to
playful, stimulating emotion, an activity of imagination.
(§23, p.75) The feeling of the sublime is a feeling of
'^^®~pl®^sure r Unlust ~[ which lacks the life-affirming
sensations that a playful imagination generates.
While Kant presents a challenge in determining the
role of abstract play in his critique of taste, it is clear
that the genius has a decisive role to play vis-a-vis the
special case of fine art, not only as arbiter but also as
producer of beautiful artworks. In the case of fine art,
Kant sets up a hierarchy by ranking poetry above all other
works of art, and music as least pleasing, since it "merely
plays with emotions" and lacks a certain "urbanity." (KdU,
§53, pp. 220-221) All other "higher" forms of art at
least play appropriately with imagination and understanding
so that their work is not completely without raison .
(p.220) Here we see an invocation of a play, an
intellectual game of sorts, that also deserves to be
labelled "Apollonian." As we shall see this has
consequences for the role of play with respect to aesthetic
pleasure.
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(3) In the context of judgments of taste, pleasure
(Lust ) is defined as being an aesthetic affect, lacking
pathological or intellectual tendencies, or as Gadamer puts
it "being free from sensualist and rationalist prejudices"
(W&M, p.55). To take (aesthetic) pleasure in the beautiful
is described as a disinterested sentiment. The subject's
feeling of pleasure stems from a formal (i.e. subjective)
purposefulness which is to be found "in the play of the
cognitive faculties of the Subject." (§12, pp. 36-37) Here
it seems that Kant is really toying with us, making believe
that such pleasure is purely aesthetically motivated.
However, I claim that this "as-if" approach is highly
rationalistic and reflects the nature of the play Kant has
in mind. Henrich is more generous in his assessment of
Kant's accomplishement and suggests that an aesthetic
attitude cannot be substituted for other rational
activities. However, I do not see that an aestheticism, in
the sense of a critique of taste, is incompatible with an
intellectualism, especially since Kant strives to show that
such judgments are indeed universal, i.e. to be approved by
everybody. Free play (of fancy) is only free insofar as
it does not go beyond the normative boundaries which are
posited by understanding.
In §54 there is another instance of how Kant imagines
the link between play and feelings of pleasure: "All
changing free play of affects (which are not based on any
intentions) gives pleasure." (p.223; my translation)
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Employing a formalistic invocation of purposefulness
without a purpose, playfulness serves here as a means to
improve one's well-being; play, e.g. telling jokes,
laughter, which is the comic effect of the metamorphosis of
^ strained expectation being suddenly reduced into
Clothing," brings about balance of vital forces and a
feeling of healthiness in the body, (p.225) In other
words, a playful wit improves digestion and thus has a
cleansing effect.^'^ Playful activities, such as
entertaining evening parties (a favourite example in Kant's
anthropological treatises), "must be pleasurable," Kant
says in an almost chatty tone, for "without play they
hardly ever escape falling flat." (§54; cf. Anthropology .
§ 88 )
While Kant's Critique of Judgment clearly shows signs
of his flirtation with the Rococo (cf. Sdun, 1966;
Seerveld, 1978)
,
his philosophical commitment puts play
into ideological suspicion, as that which is too carefree
and therefore may not be adequately tamed (as the failure
of music shows..). Even as Kant emphatically holds that
play is free, not logically constrained, in aesthetic
judgments, he seems to prefer play to be constrained by
rules of understanding. In his aesthetical writings play
is not depicted as carefree, chaotic, Bacchanalian
(Dionysian)
,
but it is always somehow in conformity with
the law (qua Spielreqeln ) . Hence, Apollonian, intellectual
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values not only dominate but do so at the expense of the
Dionysian. Nevertheless, Kant sees possibilities for the
social value of play in aesthetic judgments. Play seems
useful and almost able to enter the realm of the sublime.
Furthermore, the genius's free play of the faculty of
imagination spontaneously creates new standards of beauty
and disavows mimetic representations.
Post-Critical Anthropological Musings on Play
Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View (1797)
(hereafter. Anthropology 1 . Kant's post-critical work,
focusses on using empirical rules to describe human
behavior and on using other persons skillfully (i.e.
pragmatically) for one's own purposes. In this context,
Kant reflects on acceptable and unacceptable masks of
playing, toying with others, i.e. a play which is
illusionary, artificial, and deceptive.
In the section "On Artificial Play with Sensory
Semblance," he approves of an acceptable, i.e. natural,
play of illusions which is "the kind of false impression
that persists even though we know that the supposed object
is not real." (§13, p.l49) This type of impression is held
up against an artificial, i.e. a deceptive or fraudulent
play of the senses, e.g. conjuring tricks, where the
distinction between fact and fiction is blurred. His
poignant example to contrast the two different types: the
color of a dress that makes a face beautiful is a seductive
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illusion, but donning make-up is fraud, a bad hoax. (p.l50)
Kant has the urge to navigate through the troubling morass
of sensory appearance, giving his nod to play that pretends
to be portraying reality, but where "we" know fully well it
isn't, and dismissing play that doesn't stick to its realm
ii*^tion but transgresses it. He makes a similar point
in KdU
,
when he contrasts poetry and rhetoric. Poetry is
honest "business," whereas rhetoric as the art of
persuasion is deceptive (cf . KdU §53)
.
If we haven't already noticed an underlying moralizing
attitude in his evaluation of play, Kant is more heavy-
handed and Aristotelian— in the section "On Permissable
Moral Semblance," which discusses the limits of roles a
moral agent can enact. (§14) Kant finds it acceptable
play-acting when one is duped by another's fake
friendliness (in the hope that they might become serious
and develop that virtue out of enacting it) and this is
also permissable if we dupe ourselves: "...to deceive the
deceiver within ourselves, inclination, is to return to
obeying the law of virtue; it is not a deception, but an
innocent [ riihmliche l illusion of ourselves." (§14, p.l51)
Yet, he also holds that the mere moral semblance rather
than the genuine presence of the good in the self cannot be
tolerated, for it is moral self-deception and leads to
making excuses for one's behavior. (§14, p.l53) Note again
the oppositional pairing of the play of pretending and
virtuous seriousness. While Kant does not consider role-
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playing inherently bad, not knowing when to throw away the
mask (the veil of deception), he thinks, is despicable.
Here we find an interesting depiction of play, akin to
' s schole
. A leisurely game is purposeless in
itself, as for instance, is true of a "peaceful struggle"
of a game inspired by the fine arts or conversation;
nevertheless it is more than just "killing time" because
"we are at least cultivating our mind." (p.l52)
In §31 ("On the Constructive Power Belonging to
Sensibility f sinnliches Dichtunasvermoaen ] " ’) Kant revisits
the various functions of the imagination. It is noteworthy
that, in illustrating its uses, he also notes proper and
improper applications. Kant says in jest that "[w]e like
to play with our imagination, and often do it; but
imagination (in its role of fantasy) plays with us just as
often, and sometimes most inopportunely." (p.l75) Its play
obviously needs to be disciplined, i.e. bound by rules,
especially in conversations, which deteriorate when people
simply spout out their free associations on any given
topic. (p.l77; cf. §47) Thus, the free play of imagination
ought to be (blindly) in conformity with laws [ gesetzmagio l
without being constrained by understanding (cf. KdU's
argumentation)
.
In my analysis of Kant's play theory I have attempted
to probe the question whether play is connected with rules
or is simply something irrational and entirely subjective.
In the aesthetic realm, the free play of imagination and
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understanding is the condition of the possibility of
judging beautiful objects and setting new standards of art.
Its free activity is purposeful, yet it does not aim at a
purpose; thus Kant emphasizes a non-utilitarian aspect of
play, which has great importance for Schiller's writings on
aesthetic education. However, Kant retains Aristotle's
characterization of the ontological and epistemological
status of play by noting that metaphysical discussions
after all are not supposed to be mere Soielwerk l (cf.
Prolegomena
, WWIV, p.369) Just as Gadamer chides Kant for
ignoring the truth claim within art (its
Wahrheitsanspruch
^
,
one can criticize Kant for being
ambivalent toward play in the context of the sublime.
However, Kant's approach towards play within the aesthetic
realm differs from Aristotle's approach towards leisurely
contemplation, which is serious business not subjected to
any unregulated, inopportune, seductive lure. Kant also
breaks with Aristotle by establishing the semi-autonomous
disciplines of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics (where
the latter borders on applications in philosophical
anthropology) . While Kant certainly is not as dismissive
of play's cognitive potential as is Aristotle, clearly his
game is Apollonian in character; Bacchanalian skirmishes of
the imagination are too unruly to be considered, since they
would explode the neat, orderly boundaries of his Prussian
aesthetic Soielraum .
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gchi ller's Theory of Plav Impulspc^
Schiller, who is clearly under Kant's aesthetic spell,
nevertheless de-emphasizes the role of taste and common
sense and instead elevates the role of the genius. In this
section I will analyze in what important ways Schiller
departs from the Kantian and Aristotelian tradition and in
what ways he remains committed to them. To that end, I
will examine two of his theoretical writings. On the
Aesthetic
—
Education of Man, in a Series of Letters and "On
Grace and Dignity."
Schiller's major philosophical work "On Grace and
Dignity" ("Anmut und Wiirde", written in 1793; hereafter
AuW)
,
seems to allude to Kant's pre-critical essay "On the
Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime". In any case it
reveals his close reading of Kant's third critique and is
his first major philosophical attempt at formulating a
theory of play. According to him, play has a subjective
component; play is not play of the world (Fink) but always
relates to players. It is the function of the person, "the
free principle within man," which determines the play of
appearances. (AuW, p.263) The main player Schiller has in
mind is of course the genius. As a supreme product of
nature, he produces beautiful works of art and sets new
standards "by accelerating the game". (AuW, p.275) What is
fashionable tomorrow is created by the playful, spontaneous
genius today. Schiller displaces Kant's critique of taste
(which is generalizable) and elevates the genius to
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prescribe la mode and to make it accessible to the many,
who are free to imitate the product. Yet, Schiller's
conception of the genius follows Kant in so far as, due to
the genius's natural talents, he creates things playfully
—
an ability which is "more admired than an acguired ability
of the spirit." (AuW, p.275) In the KdU, Kant notes that
the genius's inspirations are original and not dependent on
acquired taste or knowledge.
What is also novel in Schiller's theory is that the
"beauty of play" takes precedence over Kantian "free play."
(AuW, p.264; p.279) Moreover, Schiller defines beautiful
play as the interplay of reason and sensibility, (p.282)
Thus reason plays a decisive part in defining the beauty of
play, even though it may come into "the business" of
judgment belatedly--the process of a hermeneutic delay, so
to speak, (p.264) As Sdun argues, the concept of play is
subordinated to that of freedom in AuW, a relationship
whose valence is reversed in the fully developed play
theory of the Letters (cf.l9th letter). (Sdun, pp. 509-513)
In the essay (AuW) freedom refers to the "free principle"
in the self, a rational, self-conscious autonomous agent
(cf. AuW, p.263). Nevertheless, Schiller, as a romantic
poet, emphasizes the beauty of play in order to "soften"
Kantian deontology--and he poses the following question to
the moral philosopher: "Just because the moral wimp wants
to give the law of reason a laxness , which makes it a play-
thing f Soielwerk ] of his convenience, did it have to get a
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rigidity
,
which could only serve to transform the most
powerful expression of moral freedom into a more laudable
form of servitude?" (AuW, p.285) Schiller's own (playful)
solution is more fully developed in the Letters
. as we will
see below: the free, i.e. rational self is downplayed and
the concept of freedom is captured by the expression of the
"mixed nature" of the aesthetic and physical impulses in
the self.
his On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series
of Letters (hereafter, Letters)
,
Schiller admits being
indebted to "Kantian principles," on which his elaborations
are based. ( Letters . 1, p.309) But far from merely
parroting Kant's methodology, he puts forth an original
play theory by utilizing the terms, Formtrieb and
Stofftrieb
, which he considers fundamental drives in
humans. (12, pp.344) The play-drive is the composite of
these drives, it is not a fundamental element itself. (12,
p.347) It has to be "cultivated" in aesthetic
education . Hence it is wrong for Huizinga (1950) and
Jlinger (1953) to suggest, as Sdun (1966) points out, that
play-drive has anything to do with an "innate drive." Sdun
says that "drive" has a broader meaning than indicated by
modern psychology. (Sdun, p. 501)^^
In the famous fifteenth letter, Schiller elucidates
his theory of Spieltrieb by claiming that it is an impulse
which is neither subjectively nor objectively contingent.
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yet neither externally nor internally necessary.
( 15 ,
p.357) This observation leads him to contest the role of
"mere" play and says that it is in fact only through play
that humans are fully developed in their humanity. He
postulates; "...humans only play when they are in the
fullest sense of the word human beings, and they are only
fully human beings when they play."^® Despite this
emphatic proclamation of 'fully human human beings
Schiller does not discard the dichotomies of work and play,
of reason and sense perception furthermore, he ranks
an ideal or "transcendent" play-drive over a mere material
or physical play-drive, (cf
.
27th letter)
.
Gadamer also holds Schiller responsible for separating
"aesthetics" from its original meaning of perception and
introducing the moral value of taste. As Gadamer sums
matters up, Schiller's postulate in the letters is:
"Comport yourself aesthetically!" (WuM, p.87, cf. 15th
letter) Yet, despite the fact that a playful attitude is
an intrinsic part of the (moral) self, it seems odd that
Schiller still clings to the Kantian conception of the
play-seriousness dichotomy, e.g. in contrasting play and
"seriousness of principles" ( Letters 9, p.336; 22, p.380).
He also relies on Kant's distinction between the sublime
and the beautiful by juxtaposing grace and play—as
expression of the beautiful—with dignity and seriousness,
where the latter pair gains importance vis-a-vis moral
actions and the feeling of the sublime. (AuW, p.208) On
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the other hand, Schiller argues that it is only through
play with beauty that the self gains 'completion' (15,
p.358) and that play in art leads to a beneficial influence
on the moral self. ("On the Cause of Pleasure," in Werke
.
p. 135)
However, not all playful activity is equally valued.
As we have seen with respect to a hierarchy in drives
(formal and material)
,
physical play is deemed inferior to
aesthetic play;
So nature gives a pre-play of the unlimited in
its material realm, and thus she already picks up
the constraints in part
. which she will discard
completely in the realm of form. From the
coercion of necessities or of physical
seriousness she moves toward the aesthetic play
—
beyond the coercion of superfluity or of physical
play .
" (25, p.406; Schiller's emphasis)^^
Note that aesthetic play as a higher kind of play is
akin to Aristotle's philosopher's leisurely contemplation.
In fact, it is an expressively intellectualist (Apollonian)
play that Schiller comes to value in the aesthetic
education of the self. The letters are written at the time
of the French Revolution; and the subordination of
animalistic play is probably Schiller's response to the
horrors of the Jacobin's terror. This could perhaps
explain why material (Dionysian) drives serve as the
"abject"^^ in Schiller's aesthetic writings. Trebels (who
does not take the historical situation into account)
assesses these conflictual impulses (Apollonian and
Dionysian) differently; he notes that reconciliation
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[Versohnunq ] figures as a key motif in Schiller's play
theory. The play-impulse synthesizes oppositional drives
in humans:
For Schiller, the authentic being of humans findsits fulfillment in play. Here the self's unity
IS reestablished, the unity of sensibility and
reason, of inclination and duty, [...] of
material and formal impulses. (Trebels, p.lO)^^
Trebels suggests that aesthetic judgment gains a
mediating role for Schiller. In aesthetic play a sublation
between the opposite faculties of reason and sensibility
takes place so that the subject's "double nature" is
reconciled. (Trebels, p.l28)^^ But Trebels does not
comment on the hierarchy of "games" Schiller sets up; in my
mind, reconciliation does not amount to a dynamic movement
between equally valued principles. Such reconciliation is
a mere "partial" union, which is fleeting in character,
because it merely offers a temporary retreat into the
aesthetic play dimension which is separate and distinct
from real (material) life experience. The material side
seems to be temporarily suspended in this union.
I will now turn to the socio-political implications of
Schiller's play theory. What kind of society does he
imagine where such play could thrive? In the last letter
(27th)
,
Schiller conjures up an ideal state, which is
aesthetic in character and embued with certain political
demands of the French revolution (foremost, equality) and
philosophical ideals of the Enlightenment. In Schiller's
aesthetic state, the self's realization of pleasure
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improves qualitatively (veredelt)
,
e.g. by breaking out of
the circle of brute obsession ( so ist sein thieri;:.nh^r-
Kreis aufqethan ) ; beyond mere material satisfaction akin to
animalistic play. (p.405) To enter this area 'beyond'
imagination one has to make a decisive leap and freely
submit to the legislative force of understanding: "in this
state, for the first time legislative spirit mingles with
the actions of a blind instinct and subjects f unterwirft 1
the voluntary doings of imagination to spirit's unchanging
unity, putting its autonomy into the changing
element and its infinity into the sensible element."
(p.407) Reason is not required to make playful leaps
here... In fact, that would constitute another path only to
be walked by free spirits.
Concluding I want to suggest that Schiller's
conception of an aesthetic state, in which humans ought to
comport themselves playfully, certainly has potentiality to
break out of the ludic malediction that has been prescribed
by Aristotle; however, this ideal state offers only
fleeting metaphysical comfort. As Gadamer puts it: "The
freedom of the soul [ . . . ] is freedom merely in an aesthetic
state and not in reality." (1986a, p.88) Schiller does not
give up the dualism of aesthetic play possibilities and
material necessities.
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Conclusion
Schiller's emphatic engagement with play seems to
clash with the claim that he, too, practices a malediction
of play. Yet, I contend that the valorization of a certain
kind of play (in fact, ideal play) makes him prone to
reject play which is not in accord, indeed, collides, with
this ideal. Hence, as we noticed in Aristotle, both Kant
and Schiller reassert the importance of the irreconcilable
ontological differentiation between playful and serious
each having its kairos
. to be sure, but they
cannot condone the intermingling of the two. It is Hegel
who finally breaks out of casting play as the other in
philosophical discourse and Nietzsche who completes the
ludic turn by fully casting the notion of menschlicher
Mensch as spielender Mensch without engaging in a
malediction of either term.
145
Notes
l.Makkreel does however historicize imagination, viz.the importance it gained in post Cartesian German thought(see below)
.
^
2. My analysis of The Critique of Pure Reesnn is
1989^^^*^ Wolff (1963) and his Kant seminar (Spring
3.1 am adopting here Trebels's analysis, who follows
Heidemann in this categorization of the divergent play
tendencies, (cf. Trebels, p.210)
4.
Note a parallel to the third Critique, The Critique
of Judgment, where the reference to women is dropped, but
where play is relevant in determining a beautiful object
yet irrelevant in determining a sublime object, (cf. also
Anthropology 1974, pp. 277-278)
5.
"Die Tugend des Frauenzimmers ist eine schone
Tugend. Die des mannlichen Geschlechts soil eine edele
Tugend sein. Sie [=wpmen] werden das Bose vermeiden, nicht
weil es unrecht sondern weil es haySlich ist,..." (A55-56)
6
.
Kant uses the peculiar term "Ehrbarkeitspedantin" in
this context. (A63)
7.
Although this is not a term which Kant uses in this
context, I find it is useful in so far it it appeals to the
"mere" speculative, phantasmatic realm and thus cannot be
applied in "dry" rigorous deductions. Kant speaks about
this potential mis-use in the following: "The proud
pretensions of reason, when it strives to extend its domain
beyond all limits of experience, we have represented only
in dry formulas that contain merely the ground of their
legal claims." (A462/B490-A463/B491)
8.
Kemp-Smith correctly points out that Kant "here
plays on the double meaning of sinnleeres , 'empty of sense'
and 'nonsense'." (p.436,n.l)
9 Alternatively
,
it depicts the arbitrary, random play
of ideas (cf. the section on the Widerstreit of
cosmological ideas in CPR)
.
10.
For the most part, I will follow Meredith's
translation. However, I will use the pagination of the
Originalausgabe .
11.
Cf. Gadamer's (1986a).
12.
Cf. also the criticisms of von Kirchmann (1882) and
Schmidt ( 1924 )
.
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13. The possibility of communicating judgments of tasteIS in marked contrast to the first CritiqL whe^e no
other selves are made (cf. Wolff's criticism14.
Cf. Aristotle on the importance of relaxation inohe Nicomachean Ethics
, (see Chapter IV)
15. As Crawford (1974) notes correctly, it is unclearhow imagination is supposed to execute this double mental
activity, (p.88; cf. also Wolff, 1963)
6
Cf. Gadamer (1986a), p.52.
• I 9m grateful to John Brentlinger for clarifying
this position.
18
.
Nevertheless I claim that Kant's granting
imagination a certain liberty under self-chosen constraints
is nothing like the Bacchanalian force Hegel reckons with
in embarking in the journey of consciousness in The
Phenomenology of Spirit or the playful, cunning free
spirits that Nietzsche toys with.
9.
Jest and laughter at dinner tables contribute to a
speedy rumination of the food and are as such enlivening,
"sensory effects on the body." (cf. Makkreel, p.98)
20.
Unless otherwise noted, I will rely on Meredith's
translation of The Critique of Judgment (1973)
.
2 1 Beispiele (literally "by-plays") function
prominently in Hegel, especially as "beiherspielen"
(=playing alongside with, which points to unpredictable and
cunning situations)
.
22.
No doubt, Kant's disdain for music has
autobiographical reasons: once he had to move to a new
apartment because he could not stand listening to the
spiritual intonations of prisoners chanting near his home.
23.
To use a term by Zizek here, isn't it a case of
fetishistic disavowal?
24.
Note the similarities of this description of play
and Aristotle's approval of cathartic (tragic) play and of
play as a relaxing pastime so that the player is fit for
toil
.
25.
cf. Gregor's introduction to the English version of
the Anthropology
.
pp.xviii-xx.
26.
Cf. Gadamer (1986a), p.88.
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_27.Gadamer notes that Schiller borrows the term
"drive" from Fichte's doctrine of drives or impulses
rTneblehre ] (1986a, p.88).28.
"...der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller
Bedeutung des Worts Mensch ist, und er ist nur da qanzMensch, wo er spielt."
29.
Cf. Rainer Marten's important analysis of theideological dimension of the term "menschlicher Mensch"
(1988) .
30. Cf. Plessner (1967) who states that Schiller
depends on the Kantian distinction of moral and natural law
and on the possibility of reconcialiation of classical
form.
31.
As I suggested below, this separation of aesthetics
and ethics already occurs in Kant's work.
32.
"So giebt uns die Natur schon in ihrem materiellen
Reich ein Vorspiel des Unbegrenzten
,
und hebt hier schon
-ZUin Theil die Fesseln auf, deren sie sich im Reich der Form
ganz und gar entledigt. Von dem Zwang des Bediirfnisses
Oder dem physischen Ernste nimmt sie durch den Zwang des
Ueberflusses Oder das phvsische Spiel den Uebergang zum
asthetischen Spiele. . .
"
33.
A term I borrow from Kristeva (1982).
34. "Das eigentliche Menschsein erfiillt sich fiir
Schiller im Spiel, hier stellt sich die Einheit des
Menschens wieder her, die Einheit von Sinnlichkeit und
Vernunft, von Neigung und Pflicht, von Materialem und
Formalem, von Stofftrieb und Formtrieb."
35. Cf.
Chapter VI
;
Nietzsche '
s
my discussion of Hegel's unity of opposites in
Schiller's theory of drives also foreshadows
Apollonian and Dionysian principles.
36. Cf. Gadamer (1986a), p.88.
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CHAPTER VI
play in HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
[Christopher Robin Milne] also resented the confusing
invented the game of ' pooh-sticks ,
'
wooden bridge into a flowing stream.
—The Boston Globe
. 4/22/96
Introduction
Where desire has been the 'abject' in philosophical
discourse, I claim that play has endured a similar fate,
i.e. philosophers have been repulsed by playful activities
and attitudes at the same time that they are fascinated by
them. However, Hegel does not only take up the former
concept but also introduces the latter as a 'serious' task.
Unlike other play theoreticians, I contend that Hegel
breaks with the Aristotelian malediction of play and thus
sets a new ludic agenda for future artist metaphysicians
(e.g. Nietzsche, Deleuze, Gadamer)
.
I will argue in this chapter that play is central to
defining Hegel's dialectic. In fact, without understanding
the centrality of play in Hegel, one cannot really grasp
his concept of dialectic or of truth. Hegel, as the artist
metaphysician, paves the way for the transvaluation of all
values, as shown throughout the Phenomenology of Spirit in
general and as marked by the playfulness of the artwork
sections in particular. Taking a cue from Eugen Fink, I
maintain that Hegel's concepts are constantly "on the
move," making it virtuously impossible to force anything
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into tight, steady definitions. As a Beisoiel (example)
,
I
will analyze the concept of truth in its cunning mask as a
Bacchanalian revel, whose ambiguous meaning with respect to
the dialectical process has puzzled generations of Hegel
scholars
.
The abundance of play metaphors in the Phenomenology
^ Spirit (hereafter, PhS) has been ignored by most Hegel
scholars. Notable exceptions are phenomenologists
,
such as
Heidegger (1970), who concentrates on the terms of 'play of
forces' ( Spiel der Krafte )
,
'example' or 'instance'
(Beispiel ) and Hegel's own creation of the term
beiherspielen ('playing along', 'by-play'). In various
lectures on the PhS, Eugen Fink (1977a and 1977b) has also
given some attention to this notion. In recent years,
though, Hegel's laughter (Flay), Hegel's myopic traveler
(Butler)
,
his mockery (Desmond)
,
his manipulator (Zi2ek)
have surfaced creating space for a fresh reading of the
Phenomenology . With the help of these playful
"experiments," much of Hegel's work has unleashed multiple
voices; they see themselves as undoing the deconstructivist
indictment (especially by Derrida, 1982) that Hegel's
program represents the epitomy of logocentrism. Desmond
(1992) convincingly argues—and I will follow his lead
here—that Hegel's mockery of philosophy, of Kantian and
Platonic philosophy in particular, foreshadows Nietzsche's
indictment of Platonism in his Birth of Tragedy—pace
Deleuze, who narrowly views Hegel's dialectic as carrying a
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notion of ressentiment and a 'spirit of gravity,' thus
being antithetical to Nietzsche's project (cf. Deleuze,
1983). My reading differs from these Hegelian studies
insofar as I want to focus on play and use this concept to
challenge the conception of the dialectical movement as
carrying the spirit of gravity. I argue that Hegel's
^i^lsctic is greatly influenced by Heraclitus and inspired
by Euripidian imagery; by tarrying with the negative,
Hegel plays with the ephemeral, the fleeting moment that
might disguise itself in the mask of the spirit of gravity
but it does not necessarily have to be confined to this
mask.
^
In the preface of the Phenomenology
. Hegel proclaims
his goal to make philosophizing a serious business again.
(§67) Supposedly, this means, as he says elsewhere, that
philosophy is not an "empty game" or a "restless activity
of empty reflection" (preface. Philosophy of Right
, p.5),
merely engaged in superficial diatribes. Yet, the True is
"the Bacchanalian revel" (§47) — and philosophers, engaged
in this frenzy, take this game seriously. In order to
assume this mask though, it is necessary to overcome
opinions, via determinate negation, such as the following
one, mocked by Hegel: "We do not esteem playfulness as
something sublime but as something of lower standing over
and against the form of thought."^
Hegel tries to qualify what he considers a good,
authentic playful act and toys with notions of seriousness
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and mere superficial play or leisure. For instance, the
life of the absolute and divine knowledge or cognition are
equivalents of "a play of love with itself"; yet this idea
sinks to the mere "edification" or even "trifle," if this
image fails to emphasize the seriousness, pain, work
involved in negating the negation. (§19) There is also
another important aspect to this phenomenological game.
Notably, Hegel performs, just like Tony Curtis and Jack
Lemmon in Billy Wilder's "Some like it hot," in such a way
that he never repeats his cunning past the point of
revealing his trick, since "repetition of a conjuring trick
already seen through is intolerable." (cf. §51)
As far as I can tell, Hegelian scholarship of the PhS
has intermittently engaged with the notion of play but has
not looked through the lense of play, as it were, except
for a sustained effort by Eugen Fink. The notion of truth
being disguised in the form of play ( Spiel ) has been taken
up by Martin Heidegger in his analysis of the difficult
section Force and Understanding of the PhS. He interprets
the meaning of the term 'play of forces' as "the true, the
actual [which] is the play [of forces]
,
the center which
keeps together the extremes in relation to each other."
(1970, p.l68) Eugen Fink goes even further, in so far he
does not rest his 'ludic' case with consciousness's move
toward self-consciousness via a process called Spiel der
Krafte , but asserts that Hegel strategically employs the
notions of circle and play within the realm of Reason
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In the(Vernunf
t
) in order to characterize Reason as play,
later parts of the PhS Hegel's metaphor of play is
foundational for understanding of the self-moving Concept
(Beqrif f ) . The activity of self-reflective self-
consciousness or Reason is, as Hegel puts it, a playful
motion I "Action has, . .the appearance of the
movement of a circle which moves freely within itself in a
void, which, unimpeded, now expands, now contracts, and is
perfectly content to [play] in and with its own self."
(PhS, §396) So, the movement of Reason, Fink concludes,
"which appears as a movement of work, struggle, love and
overcoming of death, is determined in its total character
as play." (1977a, p.344) This kind of game Hegel plays,
Fink states, is Dionysian and Heraclitean. I argue that
both Fink and Heidegger miss noting the deployment of
playfulness as a cunning, mocking, elusive trope which
masks the true— i.e. they do not comment on the humorous,
comic character of hegel's play. Clearly, play figures
prominently in Hegel's Bildungsroman ; Hegel dares to
include play in his dialectical method— invoking a movement
that plays-along-with^ and transgresses the boundaries of
Aristotelian metaphysics (cf. Fink, 1977a, p.l07). I argue
that his usage of play and seriousness as mockery of
philosophy foreshadows the tactics of the artist-
metaphysicians (Nietzsche, Fink, Gadamer) to intertwine,
rather than use to contrast, the opposites play-
seriousness. In Nietzsche's work we see that Hegel's
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Bacchanalian revel re-appears as a Dionysian, life-
affirming dance (cf. Mrth) and that Truth masks itself as
a woman (cf . Genealogy of Mor;=^1c; ^
.
To understand Hegel's mockery of Truth— in particular
of the correspondence theory of truth^— in his quest of
the Absolute is to realize that the Phenomenology narrates
a series of deceptions, fiction and false belief, and
ultimately of failure, (cf. Butler, 1987, pp. 22-23;
Desmond, 1992, chap. 5) Hegel engages in a game without
victors, without closure; instead he stresses the playful
movement of consciousness, full of discontinuities,
ruptures, changes. (§§184-188) Hegel's play with a
systematic approach of science, with totality ("das Wahre
ist das Ganze"), with absolute knowledge—which irritates
and infuriates Deconstructionists— is but one other
disguise, masking of his narrative ( s) . In fact, in his
comedy, farcical play, also known as "The Phenomenology of
Spirit," Hegel masters par excellence the art of cunning
and catches his opponents off guard - with lime-twigs! (cf.
§73)
The coupling of play and seriousness is most
prominently displayed in his discussion of aesthetic
dimension of religion, in particular in the section,
entitled "Kunstreligion" (in the seventh chapter on
Religion). In the section "The Spiritual Work of Art,"
Hegel dwells on the representation of necessity qua unity
of the concept by using the image of the "play of its
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actions [sc. of individual moments] which retains its
earnestness and worth." (§732) Elsewhere, he says of the
cultus: "The cultus [is] a serious playing and a playful
seriousness, a gravity that is gay." ( Philosophy of
Religion
. Vol.I, p.l68)
In my commentary of the relevant sections on the
sacred character of play, (cf. section on the spiritual
§§727—747) I will take up Desmond's book Beyond
Hegel and Dialectic (1992) which talks about a related
topic: the comic and the religious mask(s) of philosophy.
Desmond emphasizes the radical tension between religion and
philosophy, where both (faith contra reason) "mirror each
other in a positive manner which shows them to
dialectically converge in the middle." (1992, p.l50) This
convergence means that they both come to share the identity
of the other, i.e. philosophy cannot dismiss faith
(speculative thought)
,
and religion cannot do without
thought of the absolute even if that means to risk losing
faith. (1992, p.l53) Rather than heeding Desmond's call of
"think[ing] beyond the masks and the slanders," (1992,
p.l56) I hold that we should seriously play with the masks
Hegel provides us—another expression of 'tarrying with the
negative.
'
In this chapter, I hope to show that Hegel is the
first speculative thinker (in the Western philosophical
tradition) to break with the Aristotelian malediction of
play. This requires a re-reading of Hegel's absolute
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idealism and systematicity and a more literal
interpretation of the "cunning of the Idea" ( List der Idee ^
than is usually presented. I will rely on Desmond, Butler,
and Zizek to argue for a play theory that has a proto—
Nietzschean character; in fact, Hegel's play serves as a
nodal point by breaking with Kantian subjectivism and
creating the conditions of possibility of diverging play
discourses, e.g. of a play of the self and a play of the
world. It is not just a one-sided subjectivist play (of
the genius) a la Kant, but a play where the self sees
itself realized in the Absolute, externalizes itself in
substantial, objective nature.*^
The structure of the chapter is the following: First,
I will provide an analysis of the trope of the bacchanalian
revel and explore the relevance of Heraclitus's dialectics
and Euripides's play The Bacchae for Hegel. Secondly, I
use as a historical Beispiel Hegel's interpretation of the
Hellenic era's so-called art-religion ( Kunstreliqion ) in
the form of epos, tragedy and comedy. The final section of
this chapter is devoted to an ideology critique of Hegel's
play, e.g. with respect to his romanticization of the
Greeks— that only they knew how to genuinely play.^
The Bacchanalian Revel
In the Preface of the PhS, Hegel introduces the famous
metaphor of the Bacchanalian revel, which seems to
underscore his affinity to Nietzsche. The question is
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whether this revel is only formulaic, an extravagant
expression or whether in fact it explores Dionysian frenzy
and gives important clues about Hegel's conceptualization
of dialectics. I will quote the paragraph which mentions
the trope almost in its entirety:
[The philosophical movement, MN] is the process
which begets and traverses its own moments, and
this whole movement constitutes what is positive
[in it] and its truth. This truth therefore
includes the negative also, what would be called
the false, if it could be regarded as something
from which one might abstract. The evanescent
itself must, on the contrary, be regarded as
essential, not as something fixed, cut off from
the True, and left lying who knows where outside
it, any more than the True is to be regarded as
something on the other side, positive and dead.
Appearance is the arising and passing away that
does not itself arise and pass away, but is 'in
itself [i.e. subsists intrinsically], and
constitutes the actuality and the movement of the
life of truth. The True is thus the Bacchanalian
revel in which no member is not drunk; vet
because each member collapses as soon as fit, MN1
drops out, the revel is just as much transparent
and simple repose [emphasis mine, MN]
. [ Das Wahre
is so der bacchantische Taumel, an dem kein Glied
nicht trunken ist; und weil iedes, indem es sich
absondert, ebenso unmittelbar Fsich] auflost, ist
er ebenso die durchsichtiqe und einfache Ruhe. l
(PhS §47, trans. Miller)
As Richard Norman (1976) points out this passage is
central in defining dialectics, even though Hegel does not
mention the term specifically at this point in the preface
of PhS. The dialectical movement "is the dynamic aspect of
the 'system' and its 'necessity.'" (Norman, p.l22) He
finds it peculiar that the revel ( der Taumel ) "is just as
much a state of transparent unbroken calm." ( ibid
.
) What
Norman fails to look at is how this dynamism is employed
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here: what is noteworthy is actually Hegel's allusion to a
dialectical interplay of chance and necessity, reminding us
of the Nietzschean interpellation of the "iron dice of
necessity." The revel which defines the true, displays the
peculiar Hegelian brand of dialectics, since it is not only
the frantic movement from one form of consciousness to the
other but also constitutes an aspect of stasis and
systemat icity . William Desmond (1992), too, recognizes the
importance of revel in the PhS, and points to the
Bacchanalian revel as a dialectical metaphor since it
states a coincidentia opoositorum
.
(p.l37) Desmond notes
that this metaphor "also points us to what is other to
dialectical logic in that its enigmatic, ambiguous power
springs from a persisting doubleness that resists reduction
to univocity, even a 'higher' mediated univocity. This
religious metaphor images the cult of philosophy as beyond
logicist impiousness and as turned towards what is other to
philosophy." ( ibid
.
.
his emphasis) This Otherness is the
performative enactment of what Desmond calls "the agapeic
excess of the original power of being." (p.l38) The
agapeic absolute (as opposed to the erotic absolute®) is
"the affirmative indeterminacy of inexhaustibility, i.e.
overdetermination... of plenitude in itself." (1992, p.80)
Desmond also notes that Hegel's dialectic bears a
philosophical mask which is the mask of the comic.
Dialectic, he states, "articulates the logos of failure and
the failure of logos." (1992, p.284) This is a poignant
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assessment of the dialectical movement displayed in the
metaphor of Bacchanalian revel. Tarrying with the negative
moment of the dialectic, the self is emersed in this
Taumel tumbling because all foundations are shaken, she
fails to be in control of her own movements—a limit
experience which is both divine and terrifying at the same
time. This is the cunning journey that Bacchus toys with;
At every stage throughout the Phenomenology, self-
consciousness realizes that its point of departure at every
turn is always already a failure.
Since we have touched upon shaken (epistemological)
foundations, let us now turn to the thinker who introduced
the doctrine of flux.
Heraclitus's Unity of Opposites and the Interplay of
Dionysus and Apollo
In order to understand Hegel's Auseinandersetzunq
(engagement) with play in the PhS, it is pertinent to take
into account his "peculiar adoption of Heraclitus."^
Although Heraclitus is not explicitly mentioned in the PhS,
he is, I argue, nevertheless 'omnipresent'. Perhaps,
though, Hegel takes a cue from a Heraclitean fragment which
comments on the foolish practice of the Bacchic revels:
"If it were not in honor of Dionysus that they
conducted the procession, and sang the phallic
hymn, their activity would be completely
shameless. But Hades is Dionysus, in whose honor
they rave and perform the Bacchic revels." (Fr.
15)
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Hegel did in fact hold Heraclitus in high esteem; in
Lectures on the History of Philosophy (hereafter HP)
,
he states emphatically: "Here we see land; there is no
proposition of Heraclitus that I have not adopted in my
Logic." (HP, p.279) Hegel claims that Heraclitus grasps
"the Absolute itself as just this process of the dialectic
itself." (HP, p.278) The dialectical process is important
to this Presocratic thinker, because, unlike the Eleatics,
he focusses on the notion of Becoming (and Evanescent)
,
from which he derives his theory of the flux and the unity
of opposites. Hegel declares that Zeno's dialectic is
still only immanent and subjective, whereas Heraclitus's
dialectic is objective, using a process of attaining truth
by refuting previously held viewpoints. Hegel argues that
Heraclitus's speculative thought is not limited to a
philosophy of nature, "where the simple substance in fire
and the other elements in itself becomes metamorphosed"
(HP, p.290); his philosophy is the first to articulate
"the unity of the principle of consciousness and of the
object" (HP, p.293). Hegel describes it approvingly as a
"beautiful, natural, child-like manner of speaking truth of
the truth." (HP, p.293)
In his book on the influence of Heraclitus's thought
on Hegelian and Marxian dialectic, Howard Williams (1989)
argues that Hegel adopted the doctrine of flux and the
unity of opposites from this Presocratic philosopher, as
evinced by such works as The Philosophy of Right , The
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Science of Logic
. I will make use of Williams' analysis by
applying it to the PhS and in particular to our passage in
question.
In the passage of the revel (§47)
,
Hegel describes
dialectics as a constantly changing cyclical movement, as
"the process which begets and traverses its own moments,
and this whole movement constitutes what is positive [in
it] and its truth." What is a positive shape might come
into being through its very negation. Hegel illustrates
this point with his play of the fleeting, vanishing moment:
"The evanescent itself must. . .be regarded as essential, not
as something fixed, cut off from the True, and left lying
who knows where outside it, any more than the True is to be
regarded as something on the other side, positive and dead.
Appearance is the arising and passing away..." Clearly,
his dialectic is characterized by the necessity of
appearances and by the proposition of all that is
contradictory is real. Similarly, Heraclitus states that
"everything is moving and nothing stays still, and that one
cannot step twice into the same river." Both thinkers
espouse a dialectic riddled with a play of differences, in
particular toying with dialectical metaphors in form of a
coincidence of opposites. Note for instance the ambivalent
character of the "simple certainty" of Spirit in the
classical Greek period: it is defined as a "serene
existence f ruhiges Bestehen ) and as absolute unrest
( absolute Unruhe ) . . . " (PhS §701)
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since change and movement play such an important part
in the Hegelian phenomenological perspective of
consciousness and reality, rigid definitions could never
provide what Williams calls "a continually critical and
open-ended approach." (1989, p.ll) Eugen Fink, too, notes
that technical terms are never fixed, rather they are in
constant flux in the PhG. Williams argues that
Heraclitus's doctrine of flux cannot be separated
arbitrarily from the apparent paradoxical idea of the unity
of opposites^°, and Hegel too thinks them together. As
the above quote on the evanescent ( das Verschwindende ^
makes clear, the dialectical movement is determined as much
by its positive moments as by its negative ones; there are
several fragments that support the claim of the importance
of this doctrine for Heraclitus (e.g. "The purest and
foulest water: for fish drinkable and life-sustaining; for
men undrinkable and deadly."). Heraclitus's 'tarrying with
the negative'—by not only juxtaposing life-affirming and
life-threatening elements ("Hades is Dionysus"—death is
life)
,
but by reflecting on the positive value of the
negative—makes him so congenial to Hegel who says in his
Logic (hereafter SL) that the dialectical nature of reason
is such that it subverts the "determinations of the
understanding"; nevertheless reason does not remain "in
the nothingness of this result but in the result is no less
positive." (SL, p.28) Hegel explicitly refers to
dialectics as the unity of opposites. (SL, p.56)
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The cunning appeal to the proposition of the unity of
opposites does not only characterize Heraclitean dialectics
but also the Hegelian "movement of the life of truth," i.e.
the Bacchanalian revel which is frenzied movement and
controlled repose at the same time. No other passage
characterizes this unity of opposites better than the
discussion of the "simple substance of life," (PhS §171)
which Fink rightly links to the revel. Hegel states that
"[t]hus the simple substance of Life is the splitting-up of
Itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of
these existent differences; and the dissolution of the
splitting-up is just as much a splitting-up and a forming
of members." m this passage, Hegel alludes to the
positive meaning of the notion of diremption: "the
supersession of individual existence is equally the
production of it." Or, the process of life is "just as
much an imparting of shape f Gestaltung ] as a supersession
it* One could compare this to the evolutionary
process: bifurcation of cells of bacteria, where the Ur-
cell dissolves, made primitive life on earth only possible.
New shapes are developed out of the vanishing of the
primary shape. [ "Entzweiung
. . . und zugleich Auflosung. . .
"
§171, my emphasis, MN] In Hegelian jargon, this
organological thinking amounts to the formula of birth
(thesis) plus death (anti-thesis) equals life
(synthesis) .
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Hyppolite, too, attributes special significance of the
unity of opposites in the revel metaphor. He points out
the agonistic character of the relationship of the
opposites, faith and intellection (that is the struggle
between Aufklarung, Enlightenment, and Aberalaube .
superstition) exemplified in the study of the self-
alienated Spirit (in the section on Culture and
Alienation)
.
The supreme synthesis of Hegel's thought is this
unity of movement and repose
. a unity of the
disquiet of the self (temporality) and the
eternity of essence. For this reason truth in-
and-for-itself is "Bacchic delirium
. .
.
,
but this
delirium is also a translucent and simple repose"
... The two moments separate here as essence and
self, faith and intellection. (Hyppolite, p.421)
In his secular interpretation of the PhS, Eugen Fink
puts much weight into a cosmological, Heraclitean reading
of the image of the Bacchanalian revel. It is "the life-
absorbing r lebenstrunken i movement of Being, which
traverses all things; it is the incessant movement, which
pushes all Being-in-itself away into Being-for-itself
,
and
is at the same time the 'simple repose', as which the
Being-in-itself lets occur all changes in themselves and
conserves itself in all of them, at the same time
undermining them." (1977a, p.33) Fink carefully avoids an
anthropocentric reading of G1 ied and advances this view in
his book Sein und Mensch (1977b), where he integrates
Heraclitean and Nietzschean imagery in this passage: "The
True is the Bacchanalian revel, i.e. the Dionysian movement
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the revel creates and
of Being, which floods all entity;
destroys it, and it is at the same time 'simple repose.
(1977b, pp. 66-67) Fink argues that this playful metaphor
is used by Hegel to elucidate his speculative concept of
world or cosmos. (1977a, pp. 215-16)
But the revel does not only fall into the dimension of
world. Being, and truth; it also determines Life as such.
Fink points to the expression of "allgemeine Leben"
(universal life; cf. PhG §171) or in Fink's words "All-
Leben" (totality of life) where Hegel discusses the process
of life as involving diremption into various shapes and as
the dissolution of the shapes' existing differences. Here,
the revel appears as life, as a circular life-process of
creation and destruction. Hence, Fink concludes that Hegel
repeats an existential, fundamental experience of
Heraclitus. (1977a, p.l72)
Although Fink provides us with a rich and original
reading of Hegelian dialectics, I miss a discussion of the
struggle of oppositional forces which pertains to the
metaphor of the Bacchanalian frenzy. It is not clarified
whether the Dionysian is struggling with something other
than itself. Fink is ambiguous about the meaning of the
revel's relationship with the Dionysian and does not
explain what is Dionysian about 'simple repose.' In other
words, Fink does not seem to think that the Apollonian
aspect has any significance for Hegel.
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Obviously, Hegel's emphatic deployment of the revel
metaphor to define the True has led many Hegel scholars to
speculations of affinity to Nietzschean ontology, while I
think It is worthwhile to devote more space to this issue,
I shall restrict my discussion to a comparison of their
usage of the Apollonian and Dionysian principle.
In the Preface, we are told that the true is the
whole; Hegel clearly mocks the traditional correspondence
theory of truth.
A
few pages later, we hear that the
true is defined as a revel of a special sort, and if we
restrict our interpretation to Hegel's aesthetics, these
descriptions all of a sudden make sense. The interplay of
contingency and necessity or of drunken frenzy and calm
repose, I mentioned earlier, turns out to depict the life
forces of Dionysus and Apollo, to borrow Nietzschean
concepts here. In The Birth of Tragedy . Nietzsche explains
that Apollo's principium individuationis applies to the
transparency and simple repose of the revel, providing the
order, harmony and shape, whereas Dionysus's principle is
that of chaos, drunkenness, frenzy, or simply uncontrolled
motion. In the PhS, these opposing life forces are
portrayed as negative (Dionysian) and positive (Apollonian)
moments. Hegel emphasizes that negativity carries the
notion of becoming ( Enstehunq ) and positivity is attributed
to what is tactically dead, the state of calm repose. (For
further elaboration of this point, see below in the section
on "art religion".) The unity of movement and repose is a
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key marker to this dialectical play; in fact, as Hyppolite
observes, it represents "[t]he supreme synthesis of Hegel's
thought. Yet, these moments should not be thought of
as being in a binary opposition as which they are depicted
in Nietzsche's Mrth ; with his emphasis on "tarrying with
the negative," Hegel is much closer to the Heraclitean
logic of flow and destruction.!^ This point will be
clarified in the section on the abstract art work (below)
.
I contend that the revel thus depicts the Concept
(
B
egr i f
f
) or absolute Notion, which elsewhere is
characterized as the simple essence of life that "pulsates
within itself but does not move, inwardly trembles, yet is
at rest." (§162) Hence the Concept does not only reconcile
the opposites (of Apollo and Dionysus) but also is the
difference ("das vielmehr selbst alle Unterschiede ist")
.
Clearly, both aesthetic principles determine "the whole of
the movement," which is the "movement of the life of truth"
or alternatively, the self-realization of the spirit. In
fact, the cunning of the Idea or Reason (cf. below) is
actualized in so far Reason uses both principles as
playthings to arrange capriciously a unity of these
opposites. I argue then that Hegel lays the ground for
'deviant' philosophical engagement with play—and I am
thinking of the play by the so-called artist metaphysicians
Nietzsche, Fink, and Gadamer—and even if Hegel may not
seem to totally break with the logocentric, paidio-phobic
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tradition, he at least deviates from its Apollonian path
playfully.
The Cunning of Reason and Eurip ides's 'God of Many Namp-:^'
In this section I will look at anthropocentric
readings of the Bacchanalian revel. i will use Zi2ek's
psychoanalytic reading of the 'cunning of reason' and apply
it to my analysis of Hegel's employment of Dionysus, by
studying the characteristics of this god in Euripides's
The
—
^acchae
. First, I will again focus on the
Bacchanalian revel. This image jumps up out of nowhere in
guite strikingly, Hegel employs this metaphor to
describe "the True" ( das Wahre ) . What is this member and
its relationship to the whirl? In his translation of the
sentence, A.V. Miller provides an anthropocentric
interpretation of the term 'member' ( das died ) . by
rendering the German "und weil jedes, indem es sich
ab.sondert, ebenso unmittelbar [sich] auflost" into "yet
because each member collapses as soon as he drops out."
Miller suggests that this whirl envelops each Bacchic
dancer with such destructive force that holds sway of him
till he has to give up dancing and collapses due to
physical exhaustion. I hesitate to endorse that narrow
reading. Sure enough, the member partaking in the revel
could be a human player; it is plausible that in this
context humans appear as playthings which are being toyed
with. They appear to be delivered over to the whim of the
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revel, which imposes a Bacchantic force over everything—
not merely humans within its reach. The revel assumes
then the position of a cosmic play akin to Heraclitus's
aj^ where the players are not relevant, but the play as
such is. So play qua revel is subject—not the player qua
Gli^ configured in a concatenation. In other words, it is
a cosmic game where players inevitably drop out in the
course of the game and become irrelevant. This game
recapitulates the course of the PhS
,
which narrates how the
various shapes of consciousness lose their relevance, once
the Concept (qua finite reason) takes hold.’’^ Zi2ek
provides a nuanced reading of the relationship of those
human members being toyed with by the revel or the
Absolute. With respect to Hegel's famous allusion to the
dialectical interplay of subject and substance, e.g.
"everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not
only as Substance
.
but equally as Subject " (PhS, §17),
2i2ek asserts that
[t]his does not mean that the Absolute itself is
a Subject playing with us, finite humans, i.e.,
that, in the movement of absolute reflection, we,
finite humans, make ourselves into the
instrument, the medium through which the Absolute
contemplates itself—this would be a simple
perverse position. What Hegel has in mind is
that the split between us and the Absolute (the
split on account of which we are subjects) is at
the same time the self-split of the Absolute
itself: we participate at the Absolute not on
account of our exalted contemplation of it, but
by means of the very gap which forever separates
us from it—as in Kafka's novels where the
fascinated gaze of the subject is already
included in the functioning of the transcendent,
unapproachable agency of Law (the court, the
castle). (1993, pp. 243-244; his emphasis)
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The Hegelian subject's relationship to the Substance is
such that it provides a reification of the Substance, an
externalization. To understand the role-playing one
assumes "in the game of the 'cunning of reason'"
( 1993 ,
p.31), 2i2ek looks at Hegel's notion of the a^ which
involves jumping into the unknown and externalizing of the
self, insofar as it plays alongside other selves,
communicates with them in order to find out one's own
desires, values, since—as we know since Freud—one does
not have some privileged access to the truth about oneself.
Hegel elaborates the term 'cunning of reason' in The
Philosophy
—o_f—History in his analysis of historical
struggles between concrete selves. Individuals may think
they follow their own rational plans that they enact;
instead they are duped into following and legitimating the
masterplan of the Idea, the divine plan. In economic
terms, this means that an artisan believes that he produces
to accumulate wealth and takes steps to achieve this goal
(by exploiting nature and perhaps his apprentices)
,
but in
fact he takes part unwittingly in the development of
productive societal forces, i.e. the "obj ectivization of
spirit." This is a clue to the seductive appeal of Hegel's
play: laying out the functioning of the dialectics of truth
and deception. As 2i2ek explains, "the deception is just a
game Idea plays with itself. Idea realizes its true ends
by means of the 'cunning of reason.'" (1991, p. 166-7) But
ultimately, the dialectical game is a failure: there is no
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being who is the supreme manipulator, i.e. who is beyond
deception. Zi2ek emphatically declares that "the
manipulator [even God] himself is always-already
manipulated." (1993, p.33) Hence, it is a mistake to
assume that there is a grand puppeteer (the Absolute) who
IS not subjected to the subject-substance oppositional
relationship and simply toys with the human playthings.
Everybody, even the dialectician, is an integral member of
the game that produces truth through deception.
2i2ek's sophisticated reading of the "cunning of
reason" should prove useful for an interpretation of
Hegel's use of Dionysian imagery. The Dionysian revel
casts a magic spell and masks the rules to show that the
terror of the negative does indeed contain nothing
positive. Hegel, who refers to Bacchanalian revelry
repeatedly throughout the PhS, must have had in mind a
passage from Euripides's The Bacchae
. where Teiresias
praises the divine prophesies of Dionysus, which enrapture
those mortals who take part in the Bacchanalian mysteries:
And this god is a prophet, too: the Bacchic
frenzy gives the power of foresight; when
Bacchus fully infiltrates the body
of whoever is possessed, they foretell the
future
.
(lines 298ff
.
,
C.K. Williams trans., emphasis
added)
Bacchus, the trickster,—not Apollo—determines the
outcome, accomplished in a transparent manner in order to
feign harmony, not chaos. The individual member of this
game or dance lacks subjectivity, is not fiir sich . The
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player does not control the game, rather dissipates,
dissolves; he has a fleeting presence. in this way,
Dionysus uses Pentheus as his tool; however, Pentheus
taunts the god and grants him access, lets himself be
invaded by this alien, parasitical life force.
This image of the dissolving movement appears
frequently in the later part of the PhS (notably in chapter
6, Spirit: Self-alienated Spirit); Hegel brings up the
disintegration of consciousness and connects it to play,
da^—sich auflosende Spiel (poorly translated as
'nihilistic game' by Miller—even the Hegelian play with
the 'negation of negation' is not nihilistic). In a
section on Bilduno (culture)
,
we find a most intriguing
parallel to the revel image. True Spirit, Hegel asserts,
tears apart, in so far as it forces "all of those moments,
which are supposed to count as essence (Wesen ) and actual
members of the whole, to dissolve" (§521, my emphasis).
Note that as in the revel imagery, members are again put to
task to dissolve themselves; but dissipation involves
taking on another shape ( Gestalt ) —this is the significance
of the (positive) movement of the 'negation of
negation. '
Dionysus, again, is at play here, in the form of "torn
consciousness" which speaks in a cunning and witty
( qeistreich ) manner. The name of the game, Hegel alludes
to (cf. §594), is, of course, the Jacobinical terror,
involving a diabolical brutality— not unlike the
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relentless judgments which Dionysus hands down to King
Pentheus of Thebes, his mother Agave (cf. the god's final
speech in The Bacchae ) . This destructive ( zerxeissen^)
judgment is, Hegel tells us, "what amounts to the true and
invincible, while it overpowers everything." Again, the
true, as told in the revel image, amounts to the truth of a
mainomenos Dionusos
,
a truth that is utterly destructive
and inflicts madness, mania
,
and thus ultimately causes its
own dissolution.
Perhaps Hegel is playing with some of the many
attributes of the god, when he writes about Zerrissenheit
and Auflosung
. One of Dionysus's many names is
anthroporraistes (someone who tears apart humans) and—more
positively
—
lusios (someone who loosens knots, ties; who
liberates)
. What Hegel stresses here is a truly
Dionysian feature, namely transgression, hinted at with
terms, such as "dissolving game" and "disrupted
consciousness." Just as Dionysus takes possession of
Pentheus mother, who tears apart her beloved son, so does
the external revolutionary terror, as a "kind of
parasitical, malign foreign body" (Zi2ek, 1993, p.25),
intrude the subject's consciousness. The "sheer terror of
the negative" contains nothing positive, but this negation
"is not something alien" to the self. (PhS §594) Thus is
the significance of the 'negation of negation': "what first
appears as an external obstacle reveals itself to be an
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inherent hindrance, i.e., an outside force turns into an
inner compulsion." (2i2ek, 1993, p.25)
^i2ek's point is perhaps best illustrated with the
Bacch^ by Euripides. in this play, Dionysus and Bacchic
revelry exemplify the movement of internalization.
Dionysus' personae cling on parasitically to some morally
bad trait (e.g. Pentheus
' sacrilegious arrogance) and make
a mockery out of it; Dionysus' sadistic display of force
transforms into the masochistic desire of a condemned
subject. Yet, Euripides still relies on the art of make-
belief and the notion that masks actually disguise or hide
some real face, which is no longer the case in Hegel's
post—Platonic ludic world. (I will come back to the role
of masks in a later section of this chapter.)
The metaphor of the Bacchanalian revel clearly assumes
a central category in the PhS
,
in particular in light of
Hegel's play theory. As I see it, this passage of the
revel in the PhS foremost points to the cunning of Hegel's
work. Play as the other of reason marks its entry into
philosophical discourse, forcing us to rethink the
dialectical movement and its deployment in Hegel's
Bildungsroman .
In the following section I will discuss Hegel's
depiction of play in the Art-Religion chapter. This
chapter all too often is overlooked mainly because Hegel is
thought to have a more mature aesthetical analysis in his
later works. However, where we encounter a merely fleeting
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presence of the Apollonian and Dionysian forces in earlier
chapters, Hegel now fleshes them out in the section on
Greek tragedy and comedy; furthermore he provides a socio-
historical analysis of his play with subjectivity.
Westphal (1979) is correct in pointing out that we have to
read the PhS as a coherent work which gives an analysis of
transcendental subjectivity and states that it cannot be
thought of as separate from its social history.
Notes on Art-Reliaion
Play appears most prominently in "spiritual" forms of
art, i.e. epics, tragedy and comedy, in the section on art-
religion ( Kunstreliqion ) . Kunstreliqion is the term Hegel
uses to depict the interplay of religious and artistic
expressions of consciousness in a particular historical
period, namely classical Greece.^® He subdivides the
section further into the abstract work of art, the living
work of art ( das lebendiqe Kunstwerk ^ and the spiritual
work of art in order to describe the development of
(aesthetic) consciousness within Greek culture. Spiritual
artwork ( das geistiae Kunstwerk
^
,
the third and highest
form of art-religion, is relevant for our discussion
because of the occurrence of the Bacchanalian frenzy in
Greek tragedy. (In the previous section, I have hinted at
the importance of tragedy for Hegel by introducing
Euripides's play.) Yet, playful expressions surface in the
preceding lower forms, i.e. in the abstract and living
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works of art, where Hegel presents obliquely the opposite
of Apollonian and Dionysian art.
Kunstreliqion is one of three subdivisions of chapter
seven (Religion) in the PhS
. The significance of the
entire chapter of religion is, as Hyppolite (1974) notes,
Hegel's replay— in concentrated form—of the development of
the journey of consciousness, or rather of spirit. (1974,
p.544) Hegel distinguishes between natural religion
(Eastern religions, as practiced in ancient Indian,
Persian, Egyptian cultures)
,
which he compares to the state
of natural consciousness, and art-religion (Greek tragedy
and comedy) which corresponds to self-consciousness, and
finally revealed religion (Christianity) which corresponds
to Reason. In this section I will only discuss the
appearance of play in religion in the form of art. It is
noteworthy, however, that in the chapter on natural
religions play appears as a "essence-less by-play in
substance," ( ein wesenloses Beihersphielen an dieser
Substanz) which refers to the "revelling life" which is not
yet for-itself, i.e. a self-conscious subject. (§§687-88)
Here, we find one of the rare occurrences of a malediction
of Beiherspielen
.
a term that Hegel coined and which is
usually reserved for a positive dynamic movement of self-
consciousness. In this passage, play as 'essence-less
playing alongside with', is not yet good, agonistic
performance. What it indicates, moreover, Hegel's
discussion of a (moral) progression of forms of religions
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from "instinctual" natural religion (manifest in ancient
Indian, Persian and Egyptian cultures) to "revealed"
religion (Christianity)
— is a display of culturally
imperialist attitudes on his partJ’ in this historical
evaluation of pre-Christian religious consciousness, only
Greek so-called "Kunstreligion" is exempted from
malediction, since "the play of rites or actions
[ Handlunqen ] receives its earnestness and worth in the
actions themselves." (§732).
What is the significance of the connection between art
and religion? In his chapter "Religion: Mysticism or
Humanism?," Hyppolite states that religion figures
prominently as a form of art in the PhS. It is only much
later that Hegel clearly differentiates between art and
religion. But even then, e.g. in his various lectures on
religion, he is preoccupied with the tripartite semi-
autonomous spheres of art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel
adds art and play (tragedy etc) to the long chapter on
religion, because religion in its "superior" form is
synonymous with the work of art. Desmond explains that
"Greek Kunstreligion is not art in the post-Kantian sense
of a specialized realm of aesthetic experience. The
aesthetic and the mythic, that is, the religious, cannot be
separated." (1992, p.319) Hegel states that religion in
the form of art plays in—or rather with—the margins of
rationality, where the (Egyptian) artisan-turned (Hellenic)
spiritual worker has given up on blending "the
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heterogeneous forms of thought and natural objects." (PhS
§699) Natural or instinctual religion has developed into a
higher form, namely, 'artificial' ( kiinstlichP ^ religion.
(cf. §683)
In his lectures on religion, Hegel refers to art-
religion, i.e. whenever he describes Greek religion, as
religion of beauty. He invokes images of a playful people
whose initiation rites, the Eleusian mysteries, and other
sacral festivals produce enjoyment, "immediate
gratification," and conjure up phantasies of ideal
beauty. In his later work, Hegel does not maintain the
rigid characterization of Greek art-religion as the
abstract, living, and spiritual work of art, where the
spiritual work represents the highest form of art-religion.
In the introductory passages of the "Kunstreligion"
chapter in the PhS (cf. §§699-704), Hegel emphatically
dispells the naturalistic, mythical "monsters in shape,
word, and deed" (§698) by invoking a new shape of
consciousness, the affirmative Hellenic life-style, its
ioie de vivre ; art-religion conjures up the ethical Spirit
of a playful, artistic Greek polis and its artworks: "The
Spirit [of Greece] is the free nation (Volk ) in which
hallowed custom constitutes the substance of all, whose
actuality and existence each and everyone knows to be his
own will and deed." (§700) This ethical spirit embodies a
happy equilibrium of "humanity which is perfect in its
finitude, but it is an unstable equilibrium, the youth of
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world spirit." (Hyppolite, p.548) In this precious
moment, Dionysian frivolity breaks out: the dissolution of
all existing, firm boundaries of the ethical order;
transgression of enjoyment, and display of absolute
giddiness ( Leichtsinn ) . Note the Heraclitean playfulness,
the dialectics of the opposites (the Apollonian and
Dionysian forces)
,
in the following sentence: "This simple
certainty of Spirit within itself has a twofold meaning
—
Z
weideutige ) : it is a serene, stable existence and
settled truth, and also absolute unrest and the passing-
(Verqehen ) of the ethical order." (§701) This
equilibrium of this play between the extremes does not
last, however. The Bacchanalian skirmish as one of the
extremes wins control over the ethical substance.
Apollonian principium individuat ionis fails to deliver a
crucial message to the self, namely, its ability to
recognize itself as a free, liberated substance.
Experiencing this sudden negation of enjoyment, of self-
trust, Spirit mourns over the loss of its giddy Dasein.
(§701) The exuberant sentiment of this passage certainly
echoes the romanticist "back to Ancient Greece" movement of
Schleiermacher
,
Schiller and Winckelmann, but Hegel notes
that the very collapse of giddiness (of consciousness) into
absolute unrest and melancholia is the condition of
possibility of absolute art. (§702)
Its first moment is in the form of the abstract work
of art . The artwork is abstract, because the artist has
179
not yet recognized his own subjective expression in the
work. He fails to see the dialectical relationship between
the artistic creation and the self-conscious activity of
the productive process. (§§708-709) The abstract artwork
appears in two extreme instantiations, namely, in that of
the ephemeral hymn and in that of the objective, reified
statue. Again, note the interplay of opposites, of dynamic
and static aspects, in this art form. Furthermore, the
statue represents pure exteriority, pure repose of a divine
figure, the hymn expresses lyrically the god's pure
interiority, pure feelings. (§714) Hyppolite notes that
"the contrast between Apollonian and Dionysian art already
appears in these passages," i.e. in the discussion of the
opposition between sculpture and lyricism (in the abstract
work of art) and in later passages on the living work of
art. (p.551) It is noteworthy that the opposites of
lyricism and sculpture are also, as Hyppolite points out
correctly, important examples for Nietzsche's theory on
Apollonian and Dionysian art in his Birth of Tragedy .
(Hyppolite, p.551) For Hegel, these opposites are unified,
mediated in Andacht (worship) in the abstract cult. (§715,
§719) Another Nietzschean resemblance in the play of
opposites when Hegel describes the rite in this way: "The
cultus [is] a serious playing and a playful seriousness, a
gravity that is gay." ( Philosophy of Religion , Vol.I,
p. 168)
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In the performance of the sacrifice, the notion of
enjoyment resurfaces again, that is, bearing the mask of a
cunning, vanishing mediator^^ where even foul play seems
to be involved. The rite appears to demand from the
sacrificing person a total surrender of the gift to the
gods. However,
this is only a small part, and the other act of
sacrifice is merely the destruction of what
cannot be used, and is really the preparation ofthe offering for a meal, the feast that cheatsthe act out of its negative significance. Atthat first sacrifice, the person making the
offering reserves the greatest share for his own
enjoyment, and from the latter sacrifice, what is
useful, the same purpose. This enjoyment is
the negative power which puts an end both to thedivine Being r wesen ] and to the singleness
[Einzelheit]
.
.
(§718; additions, mine)
This kind of Verstellungsspiel (pretense-game) makes
possible a disalienation^^ of substance and subject. In
this cultic act of conspicuous consumption of the animal
sacrificed, the divine essence (substance) is no longer
outer, and the self (subject) "has consciousness of its
unity with the divine Being." Incidentally, this is one of
the instances where Hegel plays with the analogy of Greek
paganism to Christianity, in order to elevate Hellenist
sacral culture, as Hyppolite points out (p.552). In his
description of sacrificial offerings, Hegel refers
—
quite
unmotivated--to one God, e.g. in the phrase of Zeichen
eines Gottes ("sign of a god"), although he proceeds to
mention two oppositional divine forces, namely Apollo and
Dionysus; also often, when he mentions Ceres and Bacchus,
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he tends to allude to the Christian mysteries of bread and
wine. (§723)
In the abstract cult, the Greek gods to be worshipped
are those who control the powers of the upper law (Apollo)
,
"which has blood and actual life" and those who control the
powers of the lower law (Ceres and Bacchus)
. The latter
Dionysian divinities have vampire-like qualities. They
"possess in bloodless form secret and cunning power."
(§718) These opposing powers resurface in Hegel's
discussion of tragedy: here, the upper law is associated
with Phoebus, the sun god, god of daylight, (i.e. Apollo)
and the lower law with the furies (erinys)
,
an epithet of
Ceres. (§738) In these play of forces, Apollo, who as
bringer of light also brings life, clearly warrants the
upper hand, since Dionysus, the 'God of many names,'
"hides" behind the masks of Ceres and Bacchus, and infuses
the game with destructive power.
These divine forces are a playful Leitfaden throughout
the chapter on "Kunstreligion. " In the living work of art ,
the cultic worship is no longer a worship of a divine
being, 'as the empty Depth" (§720) but as Spirit. The gods
are no longer represented by statues but by the self-
conscious people. The worshipper knows himself to be in
unity with the Spirit; he recognizes his self in its
Substance, i.e. "he knows himself to be at one with the
divine essence." (Hyppolite, p.552) But this unity is only
externally realized, as corporality. It is epitomized in
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the athlete who represents the "inspired [beseelt^]
,
living" artwork. (§725) "The handsome warrior r Fechter ] is
indeed the glory of his particular nation, but he is a
corporeal individuality..." who lacks the spiritual
essence. (§726) Clearly, Apollo, who takes on the shape of
the lifeless beautiful statue in the abstract art work, now
assumes the body of the beautiful athlete and torchbearer.
In the living art work. Bacchanalian frenzy, the
self's "wild stammering utterance," still dominates so that
the self is "beside itself" ( auBer sich
^
,
out of sync or
out of balance. The self only grasps the mysteries of
Ceres and Bacchus, not—as Hegel emphasizes—those of the
upper gods, who infuse the self with individuality. (§724)
The raptured worshipper's rationality is clouded and lacks
Apollonian clarity. A true unity with the Absolute is only
accomplished in the higher (spiritual) form of language of
epos, tragedy and comedy. (§726)
In their realization of the form of the living art
work, the Greek Volk recognizes that it has to overcome
hybris, embodied in the Bacchantes, a swarm of roaming,
frenzied women ( schwarmende Weiber
. §723). Here, Hegel's
Aristotelian streak comes out tout force for trying to
combat hubris; he calls for temperance by envoking the
'civilizing' element of the festivals where thus
unconscious, delirious exuberance ( Schwarmerei ) can be
contained/tamed and a unity of opposites be realized.
"This undisciplined revelry of the god must bring
itself to rest as an obi ect . and the enthusiasm
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which did not attain to consciousness mustproduce a work that confronts it,
,
but nothowever, as an intrinsically lifeless, but as a
_
iving
,
self. Such a Cult is the festival whichman celebrates in his own honor." (§ 725 )
Curiously, Hegel makes no mention of the necessity of
an eguilibrium, a balance between the Dionysian and
Apollonian forces in the section of the abstract art work,
where, presumably, the untamed Bacchantes express
themselves in lyric songs and oracles. However, Hegel also
toys with the Dionysian attribute 'god of many names' who
in the shape of an earth spirit ( Erdaeisf) goes through
metamorphoses of the feminine principle of nutritional,
objective substance to the masculine principle of
spiritual, self-conscious, subjective Dasein . These
principles refer respectively to the powers of Ceres,
goddess of agriculture, and Bacchus, god of wine. They
also point to a not so subtle division of nature and
culture, where the fruits of Ceres represent the former and
the cultivated wine the latter. The determinate negation
of these opposites, i.e of pure immanence and
transcendence, occurs in the spiritual work of art, in the
language of epic, tragedy and comedy.
In the section on the spiritual art work , the
opposites do persist in a different shape. In the epos , we
find the extremes in the Olympian gods ( Gesamthimmel ) on
the one hand and the Gesamtvolk on the other, whereby the
bard, who narrates the story, functions as a vanishing
mediator (between universality of the divine and
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singularity of the human)
. The pathos of the bard is not
the immediate tranquilizing force of nature, i.e. it is not
a Bacchic force, but it is a reflective, Apollonian power
of re-collection (Mnemosyne)
. The bard is simply the
organ, "it is not his own self that counts but his muse,
his universal song." (§729, Bailie, trans.) But Hegel does
not fail to stress a certain comic element vis-a-vis the
role of the gods in the epic which displaces the serenity
of the bdrd ' s passion. Taylor (1975) notes that the gods
are parochial universals—not identical with the truly
universal self (p.205) so that the gods are cast as being
not all too different from the heroic humans depicted in
these narratives, such as the II ias . Hegel remarks that
"[t]he earnestness of those divine powers is a ridiculous
superfluity," while at the same time the superhuman work
performed by the mortal heroes is equally done in vain,
since the gods toy with them cunningly and steer them into
their predetermined fate. (§730) Due to their own
parochial nature, the gods also engage in strife among each
other, which represents "a comic self-forgetfulness of
their eternal nature." In this play of the forces, of
divine excess and heroic restraint, of seriousness and
purposelessness, the divine actions are sheer mockery and
provide comic relief. Hegel explains that "[o]ne purpose
of the activity. . . is an arbitrary showing-off which at
once melts away and transforms the apparent earnestness
[ anscheinenden Ernst i of the action into a harmless, self-
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confident play, without result or outcome." (§ 731 )
However, these contigent comic actions cannot escape the
"iron dice of necessity"
—to invoke a Nietzschean
expression. Hegel plays with a representation of necessity
by introducing a dialectical play which is not an essence-
less free-play but brings about the unity of opposites in
the form of the self-mediating Concept.
This Necessity, however, is the unity of the
Notion which brings under control the
contradictory substantial being of the separate
moments, a unity in which the inconsistency and
^^bitrariness of their action is orderly
disposed, and the play of its actions which
retains
—
its—earnestness and worth in the actions
themselves
.
The content of the world of
pictorial thought r Vorstelluna ] freely unfolds
[ spielt losoebunden ) itself in the middle term
[of its own movement], gathering itself round the
individuality of a hero who, however, in his
strength and beauty feels his life is broken and
sorrowfully awaits an early death. (§732,
emphasis added, M.N.)
This is one of the key passages of the PhS which lays
out Hegel's thoughts about play and clarifies that play—to
use a Lacanian phrase— is the unity of the Concept. It
amounts to a play which is serious and negates the 'spirit
of gravity, ' the self-pity, that holds sway of the tragic
hero, as narrated by the bard, who remains au/3er sich
(besides himself) and vanishes in his performative play.
Equally, it dissolves the pompous, mocking games of the
warring gods. Yet, the process of negation, of vanishing
does not entail that the self is completely dissolved into
its other. To use a Lacanian term: there is an obiet petit
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a, the "stuff" of the empty form (subject) which resists
objectivication (cf. Zi2ek, 1993, p. 21 ).
The Concept becomes only aware of itself in "the
higher language" of ^agedy where its power of the negative
holds sway over the human and divine worlds. in tragedy,
the Concept collects and unifies the polarized moments of
the minstrel who becomes the actor and of the divine,
abstract non-actual necessity. Both extremities which
remain unmediated in the epos, Hegel explains, have to
approach the content of the play: "one of them. Necessity,
has to fill itself with the content, the other, the
language of the Minstrel, must participate in it." (§732)
Hence, mediation, determinate negation, occurs in tragedy
^here the minstrel * s narrative is replaced by the chorus
and the bard becomes the actor. Thus, the hero's anguish
is not merely narrated but dramatically impersonated by an
actor. At this point I want to stress importance of masks
(E.6^sonae) that the hero dons--play of masks. Let me pose
the following questions: Is the actor 'other' from his
mask? Is he merely hiding behind the disguise or is he in
fsct becoming the impersonation? Is there a standpoint
beyond the masks? In embarking on this phenomenological
journey. Spirit plays with one masquerade after another but
never quite seems to discard the previous mask that no
longer "fits;" to the contrary, the previous disguises are
exteriorized ( entaussert . entfremdet )
,
yet woven into the
new fabric, be it self-consciousness or Reason, through
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Spirit's tarrying with the negative power. The mask is not
accidental to the player, but an essential part. Hegel,
the dialectician-trickster, never suggests to throw away a
mask instead, they can only be put on and piled up. This
is Hegel's post—metaphysical gesture.
The supreme god of masks is Dionysus. Tragedy has a
Dionysian character since Dionysus, in his double identity
iii® and death, needs the mask to symbolize this
doubleness. The actor who masquerades, Otto ( 1933 )
explains somewhat mysteriously, plays with—and is
enthralled by--the Dionysian force:
The actor is in awe of the eminence of those
beings who are no longer present. He is himself
yet is another. Rapture, frenzy have touched
him, revealed something of the secret of the
frenzied god, of the spirit of doubleness, which
lives in the mask, whose last descendent is the
actor. (Otto, p.l90)
Dieter Bremer (1986) argues convincingly that Hegel's
notion of tragedy is anti-Aristotelian and returns to a
pre-Aristotelian conception of justice as presented in the
trilogy of the Orestea by Aeschylus. While Hegel repeats
metaphors in the chapter on "Sittliches Recht" from
Sophocles's Antigone
. it is Aeschylus's notion of
conciliation that is the driving force in the art-religion
chapter and motivates Hegel's discussion of Greek
tragedy. Unlike modern art theory, Hegel maintains that
tragedy has a character of conciliation, is able to mediate
the conflicts that arise in the play.^^ Bremer also
discusses Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, in which he
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represents the Greek chorus as the non-dirempted
consciousness of the Divine. The sooth-saying, passive
chorus is in opposition to tragic, conflict-ridden
individuals and both find their mediation in the Greek
tragedy
Hegel's emphasis on Versohnuna is much more pronounced
in his later work, in the lectures on aesthetics and
philosophy of religion, than in his Phenomenology
. and I
miss Bremer's differentiation on that point, who dismisses
too quickly the relevance of the conflict-laden Antigone
for Hegel's theory of tragedy. Antigone's suicide is an
instance of a successful self-externalization into the
object, i.e. there is no obiet petit a left over.^^ But
note that successful negation 'spoils' Hegel's dialectical
game since it negates the Dionysian flux.
In tragic art, curiously, the chorus does not
represent Bacchic women (furies) ; Hegel maintains that
they articulate pity, are in calm repose, and thus have
clearly Apollonian traits. Tragic action on the other
hand, is dirempted into Dionysian and Apollonian forces.
These spiritual powers intermittently battle with the
human, natural powers whose antagonism lies in the feminine
and the masculine ethical poles (cf. Antigone and Creon)
.
Apollo is under siege by the lower, subterranean-dwelling
r im Hinterhalte lauernde Macht ] Furies (Erinyes) , who are
associated with Demeter and Dionysus^®. (§738) Bremer
notes that sublation occurs on two levels: through
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' forgetfulness of the heinous crime, and through
the unifying spiritual power of Zeus.^°
Tragedy fails for two reasons; first, it lacks an
element of irony and misunderstands the role of masks
donned for the performative act of reconciliation.
Therefore it does not recognize that the heavens have
become depopulated (gods have to become humans and thus
irrelevant) and plays into anthropomorphism instead of
mocking it (as already demanded by Heraclitus) ; and
secondly, it does not recognize that the warring powers
both err or hold equally just positions.
Whereas in tragedy, the extreme powers of Apollo and
the Erinyes are unified in the ethical substance, i.e. in
Zeus, now, in comedy
, which is the final stage of Art-
religion, I would like to sugggest that the god of masks
wins out by mocking the logos, the True and Beautiful,
indeed by playing tricks on what is dear to philosophical
thought. It turns out to be a comic spectacle, since in
comedy the Platonic kalokaqathia
. the ideas of the
Beautiful and the Good, are relegated to the play of
opinions. (§746) Hegel also echoes, as Desmond (1992)
argues, the Socratic spirit of irony; Greek comedy reveals
the absolute negating power of subjectivity.^^ The 'death
of god' is linked to Socrates and comedy, which represents
the decline of the tragic age.
Hyppolite (1974) notes that whereas in tragedy the
actor embodies the divine through his mask, in comedy the
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actor simply "jettisons his mask and appears on stage in
flesh and blood". However, I do not think that this is
the implied meaning of the sentence about the hero who
"dissolves [zerfallt ] into his mask and . . . his actual
self," (§742) which is the work of Dionysos, whose
attribute is lusios (who breaks ties between the human and
the divine)
. But what is this naked self, this vessel
self? Is it devoid of masks? No, after all, Hegel also
emphasizes the unity of the player with his persona— the
self is conscious of his 'collapse' r Zusammenfall ] : "the
actual self of the actor coincides with what he
impersonates (i.e. the persona or mask) The spectator is
also drawn into the theatrical representation, since he
imagines himself in those roles and is "truly at home," by
observing them. (§747)
Desmond (1992) concurs with Hyppolite that in comedy
there is no longer a unity of actor and mask. I also
disagree with Desmond's interpretation that with the
emergence of self-consciousness there is a neat separation
of persona and actor. Desmond holds further that "the
divine mask is shown to be just that, a mask. This divine
mask is a game that we cannot play naively." Surely, in
the movement of spirit, the self plays with the idea of
demythologizing, debunking of the gods, but, as Desmond
puts it, it is unaware that the gods laugh back!^^
Hence, it is puzzling to me that the self has indeed
cleansed itself of any masks if it is unable to sustain the
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mockery by answering back. in fact, Hegel has the
following to say about the naive comfort that self-
consciousness takes refuge in:
It is the return of everything universal into the
certainty of itself which, in consequence, isthis complete loss of fear and of essential being
on the part of all that is alien. This self-
certainty is a state of spiritual well-being and
of repose therein, such as is not to be found
anywhere outside of this Comedy. (§747)
Hegel plays with this state of comfort that
consciousness takes pleasure in; it is a state of Wohlsein
und Sichwohlseinlassen
—a mocking pun, not quite captured
in Miller's translation (of well-being and repose)
.
Desmond concludes that we (the spectators?) need to wait
for a new mask, namely Geist
, which is also the ultimate
disguise. Clearly, Hegel imitates Aristophanes's comic
demythologizing by suggesting that in comedy gods become
clouds. However, he does not hold that the self becomes
self-transparent to itself by tossing the masks of the
divinities away. Mockery of that which is alien turns into
self-mocking introspection; happy, comic consciousness
learns it is in fact unhappy consciousness for it realizes
that the cunning of reason has new masks waiting in the
wings for the torn self, grieving over the loss of
substance. This grief is expressed in the harsh saying
that "God is dead." (§752)
Masks in Hegel's PhS are important tools that play
alongside substance qua transcendental subjectivity, that
is in the movement of Beiherspielen . Dionysian masks are
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treacherous, carrying both life-spending and death-giving
energies; comic consciousness necessarily is the j anus-
face of unhappy consciousness. As Desmond (1992) puts it
poignantly, we bear witness to a comedy of failure, in
which the unhappy consciousness signifies the split of the
self and radical metaphysical failure. Butler (1987)
applies this idea to the general rhethoric of PhS which is
such that tragic blindness turns out to be comic
cartoonlike myopia.^®
Social and Political Implications of Hegel's Plav
In this final section, I want to focus on some of the
ideological weaknesses of Hegel's discussion on play. Much
of it is written in an emphatic witty style which does not
merely demonstrate that the PhS is narrated as a comedy of
failure but it also suggests that it is simply telling a
series of jokes, without letting us know exactly how Hegel
plays his tricks. On a more "serious" note, I also agree
with Westphal (1979) that the PhS gives us a social history
of transcendental subjectivity. In that case, we also need
to investigate the political significance of this
historical narrative. Much has been written on the ethico-
political dimensions of the PhS by feminists^’, so that I
will restrict myself to a discussion of the aesthetico-
political issues pertaining to the section on .religion.
In the section on what Hegel dubiously calls Natural
Religion, there are quite a few examples that manifest a
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clearly ideologically motivated discussion, reflecting his
romanticist, Helleno-phile penchant: The pyramids are not
works of art but merely objects ( Dinae l produced
instinctively, "as bees build their honeycomb." (§691)
These objects are works which lack consciousness. Indeed,
they are "monsters in shape, word, and deed"l (§698) These
descriptions of so-called Natural—or primitive—Religion
reveal an unreconstructed attitude of cultural imperialism,
which grants only classical Greece (not Persia, Egypt,
India, etc.) as true predecessor of Christian culture and
the German Enlightenment a 'manifest destiny.
'
Does Hegel revise his position in his later works?
The following quote from the Philosophy of Religion
manuscript, which differentiates between the 'dark'
primitive religions and Greek 'enlightened,' i.e.
spiritual, religion, does not reveal a revisionist
attitude. Comparing different degrees of intuition in the
form of the cultus, Hegel remarks that "it is ... the
intuition of the process, of the transition from savagery
to legality, from barbarism to ethical life, from
unconscious dullness to the self-illuminating certainty of
self-consciousness." ( Philosophy of Religion . Vol.I, p.l78)
Thus is the 'play of the movement' of the subjective side
of the cultus. Furthermore, I want to problematize Hegel's
romanticization of the playfulness of classical Greece. It
is one of the few instances, where he gives a hint of being
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enarmoured with the idea that there is something like good
authentic play exemplified in Greek culture.
Besides the clearly eurocentric bias in his
aesthetic/religious writings, Hegel also emphasizes the
necessity (and beauty) of gendered play worlds. He
maintains that there are two ethical poles in tragedy: On
the one hand there is the "feminine" sphere, pertaining to
Nature, human law, subterranean forces, and the family
(with such attributes as being bloodless, lifeless, dark,
secretive, and endowed with cunning powers) ; on the other
hand, there is the "masculine" sphere of importance
(Culture, divine law, polls ) which displays attributes
reminiscent of a (neo)
-Platonic metaphysics of light:
blood, life, light, revealed, transparent knowledge.
(cf.§736) Other opposites are those of the virile Apollo
''^is-a-vis the emasculated/effeminate Dionysus, the latter
alternatively appears in the forms of Bacchus and Ceres (in
the discussion of rites that involve sacrificial acts) and
in the shape of the revenging Erinyes in the Greek tragic
drama
.
In the section on the living art work Hegel comforts
his feminist reader with the following observation
regarding the metamorphoses of the (female) earth spirit:
"Through the utility of being able to be eaten and drunk,
nature attains its highest perfection; in effect in this
act nature is the possibility of a higher existence and
comes close to the confines of spiritual Dasein." (§721,
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Bailie trans.) This explanation of the ascension toward
transcendental subjectivity is Hegel's grand gesture
towards the emancipation of women, as he perhaps realized
that the political demands of the Republican women, who
helped spearheading the French Revolution, were not totally
baseless. However, Hegel does not overcome his addiction
to Aristotle's theory of the complementary nature of the
sexes. Apollo clearly rules in the male and civic sphere
of knowledge and Dionysus or the Erinyes, in the female,
private sphere of non-knowledge, i.e. intuition, (cf. § 739 )
Finally, l should briefly mention that Hegel uses
strikingly the power of irony in his social commentary. In
a few passages on religious practices, Hegel is not only
P^®ssed to hold back his endorsement of Greek paganism
(over Christianity), but also he barely veils his anti-
catholic sentiment. In the Abstract Artwork, Hegel points
that the Greeks believed that they cleansed themselves
from sinful acts simply by donning white clothes and
performing sacral rites. (§715) This exteriorization of
the soul is also present in the practices of the papal
indulgences, against which Luther raged in his 95 theses.
Hegel also jokes about the "selfless" act of fancy
decoration of the temple, which supposedly is a humble
gesture towards some benign god, but in fact have a real
use value for human consumption, i.e. the enjoyment of
one's own riches. (§§718-719) This is perhaps Hegel's
ironic stance toward the (catholic) baroque churches and
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the conspicuous consumption of the believers' gifts (i.e.
taxation) by the papal power and his other beneficiaries.
Concluding, l maintain that Hegel makes an important
contribution to play theory, which I have tried to show in
elucidating different passages in the PhS. Particularly,
in declaring the self-moving Concept as play, as a
Bacchanalian revel, he has stepped outside the
logocentric" tradition (cf. Fink, 1977a; Desmond, 1992).
Furthermore, as Desmond (1986) points out correctly, Hegel
attempts to unite Schiller's Form- and Stof ftrieb and
Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian elements in the
artwork which Hegel determines as a concrete universal or a
spiritualization of the sensuous. As his discussion on
tragedy indicates, Hegel seeks the unity of the interplay
between knowledge and intuition (Apollo vs. Erinyes)
,
which
comes to the fore through the self-conscious, masked actor.
The player is thus "subject to the cunning of reason in
aesthetic form," in other words, he is subjected to the
interplay of freedom and necessity. (Desmond, 1986, p.63)
But I disagree with Desmond (1986) who denies that the
history of beauty for Hegel is a narrative of subsequent
failures; Desmond maintains that the unity of opposites
does bring about affirmation, namely positive, speculative
Reason! (1986, p.ll4)^^ Such closure is however not the
game of the cunning of reason. Butler (1987) has best
captured the playful "spirit" of the PhS, echoed in Zi2ek
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(1993), that absolute truth is the "dramatic integrity of a
comedy of errors." Hence, the PhS "is a study in fiction-
making which shows the essential role of fiction and false
belief in the quest for philosophical truth.
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l.Cf. Butler (1987) .
wii-h contradictions comes to the foreit his description of cultic practice, which is "asserious playing and a playful seriousness, a gravity that
.
(Philosophy of Religion
. Vol.I, p.ils) Heqelbreaks with Aristotle’s postulate of difkLntiitinrbetween play and seriousness. ^
History of Philosophy , Lectures1829/30, p. 299. ( Alles Spielerische achten wir nicht als
gegen die Form des Gedankenstiefer Stehendes .
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)
4.1.e. beiherspielend
.
5. On this point cf. McCumber (1993), who states thatHegel's own account of truth eliminates "from its domain
almost everything we would ordinarily call 'true'—thingslike sentences, propositions, and beliefs: Hegel is willing
to admit that sentences, propositions, and beliefs arebearers, but of 'correctness, ' a quality which coincides
with what the correspondence theory calls 'truth.'" (p.66)Hegel holds that this kind of truth which only seeks
correctness' has limits, insofar as it does not question
the tools (concepts, etc.) it uses for the analysis of
assertions, (cf. p.63) Despite the limitations of the
correspondence theory Hegel does not render it into
abstract negation.
I am grateful to Alison Brown for pointing out McCumber 's
book to me.
6.
Cf. Finlay (1977), p.xxix.
7.
A sentiment echoed by Nietzsche's fascination with
the mythic figure of the Hellenic noble warrior.
8.
The erotic absolute is marked by lack or
indeterminacy to be overcome over time. The agapeic
absolute, on the other hand, is overdetermined, infinite.
It cannot be mediated in the finite moment, (cf. 1992,
pp. 78-79)
9.
As David Farrell Krell put it in a different context
(cf
.
Krell, 1980, p. 23)
.
10.
With respect to Heraclitus's organization of the
oneness of opposite phenomena, Guerriere (1980) has
assembled a sixfold division: "The opposites are one (1) in
origin, (2) in cognitive coincidence, (3) in evaluative
coincidence, (4) in cyclic recurrence, (5) in evaluative
correlativity
,
and (6) in a dialectic of metaphors."
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Apollonian is merely representing the Dionysian in Birth
(P-15).
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philosophy as layed out in the Science of Logic—and as
introduction, the PhS has to narrate the 'road of despair,'
the necessary negation of absolute knowledge. (Maker, 1994,
cf. Chapter 3)
16.
Cf §47: "...the single shapes of Spirit do not
persist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are
as much positive and necessary moments, as they are
negative and evanescent."
17.
Cf. Otto (1933)
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18.
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System der Hegelschen Asthetik" (1986b) for a discussion of
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19.
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20.
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21.
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2
3.
Bremer, pp. 231-233.
2
4.
Bremer, p.238.
25.
Cf. Bremer, p.226.
200
26. Bremer, p.239.
27 . Curiously,
never mentions her
play.
as Patricia Mills (1987) notes, Hegel
suicide in his discussion of Sophocles's28.
Even though Hegel focuses here on Greek traaedv heemploys the Latin names (Ceres and Bacchus) instead of
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using Demeter and Dionysus for the gods of Hades.
29.
Bremer remarks that Hegel preempts Heidegger'sdiscovery of ^etheia as unforgetfullneL
.
30.
Bremer, p.232.
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the feminist responses (of Mills, 1986; Irigaray, 1985; and
Nussbaum, 1986) and notes that Hegel opposed the
patriarchical tendencies of the Greeks but nevertheless he
failed to note this bias in his own time, (p.86) Ravven
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her "Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists?") and avers
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40.
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that Desmond (1992) has revised his thoughts on this and
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sides with Butler by stating that theLogos
.
PhS is a mockery of
42 . Butler (1987)
,
p. 23
.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In my dissertation I have attempted to show that
Aristotle rather than Plato (pace Nietzsche) was guilty in
provoking a malediction of play so that play becomes the
Other of reason in western metaphysics. l show that
Aristotle functions as a "spoilsport" insofar as he breaks
with the sophist cunning and attributes to play an
instrumental value: it is good only for relaxation to
improve one's work afterwards and play qua child's play has
a recognizable value for moral education. But play has
intrinsic worth only when it is purged from excessive,
elements, i.e. when it is contained in a purely
Apollonian framework. Such purified, serious play is
called schole (leisure) in Aristotle's ethics.
In the three chapters which outline the conception of
play in the ancient Hellenic world, I contrast and compare
the play of thinkers and poets with that of Aristotle. I
note that in the pre-Socratic world of play, notably in
Homer and Heraclitus, playfulness is not yet cast in
opposition to the concept of seriousness. Furthermore, the
Dionysian and Apollonian play impulses are employed in
these narratives without being ontologically maligned. The
unity of opposites occurs
—
par excellence— in Heraclitus's
famous fragment on child's play (B52). Hesiod's fables
seem to introduce a work ethic alien to the Hellenic nobles
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and thus emphasizing an Apollonian, rationalistic play;
however, I contend that Hesiod's poetic style suggests a
fondness of Dionysian cunning in the trope of Pandora, so
that both elements inform his conception of play. m
Euripides's tragedies the Dionysian comes to the fore
again, for which he finds himself being ridiculed by
Aristophanes
.
In Plato we see a shift towards an ethical
polarization of play. Certain kinds of play are condoned
while others are cautioned against in mimetic
representations of reality. However, Plato's Socrates toys
with Dionysian playfulness, masquerades with Sileni and
Satyrs so that ultimately Plato's game is in a dialectic
tension between the Apollonian and Dionysian; Plato does
not want to discard either notion.
I pursue the Aristotelian thread of the malediction of
play in Kant's and Schiller's discussions of the concept
and function of play. In Kant, play has a self-referential
telos ("an sich angenehm")
. But in the first Critique play
is treated as a negative activity, referring to the "mere"
play of imagination. Play is neither knowledge, nor good
in itself. In Schiller, the purpose and differentiation of
play is more pronounced. He distinguishes between a
transcendental play-drive and a material play-drive,
favoring the more intellectual drive. Here he mirrors
Aristotle's ontological differentiation between the
theoretical and practical lives ( bios theoretikos vs. bios
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^ the Aristotelian malediction of
play has left its traces even in philosophers who endorse
play and put forth a play theory (e.g. Kant, Schiller etc.)
due to their (Apollonian) emphasis on subjectivism (ranking
player over play)
.
Beginning with Hegel non-subjectivist ludic
possibilities resurface and are cast in the tradition of
Heraclitus. m the trope of the Bacchanalian revel both
Apollonian and Dionysian impulses are dialectically
intertwined. Tragic play is thus put into the foreground
again. Hegel also re-conceptualizes the meaning of masks.
In exploring the question of masks, we need to
differentiate between the moment when they cover up
something and when they are used "dialectically", i.e. when
they are piled up. Such is the difference between Platonic
and Hegelian dialectics. Furthermore, Hegel's "cunning of
reason" promises a playful conflation of the ontological
dichotomies (of subject-object, appearance-reality, mind-
body)
.
At this point I want to raise the problem of whether
we can and should conceptualize an authentic play, a play
which occurs for its own sake (autotelic play)
. Can we
relegate play into a purely aesthetic realm? I would argue
against such absolute aestheticization
. After all, child's
play is usually recognized as useful, pedagogical, and play
for adults has its significance, too. If anything we have
to "work" at confounding the aesthetic and political realm.
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Political play (e.g. of theatre) employs masquerade to
elucidate. Play may have its own realm of truth (Gadamer)
,
but nevertheless it can shed light on philosophical "noble”
lies: it can allude at political corruption allegorically -
-exemplified by medieval court jesters, by Carneval's
masquerade (in the Rheinland it had the function to
ridicule the Prussian aristocracy) and also by the playful
figure of Zarathustra.
I briefly want to mention, that in Nietzsche—whose
play theory is beyond the scope of this dissertation—we
see important reversal: Dionysian wins out over Apollonian
play. What consequences, if any, does this ludic turn have
in philosophical discourse? Does play "succeed" in
contemporary post-metaphysical philosophy? in the
aftermath of Nietzsche, play has become a respectable
subject, since it has been advocated by "artist
metaphysicians" such as Fink, Gadamer and Deleuze,
following Nietzsche.
In this dissertation I have restricted myself to the
phenomenological discussion of play being in opposition to
seriousness. Another important dimension is the opposition
of play and work. Here I want to highlight briefly Marx's
contributions to play theory. Certainly, his philosophical
writings (e.g. the 1844 manuscripts) deal with play in an
important way and point out the meaningfulness of an
inherently playful life in which one can rid oneself from
alienated work. What is novel about Marx's theory is that
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he wants to show a way to overcome the dichotomy of
leisurely play and labor.
In a future project, l wish to sketch a proposal of a
materialist feminist play which uses the analytic tools of
the Marxist tradition (Marx, Benjamin, Marcuse) and
Nietzsche's (and Wittgenstein's) emphasis on
performativity. This approach would attempt to avoid
casting play and work as opposites and it would interrogate
whether or not it is more plausible to advocate "Zero
work", following Bob Black. In confronting and displacing
the warrior" mentality that is so prevalent in play
discourse one might turn to the play of the trickster or
coyote of the Navajo nation. Such an approach might lead
to a feminist re-interpretation of Dionysian powers and to
a parodic, subversive play of the world.
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APPENDIX
A DEFENSE OF THE DOMINANT END PARADIGM IN THE NICOMACHFAN
ETHICS
I find it pertinent to re-evaluate the ontological
status of play in Aristotle's ethics with respect to the
question whether play has an intrinsinc value or merely an
instrumental value. in the context of a study of
Aristotle's conception of paidia
. I wish to revisit the
ongoing debate of inclusive versus dominant ends vis-a-vis
the human good. (cf. NE X, 6-8) The inclusivist position
states that philosophy is indeed the highest-ranking
activity, yet other kinds of activities are equally
important in the pursuit of the final good. Opponents of
that view, myself included, contend that Aristotle advances
Intel lectual ist argument in NE, since he seriously
undermines the importance of the agathon of the social
virtues; this amounts to the malediction of the bios
pr.aktikos and the benediction of the bios theoretikos
. the
life of the solitary, self-sufficient philosopher.
Defenders of the inclusive-end theory dismiss Aristotle's
claim of the primacy of the philosophical life as
inconsistent with the role he attributes to practical
reason. However, I think that a dominant end
intellectualist tendency in Book X is not a mere aberration
but rather consistent with the rest of the NE. (Consider,
for instance, the claim of the superior ranking of the
208
dianoetical virtues over any other virtues in Book VI.)
Furthermore, I will use Aristotle's discussion of play to
suggest that the philosophical, leisurely life is superior
to the life of virtue and necessities.
In this appendix, I will discuss and critique Martha
Nussbaum's account on the human and divine in the
Nicomachean Ethics
. Her defense of the "inclusive end"
position exemplifies a common fallacy in Platonic and
Aristotelian scholarship."' Moreover, Nussbaum forcefully
and provocatively defends the inclusivist position to the
point of dismissing any passages, that invite a dominant
end interpretation, as being corrupt—an approach which I
find unsatisfactory.
In the appendix of her book The Fragility of
Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy .
Nussbaum provides a brief discussion of Book X of the
Nicomachean Ethics . She states provocatively that
Aristotle's writing has become "immeasurably shallow and
trivial"
—
provided that the "notorious" passages X.6-8 are
authentic. She avers that the overwhelming appearance of
Platonic thought in EN X is quite anomalous and
inconsistent with Aristotle's "mature ethical and political
writing", (p.377) out of sync with his ethical method, i.e.
his search for a "truth in phainomena" (p.291).^ Clearly
she takes an inclusivist position, which allows her to
argue that there are indeed many goods that are chosen for
their own sake, and each of them has a part in eudaimonia .
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Therefore, a contemplative activity can only be one
component of the good life, so that EN X with its claim of
the primacy of bios theoretikos [=the theoretical life]
over the practical life must be totally out of step with
the account of the EN as a whole. Yet Nussbaum
acknowledges that occasionally Aristotle does in fact rank
nous and ^phia over social virtues and scolds him in a
*3^^®i“^i'ttgensteinian fashion for producing a "universal
ranking of lives," which, she thinks, is also the fallacy
of Plato's Phaedrus (p.374). So if it were not for the
'odd' (Platonic or corrupt) passages in Book X, Aristotle,
on her view, advocates a compatibility of the bios
prakt ikos and bios theoretikos
. in my analysis of the
odd passages, I shall show that they are consistent with
Aristotle's predilection for the 'theoretical' life.
In EN VI, in which the intellectual or dianoetical
virtues are discussed, Aristotle argues explicitly against
an anthropocentrism which focuses merely on social and
political virtues. He writes: " atopon gar ei tis ten
politiken e ten phronesin spoudaiotaten oietai einai, ei me
to ariston ton en to kosmo anthropos estin ." (1141a20-2)
(my emphasis) The translation that Nussbaum chooses (for
"ei me") leaves this quote ambiguous - on purpose. She
writes "It is odd if one thinks that political excellence
and practical wisdom are the best things, if the human
being is not the best being in the universe." (my emphasis)
I do not think that Nussbaum can take the liberty to
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translate the "eijne" literally, i.e. with "if and
indicative, because it is not really grammatical in
English. It seems to me that the " ei me " suggests an
irrealis, which is best expressed by the German
Aristotelian scholar Dirlmeier: " Es sei denn. der
v^are das hochstwertiae Wesen im .. This
translation leaves us with a rhetorical solution implying
that we, of course, cannot imagine ourselves as being such
perfect beings. A conclusion which Nussbaum does not want
to draw for reasons obvious enough. My reading is
justified by the concluding remarks which Nussbaum does not
bother to quote as a further anomaly: "But if the argument
be that man is the best of the animals, this makes no
difference (=puden diapherei
^ ; for there are other things
much more divine in their nature even than man, e.g. most
conspicuously, the bodies of which the heavens are framed."
(1141a33—b2) If we take this admonishment seriously, we
infer that though a human being is not the most divine
creature— it still is not ruled out that a person has no
divine element at all. (cf. EN X 1177b26; Met. 982b28-
982a5) And since sophia is here favorably ranked against
every other virtue, it may be implied that sophia
. if any
virtue, has at least part in the divine. Why else, one
should ask, does Aristotle bring up the theological issue
in this book, if not to pave the way to the "God's eye"
view of sophia in EN IX and X?
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— nous, says Aristotle, are indeed "by
nature"^ the highest or most honored goods (ton
timiotaton, VI 1141b3)\ since they not only strive
towards the divine, but they are, as we will see in EN X,
the divine (in the human being). Aristotle goes on to
point out that we call Anaxagoras and Thales wise because
"they know things that are remarkable, admirable,
difficult, and divine f daimonia]
,
but useless; viz. because
it is not human goods that they seek." l do not think that
the concession of their lack of praxis diminishes the value
of their philosophical activity, considering what has been
attributed to the dianoetical virtues above.
Nussbaum does not want to concede that when Aristotle
gives sophia a higher ranking than phronesis
. this could
possibly lead towards a defense of the intellectual and
anti-anthropocentric position and hence could counter her
context-relativity theory, a theory that she is very
unwilling to give up. Therefore, she holds that what
Aristotle really means is that sophia is simply a part of
eudaimonia . ^ However, I would contend that sophia plays a
more prominent role in bringing about happiness; I
interpret sophia as a causa formalis because it takes part
in actualizing the highest good. It is worth quoting the
whole passage to make this point clear:
. .
.
[phronesis and sophia] do produce something,
not as the art of medicine produces health [causa
efficiens] but as health produces a healthy state
[causa formalis] ; so does sophia produce
eudaimonia; for being a part of virtue as a
whole, by being possessed and by actualizing
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Clearly, the highest happiness cannot come about
without the activity of spphia. This definition seems to
provide the implicit answer - though inclusivists will
disagree - to the argument of EN I: "The good is the
activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if
there
_
are more than one virtue
, in accordance with the best
and most perfect ." (1098al6ff. my emphasis) Hence, sophia
is not just any intrinsic virtue which makes eudaimonia
possible, but it is the highest. This does not, however,
mean that without sophia it is not possible to be happy, it
means that without it there will be only a lower kind
of happiness.
There is a further objection I would like to bring up
in regard to Nussbaum's treatment of sophia and phronesis .
She writes that practical wisdom has to deal with things in
empirical reality whereas sophia does not. I am not so
sure if phronesis is really commensurable with pragmatism
as opposed to intellectualism. If her account is true,
then Aristotle's answer to the problem, whether phronesis
is useful, simply seems odd. He replies that it is a
necessary good which has to be chosen even if it does not
produce anything. (1144al-3)
Consider the disposition of a phronimos who, according
to Nussbaum, has a "thoroughly anthropocentric
standpoint"*^. On the elevated level of a nomothetes , a
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legislator, he is portrayed by Aristotle as so perfect that
he IS always guided by dianoia (EN X.9 1181a2)
. This
description implies that the phronimos is totally removed
from Eathe , from bodily pleasures (1153a29-34) by whom he
IS not at all troubled, in contrast to, for instance, the
encratic person.^ Hence, the phronimos seems
suspiciously fortunate in a sense similar to that in which
the spphos is - free of affection, of troublesome aloaon .
which only inhibits the perfect pursuit of eudaimonia
. if
we take the phronimos in his ideal position, i.e. as
nomothetes and not as common politician, then we might find
that this is not exactly a trait of character that "hoi
polloi" possess. Although Aristotle ranks the phronimos
under the sophos
,
they both exemplify, more than any other
human being, the dianoetical virtues. Marten (1988) notes
that phronesis is in fact a special kind of reason, namely,
one that never lends itself to the actualizing of non-
virtuous goals. A phronimos then does not simply use it in
an instrumental way. He writes: " Phronesis may be a
character trait of a person, who is considered to be
ethically superior, yet it is hardly an organ that is of
any service to him, because this would produce two
alternative possibilities, in principle: to act toward the
Good or toward the Bad (or toward the Beautiful toward
the Ugly)." (p.l62, his emphasis)
Nussbaum claims that philia is stated as an intrinsic
good that is pursued for its own sake; furthermore, in
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order to be an eudaimon, a person has to have friends.
This position is apparently contradicted by Aristotle's
finding in EN X. She notes that contemplation is a
solitary activity and is explicitly said to contribute to
the eudaimonia of the sophos in a most perfect way. This
emphatic message, uttered in the last book, is troublesome
to her, because it will not justify an inclusivist reading
of the ergon argument in EN I.
However, Nussbaum, by arguing for the intrinsic value
of Ehilia, misses the point that those values are also
subjected to the ontological hierarchy of the Good or
Happiness in Plato and Aristotle. As Brentlinger (1970)
notes
:
Plato's hierarchy is not a hierarchy of merely
instrumental goods leading to the Good; it is a
hierarchy of intrinsic goods. Each member of the
hierarchy is less good, hence less worthy of
love, than any member above it; and each depends
on the highest good for what goodness and beauty
it has. Yet since each is beautiful and
satisfying (in its limited, imperfect way), each
is (in its limited, imperfect way) intrinsically
good. (p.l23)
Aristotle explicitly says that pleasure and utility in a
friendship are of inferior nature, but that does not mean
friendship itself is not an intrinsic virtue. But what is
the "true" (or more perfect) nature of philia ? In two
separate passages in EN IX, which incidentally deal with
the special case of philautia (self-love) and are not
discussed by Nussbaum, one discovers that the purest form
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of this Ehilia is love of reason: One has to love reason
and gratify it. (1168b33)
One's living and loving in the service of rationality
does not necessarily entail a radical singularity (in an
existentialist sense)
,
but it can be done with other good
persons qua theoretikoi; "[the philosopher] can perhaps
[contemplate] better if he has fellow-workers." (Il77a34)
That these should be some sort of soul-mates or close
friends should be taken for granted.
In order to substantiate my argument for the
dominating intellectualism in the EN, I will analyze the
first two of five arguments for the self-love of the good
person, because they shed light upon that feature which is
supposed to be the most human and essential part. (cf. EN
IX. 4 1166al4-23)
(1) The spoudaios . who is the true metron of self-
love, wishes for himself what is good and does good— for
his sake (heautou heneka)
. To make sure that this is only
for a dominant end, Aristotle adds "for the sake of the
intellectual element (=dianoetikon) in him" because—as
they say (=dokei) — "this is man himself." This subclause
is translated by Dirlmeier more freely in the following
convincing wording: "(urn des Denkens willen)
,
das als das
eigentliche Selbst des Menschen gilt." Similarly, Plato
praises the dianoetical aspect of humans in the Republic
(Book IX)
.
Why now does Nussbaum not find this passage in
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the first Ehilautia-chapter peculiar, considering the
enormous elevation of the intellect?
(2) The good person wishes for herself the flourishing
of life, yet this wish does not, surprisingly, refer only
to her rational faculty—and not to the part in her that
has feelings, or which reminds her of her animality. it
would be nonsensical to infer from the particular status of
reason that the good person would choose to become god,
since the principle of " anthropos anthropon aenna '* would be
violated. Furthermore, humans unlike God are of complex,
dualistic nature. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that,
according to Aristotle, intellect is more than anything
else "man himself". We get a similar phrasing as above in
(1), yet with more emphasis: "doxeie d'an to nooun hekastos
einai e malista" (literally meaning: "at least the most";
my emphasis)
.
Clearly, Aristotle cannot do without Plato's dualistic
concept, the hierarchical order of the logistikon and the
epithymetikon
.
or the ontological primacy of the soul qua
intellect over the body. One cannot deny, whether we like
the theological tenor of EN X or not, that we are already
in EN IX confronted with the intellectual oikeion of
humans. That this is the authentic property of persons, is
the message of the second philautia-chapter (EN IX. 8).
Nous is singled out as the most authoritative ( to
kuriotaton ) component in humans. (1168b31-33)
Nous
.
as the "highest and best" good, rules over the
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thymeidic part of the soul, so that we become encratic and
are in control of our passions. This, again, is a very
Platonic image, since intellect is interwoven with the
"passionate" part, the thumos
. in order to achieve
continence. No other justification for the ruling function
of the nous is given than the now familiar phrase of the
identity of nous with "man". (Il68b35) Note that Aristotle
drops here, and in the following, the term dokei or doxeie .
The primacy of the intellect is no longer stated as a mere
opinion but as an undeniable certainty: "That this (logos
or nous) is the man himself or is so more than anything
(e malista)
,
is certain ( ouk adelon ^ .
"
(Il69a2)
Accordingly, every other life, which is not in total
conformity with rationality, is devalued. Aristotle urges
us to differentiate between a life kata logon and that
which only appears to be such a life, but is rather
inauthentic or "a-logical', a life kata pathos . To put it
into an ethical context, only the spoudaios will make the
right choice as to which life to lead, whereas the kakos
(or hoi polloi ) will be barred from such a decision and
inevitably be trapped in an animality at the expense of
rationality. There is no love in the wicked, since they
have not learned to love reason.® This condescending tone
against hedonists can easily be extended to playful
children, and women, i.e. all those who do not esteem
rationality high enough. Such play has intrinsic value
however for Aristotle it is not ranked highly—certainly.
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not as high as leisure. As the theophilia
-chFip-t-P>-r in en X
proclaims: it is the philosopher, who is the only one who
is loved by the gods, since he understands that he must
love that which is dearest to them, namely nous. (1179a22-
32) So he is most able to engage in leisurely—non-
playful!—studies (cf. Chapter IV).
Even without taking crucial passages of the
Metaphysics into consideration, we can say that Aristotle
seems to be aiming towards a defense of rationality and a
theoretical life. "Man" does not only have reason
authentically but always is reason, in a sense. This
radical equation is not true in the case of human bodies.’
A body is proper (oikeion) to "man" inauthentically
,
which
is to say, "man" has a body, but it is false to say that
the body belongs to that which man (essentially) is. (cf.
• X,9^°) It follows that what characterizes "man" qua
"man" is indeed not the human in him, but the divine, i.e.
theoretical reason. (EN X.7 1178 a5-7) As Marten (1988)
emphatically declares: "This unity of having and being
belongs solely to Reason. Man qua man is intrinsically,
from an Aristotelian standpoint, not in possession of feet,
neither of his sexual organs, but solely in possession of
Reason: he has it and he is it; he is nothing else."^^
This statement has to be qualified, though; it is only the
philosopher who is Reason in the most complete sense.
After all, the hierarchical structure can not be upset and
ontological exclusions remain in place. For Aristotle,
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children certainly are deprived of nous
, since they cannot
(yet) distinguish play and serious matters, (cf. EN X.6)
Equally, women’^ and slaves do not adequately act in
accordance with reason; the latter do not even possess nous
but can only react obediently to the noetic order of their
masters, (cf. Pol
.
I254b22)
Although Nussbaum's appeal to context-relativity is
certainly relevant for the EN (e.g. with respect to the use
of schole ) , I find it problematic that she does not notice
^ defense of the intellectual life throughout
Aristotle's ethics. To simply claim that the last book of
the EN is corrupt and out of context, along with certain
passages in EN vi, is no satisfactory answer to this
pi'oblem. I do not believe that any book or chapter can be
left out and labelled as anomalous. We have to see that
the Nicomachean Ethics is indeed a unique composition; it
has an intended beginning and ending, unlike other opera of
Aristotle (excluding the Topics ) . Furthermore, as Gigon
(1985) has pointed out, the EN has a carefully orchestrated
architectonic structure with the dianoetic virtues as the
center piece and culminating in theoria as the highest
virtue
.
Finally, it is noteworthy that Aristotle repeats his
arguments on the distinction between pastime-play and
philosophical leisure in the Politics (Book VII) . This is
yet another reason why the "odd" passages should not easily
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be dismissed. Play thus proves "authenticity" of the
contested passages in Book X of the NE.
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Notes
I. I owe this point to John Brentlinger, and I will usehis analysis of the ontological order in the discussion of
1970)^^^^^ instrumental value below, (cf. Brentlinger,
2.
To emphasize this discrepancy she employs the
expression "odd" in various configurations. She uses it
over six times deliberately as a pun to the "atopon gar"(1141 a20) - a topos where Aristotle defends
intellectual ism.
3.
"By nature" always raises suspicion that it does not
really mean "by human nature", but in fact, it points to
that which is most essential, i.e. divine about a human
being.
4.
Note that this clearly Platonic term is already used
in EN 1.1102 a20 ( to timion kai theion ^
.
5.
Nussbaum, p.375.
e.Nussbaum, p.372.
7. On this point, cf. Rorty (1980), p.274.
8. This rather inhumane condemnation has an interesting
parallel feature in the dystychisms of the "Sermon on the
Mount", Luke 6, 20-26.
9. On this point, cf. Marten (1988), pp.94.
10. "For man is here being considered on his material
side, and mattter does not create a difference, for it does
not make individual men species of man, though the flesh
and the bones of which this man and that man consist are
other." (Met. 1058b5-8)
II. Marten, p.95.
12. In this ontological tradition we find Kant, who
says that a woman is not able to actualize the categorical
imperative
:
"Die Tugend des Frauenzimmers ist eine schone Tugend. Die
des mannlichen Geschlechtes soil eine edele Tugend sein.
Sie werden das Bose vermeiden, nicht weil es ungerecht,
sondern weil es hasslich ist...Ich glaube schwerlich, dass
das schone Geschlecht der Grundsatze fahig sei." (from:
Beobachtunqen iiber das Gefiihl des Schonen und Erhabenen ,
II, 854f.)
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